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This is the 7th World Happiness Report. The first
was released in April 2012 in support of a UN High
level meeting on “Wellbeing and Happiness:
Defining a New Economic Paradigm”. That report
presented the available global data on national
happiness and reviewed related evidence from the
emerging science of happiness, showing that the
quality of people’s lives can be coherently, reliably,
and validly assessed by a variety of subjective
well-being measures, collectively referred to then
and in subsequent reports as “happiness.” Each
report includes updated evaluations and a range
of commissioned chapters on special topics
digging deeper into the science of well-being, and
on happiness in specific countries and regions.
Often there is a central theme. This year we focus
on happiness and community: how happiness has
been changing over the past dozen years, and
how information technology, governance and
social norms influence communities.
The world is a rapidly changing place. Among
the fastest changing aspects are those relating
to how people communicate and interact with
each other, whether in their schools and workplaces, their neighbourhoods, or in far-flung
parts of the world. In last year’s report, we
studied migration as one important source of
global change, finding that each country’s life
circumstances, including the social context and
political institutions were such important sources
of happiness that the international ranking of
migrant happiness was almost identical to that of
the native born. This evidence made a powerful
case that the large international differences in
life evaluations are driven by the differences in
how people connect with each other and with
their shared institutions and social norms.
This year after presenting our usual country
rankings of life evaluations, and tracing the
evolution since 2005 of life evaluations, positive
affect, negative affect, and our six key explanatory
factors, we consider more broadly some of the
main forces that influence happiness by changing
the ways in which communities and their members
interact with each other. We deal with three sets
of factors:
1. links between government and happiness
(Chapters 2 and 3),
2. the power of prosocial behaviour (Chapter 4),
and
3. changes in information technology
(Chapters 5-7).

Chapter 2 examines empirical linkages between
a number of national measures of the quality of
government and national average happiness.
Chapter 3 reverses the direction of causality,
and asks how the happiness of citizens affects
whether and how people participate in voting.
The second special topic, covered in Chapter 4,
is generosity and pro-social behaviour, important
because of its power to demonstrate and create
communities that are happy places to live.
The third topic, covered by three chapters, is
information technology. Chapter 5 discusses the
happiness effects of digital technology use,
Chapter 6 deals with big data, while Chapter 7
describes an epidemic of mass addictions in
the United States, expanding on the evidence
presented in Chapter 5.

Happiness and Government
Governments set the institutional and policy
framework in which individuals, businesses and
governments themselves operate. The links
between the government and happiness operate
in both directions: what governments do affects
happiness (discussed in Chapter 2), and in turn
the happiness of citizens in most countries
determines what kind of governments they
support (discussed in Chapter 3). It is sometimes
possible to trace these linkages in both directions.
We can illustrate these possibilities by making
use of separate material from national surveys by
the Mexican national statistical agency (INEGI),
and kindly made available for our use by Gerardo
Leyva, INEGI’s director of research.1
The effects of government actions on happiness
are often difficult to separate from the influences
of other things happening at the same time.
Unravelling may sometimes be made easier by
having measures of citizen satisfaction in various
domains of life, with satisfaction with local and
national governments treated as separate
domains. For example, Figure 1.1 shows domain
satisfaction levels in Mexico for twelve different
domains of life measured in mid-year in 2013,
2017 and 2018. The domains are ordered by their
average levels in the 2018 survey, in descending
order from left to right. For Mexicans, domain
satisfaction is highest for personal relationships
and lowest for citizen security. The high levels of
satisfaction with personal relationships echoes a
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more general Latin American finding in last
year’s chapter on the social foundations of
happiness in Latin America.
Our main focus of attention is on satisfaction with
the nation as a whole, which shows significant
changes from year to year. Satisfaction with the
country fell by about half a point between 2013
and 2017, with a similarly sized increase from 2017
to 2018. These changes, since they are specific to
satisfaction with the national government, can
reflect both the causes and the immediate
consequences of the 2018 national election. As
shown in Chapter 3, citizen unhappiness has
been found to translate into voting against the
incumbent government, and this link is likely
even stronger when the dissatisfaction is focused
in particular on the government. Consistent with
this evidence from other countries and elections,
the incumbent Mexican government lost the
election. Despite the achievements of the
administration in traditionally relevant fields,
such as economic activity and employment,
mirrored by sustained satisfaction with those
domains of life, the public seemed to feel angry
and fed up with political leaders, who were
perceived as being unable to solve growing

inequalities, corruption, violence and insecurity.
When the election went the way these voters
wished, then this arguably led to an increase in
their life satisfaction, as noted by the AMLO
spike in Figure 1.2.
The Mexican data thus add richness to the linkages
from domain happiness to voting behaviour by
showing a post-election recovery of satisfaction
with the nation to the levels of 2013. As shown
by Figure 1.1, post-election satisfaction with the
government shows a recovery of 0.5 points from
its 2017 level, returning to its level in 2013. It
nonetheless remains at a low level compared to
all other domains except personal security. The
evidence in Figure 1.1 thus suggests that unhappiness with government triggers people to vote
against the government, and that the outcomes
of elections are reflected in levels of post-election
satisfaction. This is revealed by Figure 1.2, which
shows the movements of overall life satisfaction,
on a quarterly basis, from 2013 to 2018.
Three particular changes are matched by spikes
in life satisfaction, upwards from the introduction
of free long distance calls in 2015 and the election
in 2018, and downwards from the rise in fuel

Fig 1.1: Domain Satisfaction in Mexico
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Fig 1.2: Life Satisfaction in Mexico
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prices in 2017. Two features of the trends in life
satisfaction are also worth noting. First is the
temporary nature of the spikes, none of which
seems to have translated into a level change of
comparable magnitude. The second is that the
data show a fairly sustained upward trend,
indicating that lives as a whole were gradually
getting better even as dissatisfaction was growing
with some aspects of life being attributed to
government failure. Thus the domain satisfaction
measures themselves are key to understanding
and predicting the electoral outcome, since life
satisfaction as a whole was on an upward trend
(although falling back in the first half of 2018)
despite the increasing dissatisfaction with
government. Satisfaction with government will
be tested in Chapter 2, along with other indicators
of the quality of government, as factors associated
with rising or falling life satisfaction in the much
larger set of countries in the Gallup World Poll.
It will be shown there that domain satisfaction
with government and World Bank measures of
governmental quality both have roles to play in
explaining changes in life evaluations within
countries over the period 2005 through 2018.
The Mexican data provide, with their quite
specific timing and trends, evidence that the
domain satisfaction measures are influencing
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life satisfaction and electoral outcomes, above
and beyond influences flowing in the reverse
direction, or from other causes.

Happiness and Community:
The Importance of Pro-Sociality
Generosity is one of the six key variables used in
this Report to explain differences in average life
evaluations. It is clearly a marker for a sense of
positive community engagement, and a central
way that humans connect with each other.
Chapter 4 digs into the nature and consequences
of human prosociality for the actor to provide
a close and critical look at the well-being
consequences of generous behaviour. The
chapter combines the use of survey data, to
show the generality of the positive linkage
between generosity and happiness, with
experimental results used to demonstrate the
existence and strength of likely causal forces
running in both directions.
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Happiness and Digital Technology
In the final chapters we turn to consider three
major ways in which digital technology is changing
the ways in which people come to understand
their communities, navigate their own life paths,
and connect with each other, whether at work or
play. Chapter 5 looks at the consequences of
digital use, and especially social media, for the
happiness of users, and especially young users,
in the United States. Several types of evidence
are used to link rising use of digital media with
falling happiness. Chapter 6 considers more
generally how big data are expanding the ways
of measuring happiness while at the same time
converting what were previously private data
about locations, activities and emotions into
records accessible to many others. These data in
turn influence what shows up when individuals
search for information about the communities in
which they live. Finally, Chapter 7 returns to the
US focus of Chapter 5, and places internet
addiction in a broader range of addictions found
to be especially prevalent in the United States.
Taken as a group, these chapters suggest that
while burgeoning information technologies have
ramped up the scale and complexities of human
and virtual connections, they also risk the quality
of social connections in ways that are not yet
fully understood, and for which remedies are not
yet at hand.

Looking Ahead
We finish this overview with a preview of what is
to be found in each of the following chapters:
Chapter 2 Changing World Happiness, by
John Helliwell, Haifang Huang and Shun Wang,
presents the usual national rankings of life
evaluations, supplemented by global data on
how life evaluations, positive affect and negative
affect have evolved on an annual basis since
2006. The sources of these changes are
investigated, with the six key factors being
supplemented by additional data on the nature
and changes in the quality of governance at the
global and country-by-country levels. This is
followed by attempts to quantify the links
between various features of national government
and average national life evaluations.

Chapter 3 Happiness and Voting Behaviour, by
George Ward, considers whether a happier
population is any more likely to vote, to support
governing parties, or support populist authoritarian
candidates. The data suggest that happier
people are both more likely to vote, and to vote
for incumbents when they do so. The evidence
on populist voting is more mixed. Although
unhappier people seem to hold more populist
and authoritarian attitudes, it seems difficult to
adequately explain the recent rise in populist
electoral success as a function of rising
unhappiness - since there is little evidence of
any recent drop in happiness levels. The chapter
suggests that recent gains of populist politicians
may have more to do with their increased ability
to successfully chime with unhappy voters, or be
attributable to other societal and cultural factors
that may have increased the potential gains from
targeting unhappy voters.
Chapter 4 Happiness and Prosocial Behavior: An
Evaluation of the Evidence, by Lara Aknin, Ashley
Whillans, Michael Norton and Elizabeth Dunn,
shows that engaging in prosocial behavior
generally promotes happiness, and identifies the
conditions under which these benefits are most
likely to emerge. Specifically, people are more
likely to derive happiness from helping others
when they feel free to choose whether or how to
help, when they feel connected to the people
they are helping, and when they can see how
their help is making a difference. Examining more
limited research studying the effects of generosity
on both givers and receivers, the authors suggest
that prosocial facilitating autonomy and social
connection for both givers and receivers may
offer the greatest benefits for all.
Chapter 5 The Sad State of US Happiness and
the Role of Digital Media, by Jean Twenge,
documents the increasing amount of time US
adolescents spend interacting with electronic
devices, and presents evidence that it may have
displaced time once spent on more beneficial
activities, contributing to increased anxiety and
declines in happiness. Results are presented
showing greater digital media use to predict
lower well-being later, and randomly assigned
people who limit or cease social media use
improve their well-being. In addition, the increases
in teen depression after smartphones became
common after 2011 cannot be explained by low
well-being causing digital media use.

Chapter 6 Big Data and Well-Being, by Paul
Frijters and Clément Bellet, asks big questions
about big data. Is it good or bad, old or new, is
it useful for predicting happiness, and what
regulation is needed to achieve benefits and
reduce risks? They find that recent developments
are likely to help track happiness, but to risk
increasing complexity, loss in privacy, and
increased concentration of economic power.
Chapter 7 Addiction and Unhappiness in
America, by Jeffrey D. Sachs, situates the
decline of American well-being in the context
of a mass-addiction society. A variety of
interrelated evolutionary, socioeconomic,
physiological, and regulatory factors are
associated with rising addiction rates across
areas including drugs and alcohol, food and
obesity, and internet usage. The United States’
historical failure to implement public health
policies that emphasize well-being over
corporate interests must be addressed to
respond to the addiction epidemic. Effective
interventions might include a rapid scale-up
of publicly financed mental health services
and increased regulation of the prescriptive
drug industry and other addictive products
and activities.
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Endnotes
1	Figures 1.1 and 1.2 are drawn from a presentation given
by Gerardo Leyva during the 2° Congreso Internacional
de Psicología Positiva “La Psicología y el Bienestar”,
November 9-10, 2018, hosted by the Universidad
Iberoamericana, in Mexico City and in the “Foro
Internacional de la Felicidad 360”, November 2-3, 2018,
organized by Universidad TecMilenio in Monterrey, México.
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Haifang Huang
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Professor, KDI School of Public Policy and Management
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Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Jon Hall, Richard Layard, Max Norton, Hugh Shiplett,
and Meik Wiking.
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Introduction
In the first World Happiness Report we surveyed
a wide range of available data. The Gallup World
Poll surveys covering 2005-2011 gave the widest
international coverage. Now, seven years later,
we have twice as many years of data from the
Gallup World Poll, giving us a sufficient time
span to consider how our principal measures of
happiness, and their main supporting factors,
have evolved from 2005 through 2018.
The chapter therefore starts with a presentation
of the evolution of annual data at the global and
regional levels for three key happiness measures
– life evaluations, positive affect, and negative
affect over the whole course of the Gallup World
Poll from 2005 through 2018. For all our plots of
annual data, we combine the surveys in 2005
and 2006, because of the small number of
countries in the first year.1
The title of this chapter is intentionally ambiguous,
designed to document not just the year-to-year
changes in happiness, but also to consider how
happiness has been affected by changes in the
quality of government. After our review of how
world happiness has been changing since the
start of the Gallup World Poll, we turn to present
our rankings and analysis of the 2016-2018
average data for our three measures of subjective
well-being plus the six main variables we use to
explain their international differences. See
Technical Box 1 for the precise definitions of all
nine variables.
For our country-by-country analysis of changes,
we report changes from 2005-2008 to 2016-2018,
grouping years together to provide samples of
sufficient size. We shall also provide estimates of
the extent to which each of the six key explanatory
variables contributed to the actual changes in life
evaluations from 2005-2008 to 2016-2018.
We then complete the chapter with our latest
evidence on the links between changes in the
quality of government, by a variety of measures,
and changes in national average life evaluations
over the 2005-2018 span of years covered by the
Gallup World Poll.

The Evolution of World Happiness
2005-2018
In recent previous reports, we presented bar
charts showing for the world as a whole, and for
each of 10 global regions, the distribution of
answers to the Cantril ladder question asking
respondents to value their lives today on a 0 to
10 scale, with the worst possible life as a 0 and
the best possible life as a 10. This gave us a
chance to compare happiness levels and inequality
in different parts of the world. Populationweighted average life evaluations differed
significantly among regions, being highest in
North America and Oceania, followed by Western
Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean,
Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth
of Independent States, East Asia, Southeast Asia,
the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia, in that order. We found
that well-being inequality, as measured by the
standard deviation of the distributions of individual
life evaluations, was lowest in Western Europe,
North America and Oceania, and South Asia; and
greatest in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa,
and the Middle East and North Africa.2
This year we shift our focus from the levels and
distribution of well-being to consider their
evolution over the years since the start of the
Gallup World Poll. We now have twice as many
years of coverage from the Gallup World Poll as
were available for the first World Happiness
Report in 2012. This gives us a better chance
to see emerging happiness trends from 2005
through 2018, and to investigate what may
have contributed to them.
First we shall show the population-weighted
trends3, based on annual samples for the world
as a whole, and for ten component regions, for
each of our three main happiness measures: life
evaluations, positive affect, and negative affect.
As described in Technical Box 1, the life evaluation
used is the Cantril Ladder, which asks survey
respondents to place the status of their lives on
a “ladder” scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0
means the worst possible life and 10 the best
possible life. Positive affect comprises the
average frequency of happiness, laughter and
enjoyment on the previous day, and negative
affect comprises the average frequency of worry,
sadness and anger on the previous day. The
affect measures thus lie between 0 and 1.
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favoured the largest countries, as confirmed by
The three panels of Figure 2.1 show the global
the third line, which shows a population-weighted
and regional trajectories for life evaluations,
average for all countries in the world except the
positive affect, and negative affect. The whiskers
on the lines in all figures indicate 95% confidence five countries with the largest populations – China,
India, Indonesia, the United States and Russia.4
intervals for the estimated means. The first panel
shows the evolution of life evaluations measured
The individual trajectories for these largest
three different ways. Among the three lines, two
countries are shown in Figure 1 of Statistical
lines cover the whole world population, with one
Appendix 1, while their changes from 2005-2008
of the two weighting the country averages by
to 2016-2018 are shown later in this chapter, in
each country’s share of the world population,
Figure 2.8. Even with the largest countries
and the other being an unweighted average of
removed, the population-weighted average does
the individual national averages. The unweighted
not rise as fast as the unweighted average,
average is always above the weighted average,
suggesting that smaller countries have had
especially after 2015, when the weighted average greater happiness growth since 2015 than have
starts to drop significantly, while the unweighted
the larger countries.
average starts to rise equally sharply. This
suggests that the recent
trends
have not
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The second panel of Figure 2.1 shows positive
affect over the same period as used in the first
panel. There is no significant trend in either the
weighted or unweighted series. The populationweighted series show slightly but significantly
more positive affect than does the unweighted
series, showing that positive affect is on average
higher in the larger countries.

with about 80% of its population in the United
States. The weighted average, heavily influenced
by the U.S. experience, has fallen more than 0.4
points from its pre-crisis peak to 2018, about on
a par with Western Europe. The lower line shows
that average happiness in Latin America and the
Caribbean rose without much pause until a peak
in 2013, with a continuing decline since then.

The third panel of Figure 2.1 shows negative
affect, which follows a quite different path from
positive affect. The population-weighted world
frequency of negative affect in 2005-2006 is
about one-third of the frequency of positive
affect. Negative affect is lower for the weighted
series, just as positive affect is greater. Both the
weighted and unweighted series show significant
upward trends in negative affect starting in 2010
or 2011. The global weighted measure of negative
affect rises by more than one-quarter from 2010
to 2018, from a frequency of 22% to 28%. This
global total, striking as it is, masks a great deal of
difference among global regions, as will be
shown later in Figure 2.4.

The third panel shows quite different evolutions
of life evaluations in the three parts of Asia, with
South Asia showing a drop of a full point, from
5.1 to 4.1 on the 0 to 10 scale, driven mainly by
the experience of India, given its dominant share
of South Asian population. Southeast Asia and
East Asia, in contrast, have had generally rising
life evaluations over the period. Southeast and
South Asia had the same average life evaluations
in 2005-2006, but the gap between them was
up to 1.3 points by 2018. Happiness in East Asia
was worst hit in the economic crisis years, but
has since posted a larger overall gain than
Southeast Asia to end the period at similar levels.

The four panels of Figure 2.2 show the evolution
of life evaluations in ten global regions, divided
into four continental groupings.5 In each case the
averages are adjusted for sampling and population
weights. The first panel has three lines, one each
for Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe,
and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). All three groups of countries show average
life evaluations that fell in the wake of the 20072008 financial crash, with the falls being greatest
in Western Europe, then in the CIS, with only a
slight drop in Central and Eastern Europe. The
post-crash happiness recovery started first in the
CIS, then in Central and Eastern Europe, while in
Western Europe average life evaluations only
started recovering in 2015. CIS evaluations rose
almost to the level of those in Central and
Eastern Europe by 2014, but have since fallen,
while those in Central and Eastern Europe have
continued to rise, parallelling the post-2015 rise
in Western Europe. The overall pattern is one of
happiness convergence among the three parts of
Europe, but with a recent large gap opening up
between Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS.
The second panel of Figure 2.2 covers the
Americas. The upper line shows the North
America+ANZ country grouping comprising the
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand,

Finally, the fourth panel of Figure 2.2 contains
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with MENA dropping
fairly steadily, and SSA with no overall trend. In
all regions there is a variety of country experiences
underlying the averages reported in Figure 2.2.
The country-by-country data are reported in the
on-line statistical data, and the country changes
from 2005-2008 to 2016-2018 shown later in
Figure 2.8 will help to reveal the national sources
of the regional trends.
The four panels of Figures 2.3 and 2.4 have the
same structure as Figure 2.2, with life evaluations
being replaced by positive affect in Figure 2.3
and by negative affect in Figure 2.4. Figure 2.3
shows that positive affect is generally falling in
Western Europe, and falling and then rising in
both Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS,
achieving its highest levels at the end of the
period. This pattern of partial convergence of
positive affect between the two parts of Europe
leaves positive affect still significantly more
frequent in Western Europe. Within the Americas,
the incidence of positive affect is generally
falling, at about the same rates in both the
NA-ANZ region (with most of the population
weight being on the United States), and in Latin
America. Positive affect is fairly stable and at
similar levels in East and Southeast Asia, while
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Figure 2.3: Dynamics of Positive Affect in 10 Regions
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The Evolution of Happiness Inequality
In this section we focus our attention on changes
in the distribution of happiness. There are at least
two reasons for us to do this. First, it is important
to consider not just average happiness in a
community or country, but also how it is
distributed. Second, it is done to encourage
those interested in inequality to consider
happiness inequality as a useful umbrella
measure. Most studies of inequality have focused
on inequality in the distribution of income and
wealth,6 while in Chapter 2 of World Happiness
Report 2016 Update we argued that just as
income is too limited an indicator for the overall
quality of life, income inequality is too limited
a measure of overall inequality.7 For example,
inequalities in the distribution of health8 have
effects on life satisfaction above and beyond those
flowing through their effects on income. We and
others have found that the effects of happiness
equality are often larger and more systematic than
those of income inequality. For example, social
trust, often found to be lower where income
inequality is greater, is even more closely connected
to the inequality of subjective well-being.9

Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of global inequality
of happiness, as measured by the standard
deviation of the distribution of the individual life
evaluations on the 0 to 10 scale, from 2005-2006
to 2018. The upper line illustrates the trend of
overall inequality, showing a clear increase since
2007. We further decompose overall inequality
into two components: one for within-country
inequality, and another for between-country
inequality. The figure shows that inequality within
countries follows the same increasing trend as
overall inequality, while between-country
inequality has increased only slightly. In summary,
global happiness inequality, measured by the
standard deviation of Cantril Ladder, has been
increasing, driven mainly by increasing happiness
inequality within countries.
Figure 2.6 shows that the inequality of happiness
has evolved quite differently in the ten global
regions. The inequality of happiness rose between
2006 and 2012 in Western Europe, and has been
falling steadily since, while in Central and Eastern
Europe it has followed a similar path but starting
from a higher starting point and falling faster.
Inequality in the CIS region follows somewhat
the reverse pattern, being stable at first and

Figure 2.5: Dynamics of Inequality of Ladder (Standard Deviation)
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indicated by the Cantril ladder. Rather, we use
the six variables to explain the variation of
happiness across countries. We shall also show how
measures of experienced well-being, especially
positive affect, supplement life circumstances in
explaining higher life evaluations.
In Table 2.1 we present our latest modeling of
national average life evaluations and measures of
positive and negative affect (emotion) by country
and year.10 For ease of comparison, the table has
the same basic structure as Table 2.1 in several
previous editions of the World Happiness Report.
The major difference comes from the inclusion of
data for 2018, and the resulting changes to the
estimated equation are very slight.11 There are
four equations in Table 2.1. The first equation
provides the basis for constructing the sub-bars
shown in Figure 2.7.

The results in the first column of Table 2.1 explain
national average life evaluations in terms of six key
variables: GDP per capita, social support, healthy
life expectancy, freedom to make life choices,
generosity, and freedom from corruption.12 Taken
together, these six variables explain almost
three-quarters of the variation in national annual
average ladder scores among countries, using
data from the years 2005 to 2018. The model’s
predictive power is little changed if the year
fixed effects in the model are removed, falling
from 0.740 to 0.735 in terms of the adjusted
R-squared.
The second and third columns of Table 2.1 use
the same six variables to estimate equations
for national averages of positive and negative
affect, where both are based on answers
about yesterday’s emotional experiences

Table 2.1: Regressions to Explain Average Happiness across Countries (Pooled OLS)
Dependent Variable
Cantril Ladder

Independent Variable
Log GDP per capita
Social support
Healthy life expectancy at birth
Freedom to make life choices
Generosity
Perceptions of corruption

(0-10)

Positive Affect
(0-1)

Negative Affect
(0-1)

Cantril Ladder
(0-10)

0.318

-.011

0.008

0.338

(0.066)***

(0.01)

(0.008)

(0.065)***

2.422

0.253

-.313

1.977

(0.381)***

(0.05)***

(0.051)***

(0.397)***

0.033

0.001

0.002

0.03

(0.01)***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.01)***

1.164

0.352

-.072

0.461

(0.3)***

(0.04)***

(0.041)*

(0.287)

0.635

0.137

0.008

0.351

(0.277)**

(0.03)***

(0.028)

(0.279)

-.540

0.025

0.094

-.612

(0.294)*

(0.027)

(0.024)***

(0.287)**

Positive affect

2.063
(0.384)***

Negative affect

0.242
(0.429)

Year fixed effects
Number of countries

Included

Included

Included

Included

157

157

157

157

Number of obs.

1,516

1,513

1,515

1,512

Adjusted R-squared

0.74

0.476

0.27

0.76

Notes: This is a pooled OLS regression for a tattered panel explaining annual national average Cantril ladder
responses from all available surveys from 2005 to 2018. See Technical Box 1 for detailed information about each
of the predictors. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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(see Technical Box 1 for how the affect measures
are constructed). In general, the emotional
measures, and especially negative emotions, are
differently, and much less fully, explained by the
six variables than are life evaluations. Per-capita
income and healthy life expectancy have significant
effects on life evaluations, but not, in these
national average data, on either positive or
negative affect. The situation changes when we
consider social variables. Bearing in mind that
positive and negative affect are measured on a
0 to 1 scale, while life evaluations are on a 0 to 10
scale, social support can be seen to have similar
proportionate effects on positive and negative
emotions as on life evaluations. Freedom and
generosity have even larger influences on positive
affect than on the ladder. Negative affect is
significantly reduced by social support, freedom,
and absence of corruption.
In the fourth column we re-estimate the life
evaluation equation from column 1, adding both
positive and negative affect to partially implement
the Aristotelian presumption that sustained
positive emotions are important supports for a
good life.13 The most striking feature is the extent to
which the results buttress a finding in psychology
that the existence of positive emotions matters
much more than the absence of negative ones.14
Positive affect has a large and highly significant
impact in the final equation of Table 2.1, while
negative affect has none.
As for the coefficients on the other variables in
the final equation, the changes are material only
on those variables – especially freedom and
generosity – that have the largest impacts on
positive affect. Thus we infer that positive
emotions play a strong role in support of life
evaluations, and that much of the impact of
freedom and generosity on life evaluations is
channeled through their influence on positive
emotions. That is, freedom and generosity have
large impacts on positive affect, which in turn
has a major impact on life evaluations. The
Gallup World Poll does not have a widely
available measure of life purpose to test
whether it too would play a strong role in
support of high life evaluations. However, data
from large samples of UK do suggest that life
purpose plays a strongly supportive role,
independent of the roles of life circumstances
and positive emotions.

Our country rankings in Figure 2.7 show life
evaluations (the average answer to the Cantril
ladder question, asking people to evaluate the
quality of their current lives on a scale of 0 to 10)
for each country, averaged over the years
2016-2018. Not every country has surveys in
every year; the total sample sizes are reported
in the statistical appendix, and are reflected in
Figure 2.7 by the horizontal lines showing the 95%
confidence intervals. The confidence intervals are
tighter for countries with larger samples. To
increase the number of countries ranked, we also
include three countries that did have surveys in
2015 but have not had one since.15
The overall length of each country bar represents
the average ladder score, which is also shown in
numerals. The rankings in Figure 2.7 depend only
on the average Cantril ladder scores reported by
the respondents, and not on the values of the six
variables that we use to help account for the
large differences we find.
Each of these bars is divided into seven segments,
showing our research efforts to find possible
sources for the ladder levels. The first six sub-bars
show how much each of the six key variables is
calculated to contribute to that country’s ladder
score, relative to that in a hypothetical country
called Dystopia, so named because it has values
equal to the world’s lowest national averages for
2016-2018 for each of the six key variables used
in Table 2.1. We use Dystopia as a benchmark
against which to compare contributions from
each of the six factors. The choice of Dystopia as
a benchmark permits every real country to have
a positive (or at least zero) contribution from
each of the six factors. We calculate, based on
the estimates in the first column of Table 2.1, that
Dystopia had a 2016-2018 ladder score equal to
1.88 on the 0 to 10 scale. The final sub-bar is the
sum of two components: the calculated average
2016-2018 life evaluation in Dystopia (=1.88) and
each country’s own prediction error, which
measures the extent to which life evaluations are
higher or lower than predicted by our equation in
the first column of Table 2.1. These residuals are
as likely to be negative as positive.16
It might help to show in more detail how we
calculate each factor’s contribution to average
life evaluations. Taking the example of healthy life
expectancy, the sub-bar in the case of Tanzania
is equal to the number of years by which healthy

Technical Box 1: Detailed information about each of the predictors in Table 2.1

1. GDP per capita is in terms of Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted to constant
2011 international dollars, taken from the
World Development Indicators (WDI)
released by the World Bank on November
14, 2018. See Statistical Appendix 1 for
more details. GDP data for 2018 are not
yet available, so we extend the GDP time
series from 2017 to 2018 using countryspecific forecasts of real GDP growth
from the OECD Economic Outlook No.
104 (Edition November 2018) and the
World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects
(Last Updated: 06/07/2018), after adjustment for population growth. The equation
uses the natural log of GDP per capita, as
this form fits the data significantly better
than GDP per capita.
2. T
 he time series of healthy life expectancy
at birth are constructed based on data
from the World Health Organization
(WHO) Global Health Observatory data
repository, with data available for 2005,
2010, 2015, and 2016. To match this
report’s sample period, interpolation and
extrapolation are used. See Statistical
Appendix 1 for more details.
3. Social support is the national average
of the binary responses (either 0 or 1)
to the Gallup World Poll (GWP) question
“If you were in trouble, do you have
relatives or friends you can count on
to help you whenever you need them,
or not?”
4. F
 reedom to make life choices is the
national average of binary responses to
the GWP question “Are you satisfied or
dissatisfied with your freedom to choose
what you do with your life?”

5. G
 enerosity is the residual of regressing
the national average of GWP responses
to the question “Have you donated
money to a charity in the past month?”
on GDP per capita.
6. P
 erceptions of corruption are the average
of binary answers to two GWP questions:
“Is corruption widespread throughout the
government or not?” and “Is corruption
widespread within businesses or not?”
Where data for government corruption
are missing, the perception of business
corruption is used as the overall corruption-perception measure.
7. Positive affect is defined as the average
of previous-day affect measures for
happiness, laughter, and enjoyment for
GWP waves 3-7 (years 2008 to 2012, and
some in 2013). It is defined as the average
of laughter and enjoyment for other
waves where the happiness question was
not asked. The general form for the
affect questions is: Did you experience
the following feelings during a lot of the
day yesterday? See pp. 1-2 of Statistical
Appendix 1 for more details.
8. N
 egative affect is defined as the average
of previous-day affect measures for
worry, sadness, and anger for all waves.
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life circumstances tend to average out at the
national level.

life expectancy in Tanzania exceeds the world’s
lowest value, multiplied by the Table 2.1 coefficient
for the influence of healthy life expectancy on
life evaluations. The width of these different
sub-bars then shows, country-by-country, how
much each of the six variables is estimated to
contribute to explaining the international ladder
differences. These calculations are illustrative
rather than conclusive, for several reasons. First,
the selection of candidate variables is restricted
by what is available for all these countries.
Traditional variables like GDP per capita and
healthy life expectancy are widely available. But
measures of the quality of the social context,
which have been shown in experiments and
national surveys to have strong links to life
evaluations and emotions, have not been
sufficiently surveyed in the Gallup or other
global polls, or otherwise measured in statistics
available for all countries. Even with this limited
choice, we find that four variables covering
different aspects of the social and institutional
context – having someone to count on, generosity,
freedom to make life choices and absence of
corruption – are together responsible for more
than half of the average difference between each
country’s predicted ladder score and that in
Dystopia in the 2016-2018 period. As shown in
Statistical Appendix 1, the average country has a
2016-2018 ladder score that is 3.53 points above
the Dystopia ladder score of 1.88. Of the 3.53
points, the largest single part (34%) comes
from social support, followed by GDP per capita
(26%) and healthy life expectancy (21%), and
then freedom (11%), generosity (5%), and
corruption (3%).17

The seventh and final segment is the sum of
two components. The first component is a fixed
number representing our calculation of the
2016-2018 ladder score for Dystopia (=1.88).
The second component is the average 2016-2018
residual for each country. The sum of these two
components comprises the right-hand sub-bar
for each country; it varies from one country to
the next because some countries have life
evaluations above their predicted values, and
others lower. The residual simply represents that
part of the national average ladder score that is
not explained by our model; with the residual
included, the sum of all the sub-bars adds up to
the actual average life evaluations on which the
rankings are based.

Our limited choice means that the variables we
use may be taking credit properly due to other
better variables, or to unmeasured factors. There
are also likely to be vicious or virtuous circles,
with two-way linkages among the variables. For
example, there is much evidence that those who
have happier lives are likely to live longer, be
more trusting, be more cooperative, and be
generally better able to meet life’s demands.18
This will feed back to improve health, GDP,
generosity, corruption, and sense of freedom.
Finally, some of the variables are derived from
the same respondents as the life evaluations and
hence possibly determined by common factors.
This risk is less using national averages, because
individual differences in personality and many

What do the latest data show for the 2016-2018
country rankings? Two features carry over from
previous editions of the World Happiness Report.
First, there is still a lot of year-to-year consistency
in the way people rate their lives in different
countries, and of course we do our ranking on a
three-year average, so that there is information
carried forward from one year to the next. But
there are nonetheless interesting changes. The
annual data for Finland have continued their
modest but steady upward trend since 2014,
so that dropping 2015 and adding 2018 boosts
the average score, thereby putting Finland
significantly ahead of other countries in the top
ten. Denmark and Norway have also increased
their average scores, but Denmark by more than

To provide more assurance that our results are
not seriously biased because we are using the
same respondents to report life evaluations, social
support, freedom, generosity, and corruption,
we tested the robustness of our procedure
(see Table 10 of Statistical Appendix 1 of World
Happiness Report 2018 for more detail) by
splitting each country’s respondents randomly
into two groups, and using the average values for
one group for social support, freedom, generosity,
and absence of corruption in the equations to
explain average life evaluations in the other half
of the sample. The coefficients on each of the
four variables fall, just as we would expect. But
the changes are reassuringly small (ranging from
1% to 5%) and are far from being statistically
significant.19

Figure 2.7: Ranking of Happiness 2016-2018 (Part 1)
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Figure 2.7: Ranking of Happiness 2016-2018 (Part 2)
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71.

Moldova (5.529)

72. Libya (5.525)
73. Montenegro (5.523)
74. Tajikistan (5.467)
75. Croatia (5.432)
76. Hong Kong SAR, China (5.430)
77.

Dominican Republic (5.425)

78. Bosnia and Herzegovina (5.386)
79. Turkey (5.373)
80. Malaysia (5.339)
81.

Belarus (5.323)

82. Greece (5.287)
83. Mongolia (5.285)
84. Macedonia (5.274)
85. Nigeria (5.265)
86. Kyrgyzstan (5.261)
87.

Turkmenistan (5.247)

88. Algeria (5.211)
89. Morocco (5.208)
90. Azerbaijan (5.208)
91.

Lebanon (5.197)

92. Indonesia (5.192)
93. China (5.191)
94. Vietnam (5.175)
95. Bhutan (5.082)
96. Cameroon (5.044)
97.

Bulgaria (5.011)

98. Ghana (4.996)
99. Ivory Coast (4.944)
100. Nepal (4.913)
101. Jordan (4.906)
102. Benin (4.883)
103. Congo (Brazzaville) (4.812)
104. Gabon (4.799)
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Figure 2.7: Ranking of Happiness 2016-2018 (Part 3)
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106. South Africa (4.722)
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Norway, so Denmark is now in second place and
Norway third. There are no 2018 survey results
available for Iceland, and their score and ranking
remain the same, in 4th place. The Netherlands
have slipped into 5th place, dropping Switzerland
to 6th.The next three places contain the same
three countries as last year, with Sweden’s
increasing scores raising it to 7th, with New
Zealand remaining 8th and Canada now in 9th.
The final position in the top ten goes to Austria,
rising from 12th to 10th, with Australia dropping
to 11th, followed by Costa Rica in 12th, and Israel
in 13th.There are further changes in the rest of
the top 20, with Luxembourg rising to 14th and
the United Kingdom to 15th, Ireland and Germany
in 16th and 17th, and Belgium and the United
States in 18th and 19th. The Czech Republic
rounds out the top 20 by switching positions
with the United Arab Emirates. Both countries
posted rising averages, with the Czech score
rising more. Throughout the top 20 positions,
and indeed at most places in the rankings, even
the three-year average scores are close enough
to one another that significant differences are
found only between country pairs that are
several positions apart in the rankings. This
can be seen by inspecting the whisker lines
showing the 95% confidence intervals for the
average scores.
There remains a large gap between the top and
bottom countries. The top ten countries are less
tightly grouped than last year. The national life
evaluation scores now have a gap of 0.28 between
the 1st and 5th position, and another 0.24 between
5th and 10th positions, a more spread-out
situation than last year. Thus there is now a gap
of about 0.5 points between the first and 10th
positions. There is a bigger range of scores
covered by the bottom 10 countries. Within this
group, average scores differ by almost
three-quarters of a point, more than one-fifth of
the average national score in the group. Tanzania,
Rwanda and Botswana still have anomalous
scores, in the sense that their predicted values,
based on their performance on the six key
variables, would suggest they would rank much
higher than shown by the survey answers.
Despite the general consistency among the top
country scores, there have been many significant
changes in the rest of the countries. Looking at
changes over the longer term, many countries
have exhibited substantial changes in average

scores, and hence in country rankings, between
2005-2008 and 2016-2018, as will be shown in
more detail in Figure 2.8.
When looking at average ladder scores, it is also
important to note the horizontal whisker lines at
the right-hand end of the main bar for each
country. These lines denote the 95% confidence
regions for the estimates, so that countries with
overlapping error bars have scores that do not
significantly differ from each other. The scores
are based on the resident populations in each
country, rather than their citizenship or place of
birth. In World Happiness Report 2018 we split
the responses between the locally and foreignborn populations in each country, and found the
happiness rankings to be essentially the same for
the two groups, although with some footprint
effect after migration, and some tendency for
migrants to move to happier countries, so that
among 20 happiest countries in that report, the
average happiness for the locally born was about
0.2 points higher than for the foreign-born.20
Average life evaluations in the top 10 countries
are more than twice as high as in the bottom 10.
If we use the first equation of Table 2.1 to look
for possible reasons for these very different
life evaluations, it suggests that of the 4.16 points
difference, 3.06 points can be traced to differences
in the six key factors: 0.99 points from the GDP
per capita gap, 0.88 due to differences in social
support, 0.59 to differences in healthy life
expectancy, 0.35 to differences in freedom,
0.20 to differences in corruption perceptions,
and 0.06 to differences in generosity.21 Income
differences are the single largest contributing
factor, at one-third of the total, because, of the
six factors, income is by far the most unequally
distributed among countries. GDP per capita is
22 times higher in the top 10 than in the bottom
10 countries.22
Overall, the model explains average life
evaluation levels quite well within regions,
among regions, and for the world as a whole.23
On average, the countries of Latin America still
have mean life evaluations that are higher (by
about 0.6 on the 0 to 10 scale) than predicted
by the model. This difference has been attributed
to a variety of factors, including especially some
unique features of family and social life in Latin
American countries. To help explain what is
special about social life in Latin America,

Chapter 6 of World Happiness Report 2018 by
Mariano Rojas presented a range of new data
and results showing how the social structure
supports Latin American happiness beyond
what is captured by the variables available in
the Gallup World Poll. In partial contrast, the
countries of East Asia have average life
evaluations below those predicted by the model,
a finding that has been thought to reflect, at
least in part, cultural differences in response
style.24 It is reassuring that our findings about
the relative importance of the six factors are
generally unaffected by whether or not we make
explicit allowance for these regional differences.25
Our main country rankings are based on the
average answers to the Cantril ladder life
evaluation question in the Gallup World Poll. The
other two happiness measures, for positive and
negative affect, are themselves of independent
importance and interest, as well as being,
especially in the case of positive affect,
contributors to overall life evaluations. Measures
of positive affect also play important roles in
other chapters of this report, in large part
because most lab experiments, being of
relatively small size and duration, can be
expected to affect current emotions but not life
evaluations, which tend to be more stable in
response to small or temporary disturbances.
The various attempts to use big data to measure
happiness using word analysis of Twitter feeds,
or other similar sources, are likely to be
capturing mood changes rather than overall life
evaluations. In this report, for the first time since
2012, we are presenting, in Table 2.2, rankings for
all three of the measures of subjective well-being
that we track: the Cantril ladder (and its standard
deviation, which provides a measure of happiness
inequality), positive affect and negative affect.
We also show country rankings for the six
variables we use in Table 2.1 to explain our
measures of subjective well-being.26 The same
data are also shown in graphical form, on a
variable by variable basis, in Figures 16 to 39
of Statistical Appendix 1. The numbers shown
reflect each country’s global rank for the variable
in question, with the number of countries ranked
depending on the availability of data. The league
tables are divided into a premier league (the
OECD, whose 36 member countries include 19 of
the top 20 countries) and a number of regional
leagues comprising the remaining countries

grouped in the same global regions used
elsewhere in the report. Within leagues, countries
are ordered by their 2016-2018 ladder scores.
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Table 2.2: Happiness League Tables
Country
(region)

Ladder

SD of ladder

Positive
affect

Negative
affect

Social
support

Finland

1

4

41

10

2

5

4

47

22

27

Denmark

2

13

24

26

4

6

3

22

14

23

Freedom

Corruption Generosity

Log of GDP Healthy life
per capita expectancy

OECD

Norway

3

8

16

29

3

3

8

11

7

12

Iceland

4

9

3

3

1

7

45

3

15

13
18

Netherlands

5

1

12

25

15

19

12

7

12

Switzerland

6

11

44

21

13

11

7

16

8

4

Sweden

7

18

34

8

25

10

6

17

13

17
14

New Zealand

8

15

22

12

5

8

5

8

26

Canada

9

23

18

49

20

9

11

14

19

8

Austria

10

10

64

24

31

26

19

25

16

15
10

Australia

11

26

47

37

7

17

13

6

18

Israel

13

14

104

69

38

93

74

24

31

11

Luxembourg

14

3

62

19

27

28

9

30

2

16

United Kingdom

15

16

52

42

9

63

15

4

23

24

Ireland

16

34

33

32

6

33

10

9

6

20

Germany

17

17

65

30

39

44

17

19

17

25

Belgium

18

7

57

53

22

53

20

44

21

26
39

United States

19

49

35

70

37

62

42

12

10

Czech Republic

20

20

74

22

24

58

121

117

32

31

Mexico

23

76

6

40

67

71

87

120

57

46

France

24

19

56

66

32

69

21

68

25

5

Chile

26

61

15

78

58

98

99

45

49

30
3

Spain

30

21

107

107

26

95

78

50

30

Italy

36

31

99

123

23

132

128

48

29

7

Slovakia

38

39

53

47

21

108

142

70

35

38

Poland

40

28

76

33

44

52

108

77

41

36

Lithuania

42

55

138

41

17

122

113

124

36

62

Slovenia

44

54

114

71

14

13

97

54

34

29

Latvia

53

30

119

38

34

126

92

105

43

68

South Korea

54

57

101

45

91

144

100

40

27

9
41

Estonia

55

32

50

6

12

45

30

83

37

Japan

58

43

73

14

50

64

39

92

24

2

Hungary

62

36

86

31

51

138

140

100

42

56

Portugal

66

73

97

100

47

37

135

122

39

22

Turkey

79

58

154

121

61

140

50

98

44

69

Greece

82

87

102

94

102

150

123

152

46

21

Europe
Non-OECD Western, Central, and Eastern Europe
Malta

22

42

83

103

16

12

32

5

28

19

Kosovo

46

107

71

7

85

50

144

31

88

N.A.
61

Romania

48

75

80

62

86

57

146

102

48

Cyprus

49

95

60

99

90

81

115

39

33

6

Northern Cyprus

64

35

144

90

81

77

29

43

N.A.

N.A.

Serbia

70

100

148

92

57

124

118

84

71

48

Montenegro

73

84

143

118

60

139

77

76

61

44

Croatia

75

29

122

101

79

118

139

81

50

32

Table 2.2: Happiness League Tables (continued)
Country
(region)

Ladder

SD of ladder

Positive
affect

Negative
affect

Social
support

Freedom

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

78

80

116

79

92

137

Macedonia

84

67

140

89

74

105

125

55

75

52

Bulgaria

97

47

117

13

18

115

147

112

56

65

Albania

107

126

90

108

133

87

134

60

81

40

Corruption Generosity
145

32

Log of GDP Healthy life
per capita expectancy
82

50

Commonwealth of Independent States
Uzbekistan

41

99

19

15

11

1

18

29

104

83

Kazakhstan

60

40

81

5

19

80

57

57

47

88

Russia

68

64

96

9

40

107

127

101

45

89

Moldova

71

45

133

67

65

128

148

86

109

86

Tajikistan

74

50

120

54

113

86

35

72

123

92

Belarus

81

22

149

36

33

131

37

103

58

76

Kyrgyzstan

86

46

58

4

45

38

138

36

120

91

Turkmenistan

87

2

135

63

8

83

N.A.

33

60

100

Azerbaijan

90

24

134

20

104

101

22

146

65

82

Armenia

116

82

126

145

117

123

93

129

91

64

Georgia

119

51

141

43

147

104

28

153

87

84

Ukraine

133

69

131

44

56

141

143

66

94

87

Costa Rica

12

62

4

87

42

16

58

75

67

28

Guatemala

27

136

8

85

78

25

82

78

99

85
33

Latin America and the Caribbean

Panama

31

121

7

48

41

32

104

88

51

Brazil

32

116

69

105

43

84

71

108

70

72

Uruguay

33

88

10

76

35

30

33

80

52

35

El Salvador

35

112

23

84

83

74

85

134

100

75

Trinidad and
Tobago

39

89

14

52

29

51

141

41

38

93

Colombia

43

120

30

88

52

56

124

111

74

51

Nicaragua

45

133

31

125

66

70

43

71

108

53

Argentina

47

97

28

93

46

54

109

123

55

37

Ecuador

50

113

11

113

71

42

68

95

86

45

Jamaica

56

102

51

51

28

49

130

119

93

55

Honduras

59

151

13

73

84

39

79

51

113

57
94

Bolivia

61

71

70

138

93

35

91

104

101

Paraguay

63

90

1

39

30

34

76

67

90

81

Peru

65

114

36

127

77

61

132

126

76

47

Dominican
Republic

77

155

66

77

55

43

52

93

69

80

Venezuela

108

141

77

135

49

145

110

139

78

71

Haiti

147

111

142

119

146

152

48

20

138

125

Asia
Non-OECD East Asia
Taiwan Province
of China

25

37

17

1

48

102

56

56

N.A.

N.A.

Hong Kong
S.A.R. of China

76

33

105

28

76

66

14

18

9

N.A.

Mongolia

83

48

95

17

10

112

119

38

80

97

China

93

72

21

11

108

31

N.A.

133

68

34

30
31
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Table 2.2: Happiness League Tables (continued)
Country
(region)

Ladder

SD of ladder

Positive
affect

Negative
affect

Social
support

Singapore

34

5

38

2

36

20

1

21

3

1

Thailand

52

81

20

35

53

18

131

10

62

58

Philippines

69

119

42

116

75

15

49

115

97

99

Malaysia

80

12

25

23

97

36

137

27

40

59

Indonesia

92

108

9

104

94

48

129

2

83

98

Vietnam

94

27

121

27

64

23

86

97

105

49

Freedom

Corruption Generosity

Log of GDP Healthy life
per capita expectancy

Southeast Asia

Laos

105

59

5

112

120

22

27

34

102

112

Cambodia

109

135

27

142

109

2

94

61

116

102

Myanmar

131

70

45

86

96

29

24

1

106

110

South Asia
Pakistan

67

53

130

111

130

114

55

58

110

114

Bhutan

95

6

37

98

68

59

25

13

95

104

Nepal

100

128

137

134

87

67

65

46

127

95

Bangladesh

125

52

145

68

126

27

36

107

119

90

Sri Lanka

130

91

32

81

80

55

111

35

79

54

India

140

41

93

115

142

41

73

65

103

105

Afghanistan

154

25

152

133

151

155

136

137

134

139

4

N.A.

15

4

60

Africa and Middle East
Middle East and North Africa
United Arab
Emirates

21

65

43

56

72

Saudi Arabia

28

93

49

82

62

68

N.A.

82

11

74

Qatar

29

86

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1

43

Bahrain

37

83

39

83

59

24

N.A.

23

20

42

Kuwait

51

98

89

97

69

47

N.A.

42

5

70

Libya

72

115

85

137

73

79

31

87

63

96

Algeria

88

56

113

106

101

149

46

128

72

78

Morocco

89

101

110

91

139

76

84

154

98

79
66

Lebanon

91

60

150

61

89

136

133

63

73

Jordan

101

127

112

120

88

88

N.A.

118

92

63

Palestinian
Territories

110

110

128

140

82

134

90

147

112

N.A.

Iran

117

109

109

150

134

117

44

28

54

77

Tunisia

124

79

147

132

121

143

101

144

84

67

Iraq

126

147

151

154

124

130

66

73

64

107

Egypt

137

66

146

124

118

129

89

132

85

101

Syria

149

137

155

155

154

153

38

69

N.A.

128

Yemen

151

85

153

75

100

147

83

155

141

124

		

Sub-Saharan Africa

Mauritius

57

94

55

16

54

40

96

37

53

73

Nigeria

85

130

61

55

111

75

114

59

107

145
141

Cameroon

96

131

106

129

129

90

120

91

121

Ghana

98

129

92

72

132

91

117

52

114

121

Ivory Coast

99

134

88

130

137

100

62

114

118

147

Benin

102

149

118

148

153

103

75

116

128

133

Congo
(Brazzaville)

103

152

124

136

138

92

60

140

111

116

Gabon

104

105

111

144

95

119

103

143

59

108

Table 2.2: Happiness League Tables (continued)
Country
(region)
South Africa
Senegal

Ladder

SD of ladder

Positive
affect

Negative
affect

Social
support

106

124

40

80

63

85

102

89

77

123

111

44

68

60

106

121

88

130

126

109

Freedom

Corruption Generosity

Log of GDP Healthy life
per capita expectancy

Somalia

112

74

2

18

145

14

16

96

N.A.

144

Namibia

113

106

75

59

70

82

98

142

89

122

Niger

114

144

79

141

140

111

51

135

148

138

Burkina Faso

115

92

115

117

116

127

47

125

137

136

Guinea

118

146

82

143

136

109

70

94

130

137

Gambia

120

142

29

109

125

89

26

64

139

130

Kenya

121

118

59

46

123

72

105

26

122

106
120

Mauritania

122

68

94

58

99

151

67

148

117

Mozambique

123

154

108

131

122

46

40

121

146

134

Congo
(Kinshasa)

127

78

125

95

107

125

106

127

149

140

Mali

128

96

48

122

112

110

107

138

129

142

Sierra Leone

129

153

139

149

135

116

112

79

145

146
148

Chad

132

139

136

151

141

142

80

106

133

Ethiopia

134

38

100

74

119

106

53

99

135

115

Swaziland

135

104

26

57

103

113

41

145

96

N.A.
127

Uganda

136

148

91

139

114

99

95

74

136

Zambia

138

145

84

128

115

73

69

53

115

131

Togo

139

103

123

147

149

120

72

131

142

132

Liberia

141

156

103

146

127

94

126

110

150

126

Comoros

142

143

67

114

143

148

81

62

143

117

Madagascar

143

77

46

96

128

146

116

136

144

111

Lesotho

144

150

72

64

98

97

59

151

124

149

Burundi

145

138

98

126

152

135

23

149

151

135

Zimbabwe

146

123

63

34

110

96

63

141

131

129

Botswana

148

125

87

65

105

60

54

150

66

113

Malawi

150

132

129

110

150

65

64

109

147

119
103

Rwanda

152

63

54

102

144

21

2

90

132

Tanzania

153

122

78

50

131

78

34

49

125

118

Central African
Republic

155

117

132

153

155

133

122

113

152

150

South Sudan

156

140

127

152

148

154

61

85

140

143

Notes: The data are organized so that for negative affect a higher rank (i.e. a lower number in the Table) means fewer
negative experiences and for corruption a higher rank means a lower perceived frequency of corruption. All other
variables are measured in their usual scales, with a higher rank standing for better performance.
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Changes in National Happiness and
Its Main Supports
We now turn to our country-by-country ranking
of changes in life evaluations. In the two previous
reports, we concentrated on looking at recent
changes in life evaluations. This year we take
advantage of the ever-growing length of the
Gallup sample to compare life evaluations
over a longer span, averaging ten years, from
2005-2008 to 2016-2018. In Figure 2.8 we show
the changes in happiness levels for all 132 countries
that have sufficient numbers of observations for
both 2005-2008 and 2016-2018.
Of the 132 countries with data for 2005-2008
and 2016-2018, 106 had significant changes. 64
were significant increases, ranging from 0.097 to
1.39 points on the 0 to 10 scale. There were also
42 significant decreases, ranging from -0.179 to
–1.944 points, while the remaining 26 countries
revealed no significant trend from 2005-2008 to
2016-2018. As shown in Table 32 in Statistical
Appendix 1, the significant gains and losses are
very unevenly distributed across the world, and
sometimes also within continents. In Central and
Eastern Europe, there were 15 significant gains
against only one significant decline, while in
Western Europe there were eight significant
losses compared to four significant gains. The
Commonwealth of Independent States was a
significant net gainer, with eight gains against
two losses. In Latin America and the Caribbean
and in East Asia, significant gains outnumbered
significant losses by more than a two to one
margin. The Middle East and North Africa was
net negative, with six losses against three gains.
In the North American and Australasian region,
the four countries had two significant declines
and no significant gains. The 28 Sub-Saharan
African countries showed a real spread of
experiences, with 13 significant gainers and 10
significant losers. In South and Southeast Asia,
most countries had significant changes, with a
fairly even balance between gainers and losers.
Among the 20 top gainers, all of which showed
average ladder scores increasing by more than
0.7 points, 10 are in the Commonwealth of
Independent States or Central and Eastern
Europe, five are in Sub-Saharan Africa, and
three in Latin America. The other two are
Pakistan and the Philippines. Among the
20 largest losers, all of which show ladder

reductions exceeding about 0.5 points, seven
are in the Middle East and North Africa, six in
Sub-Saharan Africa, three in Western Europe,
with the remaining significant losers being
Venezuela, India, Malaysia and Ukraine.
These changes are very large, especially for the
10 most affected gainers and losers. For each of
the 10 top gainers, the average life evaluation
gains were more than would be expected from a
tenfold increase of per capita incomes. For each
of the 10 countries with the biggest drops in
average life evaluations, the losses were more
than twice as large as would be expected from
a halving of GDP per capita.
On the gaining side of the ledger, the inclusion of
four transition countries among the top 10
gainers reflects the rising average life evaluations
for the transition countries taken as a group. The
appearance of Sub-Saharan African countries
among the biggest gainers and the biggest
losers reflects the variety and volatility of
experiences among the Sub-Saharan countries
for which changes are shown in Figure 2.8, and
whose experiences were analyzed in more detail
in Chapter 4 of World Happiness Report 2017.
Benin, the largest gainer since 2005-2008, by
almost 1.4 points, ranked 4th from last in the
first World Happiness Report and has since risen
50 places in the rankings.
The 10 countries with the largest declines in
average life evaluations typically suffered some
combination of economic, political, and social
stresses. The five largest drops since 2005-2008
were in Yemen, India, Syria, Botswana and
Venezuela, with drops over one point in each
case, the largest fall being almost two points in
Venezuela. Among the countries most affected
by the 2008 banking crisis, Greece is the only
one remaining among the 10 largest happiness
losers, although Spain and Italy remain among
the 20 largest.
Figure 42 and Table 31 in Statistical Appendix 1
show the population-weighted actual and
predicted changes in happiness for the 10
regions of the world from 2005-2008 to
2016-2018. The correlation between the actual
and predicted changes is only 0.14, and with
actual changes being less favorable than predicted.
Only in Central and Eastern Europe, where life
evaluations were up by 0.6 points on the 0 to 10
scale, was there an actual increase exceeding

Figure 2.8: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2008 to 2016-2018 (Part 1)
1.

Benin (1.390)

2.

Nicaragua (1.264)

3.

Bulgaria (1.167)

4.

Latvia (1.159)

5.

Togo (1.077)

6.

Congo (Brazzaville) (0.992)

7.

Sierra Leone (0.971)

8.

Slovakia (0.933)

9.

Ecuador (0.926)

10.

Uzbekistan (0.903)

11.

Cameroon (0.880)

12.

Philippines (0.860)

13.

El Salvador (0.859)

14.

Serbia (0.853)

15.

Romania (0.851)

16.

Kosovo (0.785)

17.

Macedonia (0.780)

18.

Tajikistan (0.764)

19.

Mongolia (0.735)
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20. Pakistan (0.703)
21.

Burkina Faso (0.698)

22. Hungary (0.683)
23. Georgia (0.665)
24. Peru (0.645)
25. Cambodia (0.636)
26. Iceland (0.605)
27.

Chile (0.597)

28. Uruguay (0.579)
29. Taiwan Province of China (0.578)
30. Kyrgyzstan (0.569)
31.

Honduras (0.556)

32. Paraguay (0.551)
33. Niger (0.548)
34. Estonia (0.519)
35. Azerbaijan (0.502)
36. Bosnia and Herzegovina (0.487)
37.

Germany (0.469)

38. Poland (0.445)
39. China (0.426)
40. Dominican Republic (0.422)
41.

Nigeria (0.418)

42. South Korea (0.404)
43. Moldova (0.401)
44. Russia (0.385)
45. Czech Republic (0.381)
46. Bolivia (0.346)
47.

Lithuania (0.333)

48. Nepal (0.328)
49. Montenegro (0.327)
50. Mali (0.326)
51.

Kenya (0.310)

52. Slovenia (0.306)
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Figure 2.8: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2008 to 2016-2018 (Part 2)
53. Mauritania (0.292)
54. Lebanon (0.285)
55. Palestinian Territories (0.279)
56. Chad (0.275)
57.

Indonesia (0.240)

58. Zimbabwe (0.236)
59. Thailand (0.227)
60. Guatemala (0.223)
61.

Turkey (0.218)

62. Burundi (0.212)
63. United Kingdom (0.137)
64. Portugal (0.129)
65. Kazakhstan (0.118)
66. Hong Kong SAR, China (0.100)
67.

Finland (0.097)

68. Austria (0.094)
69. Ghana (0.090)
70. United Arab Emirates (0.090)
71.

Senegal (0.088)

72. Albania (0.084)
73. Costa Rica (0.046)
74. Israel (0.045)
75. Norway (0.030)
76. Colombia (0.014)
77.

Liberia (0.014)

78. Switzerland (0.007)
79. Netherlands (-0.028)
80. Argentina (-0.029)
81.

Sri Lanka (-0.030)

82. Sweden (-0.035)
83. Armenia (-0.048)
84. Mexico (-0.051)
85. Kuwait (-0.055)
86. Uganda (-0.064)
87.

Australia (-0.065)

88. Trinidad and Tobago (-0.071)
89. New Zealand (-0.109)
90. Iraq (-0.153)
91.

Canada (-0.179)

92. Cyprus (-0.192)
93. Bangladesh (-0.195)
94. Haiti (-0.203)
95. Japan (-0.215)
96. Vietnam (-0.225)
97.

Mozambique (-0.227)

98. Namibia (-0.246)
99. Brazil (-0.250)
100. Belarus (-0.257)
101. Belgium (-0.276)
102. France (-0.282)
103. Jamaica (-0.318)
104. Panama (-0.329)
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Figure 2.8: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2008 to 2016-2018 (Part 3)
105. Ireland (-0.337)
106. Denmark (-0.341)
107. Laos (-0.365)
108. Madagascar (-0.377)
109. Singapore (-0.379)
110. Croatia (-0.389)
111.

Zambia (-0.413)

112. United States (-0.446)
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113. South Africa (-0.490)
114. Italy (-0.512)
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115. Afghanistan (-0.520)
116. Saudi Arabia (-0.666)
117. Malaysia (-0.697)
118. Jordan (-0.697)
119. Iran (-0.713)
120. Ukraine (-0.741)
121. Spain (-0.793)
122. Egypt (-0.936)
123. Rwanda (-0.940)
124. Malawi (-0.951)
125. Tanzania (-0.982)
126. Greece (-1.040)
127. Central African Republic (-1.077)
128. Yemen (-1.097)
129. India (-1.137)
130. Botswana (-1.606)
131. Syria (-1.861)
132. Venezuela (-1.944)
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what was predicted. South Asia had the largest
drop in actual life evaluations (more than 0.8
points on the 0 to 10 scale) while it was predicted
to have a substantial increase. Since these
regional averages are weighted by national
populations, the South Asian total is heavily
influenced by the Indian decline of more than 1.1
points. Sub-Saharan Africa was predicted to have
a substantial gain, while the actual increase was
much smaller. Latin America was predicted to
have a small gain, while it shows a population-weighted actual drop of the same size. The
MENA region was predicted to be a gainer, and
instead lost 0.52 points. The countries of Western
Europe were predicted to have no change, but
instead experienced a small reduction. For the
remaining regions, the predicted and actual
changes were in the same direction, with the
substantial reductions in the United States (the
largest country in the NANZ group) being larger
than predicted. As Figure 42 and Table 31 show
in Statistical Appendix 1, changes in the six
factors are not very successful in capturing the
evolving patterns of life over what have been
tumultuous times for many countries. Nine of the
ten regions were predicted to have 2016-2018 life
evaluations higher than in 2005-2008, but only
half of them did so. In general, the ranking of
regional predicted changes matched the ranking
of the actual changes, despite typical experience
being less favorable than predicted. The notable
exception is South Asia, which experienced the
largest drop, contrary to predictions.
On a country-by-country basis, the actual changes
from 2005-2008 to 2016-2018 are on average
much better predicted than on a regional basis,
with a correlation of 0.50, as shown in Figure 41
in Statistical Appendix 1. This difference can be
traced to the great variety of experiences within
regions, many of which were predicted reasonably
well on a national basis, and by the presence of
some very large countries with substantial
prediction errors, India being the largest example.

Changes in Governance
Government institutions and policies set the
stages on which lives are lived. These stages differ
largely from country to country, and are among
primary factors influencing how highly people
rate the quality of their lives. The importance of
national institutions and living conditions was

shown forcefully in World Happiness Report
2018, which presented happiness rankings for
immigrants and the locally born, and found them
to be almost exactly the same (a correlation of
+0.96 for the 117 countries with a sufficient
number of immigrants in their sampled
populations). This was the case even for
migrants coming from source countries with
life evaluations less than half as high as in the
destination country.
The evidence from the happiness of immigrants
and the locally born suggests strongly that the
large international differences in average national
happiness documented in this report depend
primarily on the circumstances of life in each
country. These differences in turn invite explanation
by factors that differ among nations, including
especially institutions that are national in scope,
among which governments are perhaps the most
prominent examples.
It is natural, as public and policy attention starts to
shift from GDP to broader measures of progress,
and especially to how people value their lives,
that there should be growing policy interest in
knowing how government institutions and
actions influence happiness, and in whatever
changes in policies might enable citizens to lead
happier lives.

What is Good Government?
At the most basic level, good government
establishes and maintains an institutional
framework that enables people to live better
lives. Similarly, good public services are those
that improve lives while using fewer scarce
resources. How can the excellence of government be measured, and how can its effects on
happiness be determined? There are two main
possibilities for assessment, one very specific
and the other at the aggregate level. The more
specific approach is adopted in the Global
Happiness and Well-being Policy Reports, while
here we shall take a more aggregate approach
using the national happiness data that lie at the
core of the World Happiness Reports.
Created in response to growing interest in the
policy relevance of happiness, the Global Happiness
and Well-being Policy Reports aim to find and
evaluate best-practice examples from around the
world on how government policies in specific

areas could be redesigned to support happier
lives. The just-released Global Happiness and
Well-being Policy Report 2019,27 for example,
contains surveys of happiness-oriented policy
interventions in specific areas of public policy –
in particular education, health, work and cities
– as well as on topics of cross-cutting importance,
such as personal happiness28 and the metrics and
policy frameworks29 needed to support policies
for well-being. These policy surveys show that
what counts as good governance is specific to
each policy area. Within each ministry or subject
area there are specific targets that are the
primary focus of attention, including mainly
medical and cost outcomes in health care,30
academic achievement and completion in
education,31 productivity and job satisfaction in
the workplace,32 reduced crime and incarceration
rates in justice, and a range of specific indicators
of the quality of city life.33 The happiness lens is
then used to find those policies that achieve their
traditional objectives in the most happinesssupporting ways. This kind of specific focus is
probably the most effective way to move from a
general interest in using happiness as a policy
objective to the development of cost-effective
ways of delivering happiness. One major common
element in the chapters of Global Happiness
and Well-being Policy Report 2019 is the use of
results from happiness research to establish the
relative importance of a variety of outcomes long
considered important but not readily comparable.
As advocated by Chapter 634 in World Happiness
Report 2013, developed in more detail in a recent
paper35 for the UK Treasury, and exemplified by
the happiness-based policy evaluation tool in
Dubai, and in the health chapter36 of Global
Happiness and Well-being Policy Report 2019,
this involves expanding traditional methods for
estimating the cost-effectiveness of policies to
make happier lives the objective. Seen from this
perspective, good governance would be defined
in terms of the methods used and results
obtained, both for traditional policy objectives
and the happiness of all participants.
There is another way of assessing different
government structures and policies. This is done
at a more aggregate level by using a number
of national-level indicators of the quality of
governance to see how well they correlate with
levels and changes in national average life
evaluations. There are now many examples of

this sort of research. We consider here some of
the effects of government structure and behavior
on average national happiness, while Chapter 3
considers how happiness affects voting behavior.
Our own analysis in Table 2.1 provides one
example of the effects of government via its
estimate of the links between corruption and life
satisfaction, holding constant some other key
variables, including income, health, social
support, a sense of freedom and generosity, all
of which themselves are likely to be affected by
the quality of government. Unpacking these
channels convincingly is not possible using the
aggregate data available, since there is too much
in play to establish strong evidence of causality,
and many of the system features held to be of
primary importance, for example the rule of law,
tend to take long to establish, thereby reducing
the amount of evidence available.
Hence any conclusions reached are likely to be
suggestive at best, and have also been found to
be more evident in some countries and times
than in others. For example, a number of studies
have divided the World Bank’s37 six main
indicators of governmental quality into two
groups, with the four indicators for effectiveness,
rule of law, quality of regulation, and control of
corruption combined to form an index of the
quality of delivery, and the two indicators for
voice and accountability and for political stability
and absence of violence combined to form an
index of the democratic quality of government.
Previous studies comparing these two indexes
as predictors of life evaluations have found that
quality of delivery is more important than the
democracy variable, both in studies across
countries38 and in ones that include country-fixed
effects, so that the estimated effects are based
on changes in governance quality within each
country.39 These latter results are more convincing,
since they are uninfluenced by cross-country
differences in other variables, and have the
capacity to show whether significant changes in
the quality of government can happen within a
policy-relevant time horizon. These studies made
use of data from the World Values Survey and
from the Gallup World Poll, but were based on
shorter sample periods. For this chapter we
replicated earlier analysis based on the GWP
data for 2005-2012 but now using the longest
sample with available data for life evaluations
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and for the indicators of government quality,
covering 2005-2017. The results are shown in
Table 10 in Statistical Appendix 2. The core
results continue to show that delivery quality
has a significant positive effect on average life
evaluations with or without accounting for the
effects flowing through the higher levels of
GDP per capita made possible by government
regulations and services that are more efficient,
more configured to match the rule of law, and
less subject to corruption. The estimated
magnitude of the more convincing results, which
are the ones based on within-country changes in
governance quality, is substantial. For example, a
previous study found that “the ten most-improved
countries, in terms of delivery quality changes
between 2005 and 2012, when compared to the
ten countries with most worsened delivery
quality, are estimated to have higher average life
evaluations by one tenth of the overall life
evaluation gap between the world’s most and
least happy ten countries.”40 In other words, the
estimated effect of the divergence in governance
quality on life evaluations was about 0.4 points
on the 0 to 10 scale. We have been able to
confirm that previous result with data now
covering twice as long a time period, as shown
in Table 22 in Statistical Appendix 2.
To extend our analysis into other aspects of
governance, we have assembled data to match
our mix of country-years for several variables
that have either been used as measures of the
quality of governance, or can been seen to
reflect some aspects of governmental quality.
One question of perennial research and policy
interest is whether people are happier living in
political democracies. Our earlier research based
on World Values Survey data and shorter samples
of Gallup World Poll data found that delivery
quality was always more important than the
measure of democratic quality, whether or not
the analysis included country fixed effects, which
help to make the results more convincing. This is
still borne out in our doubled sample length for
the Gallup World Poll (Table 10, Appendix 2). We
also found in earlier research that if the sample
was split between countries with higher and
lower governmental effectiveness, that increases
in the extent of democracy had positive life
satisfaction effects in those countries with
effective governments, but not in countries with
less effective governments.41 But this interaction

effect disappears in the new longer sample,
where we find that changes in the quality of
delivery have equally large and significant effects
on life evaluations, and changes in democratic
quality have no significant effects, whatever the
average state of delivery quality.42
Tables 12 to 15 in Statistical Appendix 2 test
whether changes in a variety of other measures
of governmental quality contribute to changes in
life evaluations. None show significant effects
with one notable exception. Changes in the
Gallup World Poll’s measure of confidence in
government do contribute significantly to life
evaluations, as shown in Table 13 of Statistical
Appendix 2. To some extent, this variable might
be thought to reflect a measure of satisfaction
with a particular life domain, much as was shown
in Figure 1.1 for Mexico in Chapter 1.
Tables 16 to 18 of Statistical Appendix 2 look for
linkages between average life evaluations and a
number of government characteristics including
different forms of democratic institutions, social
safety net coverage, and percent of GDP devoted
to education, healthcare and military spending.43
The only characteristics that contribute beyond
what is explained by the six variables of Table 2.1
and regional fixed effects are the shares of GDP
devoted to healthcare and military spending, the
former having a positive effect and the latter a
negative one.44
It is noteworthy that many countries with low
average life evaluations, and with life evaluations
much lower than would be predicted by the
standard results in Table 2.1, have been subject to
internal and external conflicts. Such conflicts can
in part be seen as evidence of bad governance,
and have no doubt contributed to bad governance
elsewhere. In any event, they are almost surely
likely to lead to low life evaluations.45 For example,
freedom from violence is part of one of the
World Bank’s six indicators for the quality of
governance, and several of the countries among
those ranked as least happy in Figure 2.7 are or
have been subject to fatal political violence. We
have assembled data for several measures of
internal and international conflict, and have
found evidence that conflict is correlated with
lower life evaluations, sometimes beyond what is
already captured by the variables for income,
health, freedom, social support, generosity and
corruption. The Uppsala data for death rates

from armed conflicts, non-state conflicts and
one-sided violence are negatively correlated with
life evaluations, but also with GDP per capita, the
World Bank’s democracy variables, and both
freedom and social support. These correlations
are almost unchanged if put on a within-country
change basis, as can been seen by comparing
Tables 2 and 3 in Statistical Appendix 2. The
estimated impact of conflict deaths on average
life evaluations is especially great in the 14
countries where conflict deaths have in one or
more years been above the 90th percentile of
the distribution of positive death rates by year
from 2005 to 2017.46 But even here they add little
additional explanatory power once allowance is
made for all the other variables in Table 2.1.
Somewhat stronger results are obtained by using
the Global Peace Index assessing 163 countries in
three domains: the level of societal safety and
security, the extent of ongoing domestic and
international conflict, and the degree of militarisation. The index (which is defined as if it were a
conflict variable, so that a more peaceful country
has a lower value) is negatively correlated with
average life evaluations in both levels and changes
from 2008 to 2016-2018.47 The effect of withincountry changes in the peace index remains
significant even when changes in GDP and the
rest of the six key variables are included, with a
change of 0.5 in the peace index (about 1 standard
deviation) estimated to alter average life
evaluations by 0.15 points on the 0 to 10 scale,
a value equivalent to a change of more than
15% in per capita GDP.48

Conclusions
This chapter has had a special focus on how
several measures of happiness, and of its
contributing factors, have changed over the
2005 to 2018 period covered by the Gallup
World Poll. We started by tracing the trajectories
of happiness, and its distribution, primarily based
on annual population-weighted averages for the
world as a whole and for its ten constituent
regions. This was followed by our latest ranking
of countries according to their average life
evaluations over the previous three years,
accompanied this year by comparable rankings
for positive and negative affect, for six key
factors used to explain happiness, and for
happiness inequality. We then presented

2005-2008 to 2016-2018 changes in life
evaluations, positive and negative affect, and the
key variables supporting life evaluations. Finally,
we considered different ways in which the
nature and quality of government policies and
institutions can influence happiness.
At a global level, population-weighted life
evaluations fell sharply during the financial crisis,
recovered completely by 2011, and fell fairly
steadily since to a 2018 value about the same
level as its post-crisis low. This pattern of falling
global life evaluations since 2011 was driven
mainly by what was happening in the five
countries with the largest populations, and
especially India, which has had a post-2011 drop
of almost a full point on the 0 to 10 scale.
Excluding the five largest countries removes
the decline, while an unweighted average of the
country scores shows a significant rise since
2016. Positive emotions show no significant
trends by either weighted or unweighted
measures. Negative emotions show the most
dramatic global trends, rising significantly by
both global measures. Global inequality of
well-being has been fairly constant between
countries while rising within countries.
These global movements mask a greater variety
of experiences among and within global regions.
There continues to be convergence of life
evaluations among the three main regions of
Europe. In Asia, divergence among the regions is
more evident. All three parts of Asia had roughly
comparable life evaluations in the 2006-2010
period, but since then life evaluations have
generally risen in East and Southeast Asia and
fallen in South Asia, with a gap building to more
than 1 point on the 0 to 10 scale by 2018. Since
2013, life evaluations have risen by 0.4 points in
Sub-Saharan Africa and fallen by 0.4 points in
the Middle East and North Africa, finishing in
2018 at roughly equal levels. In Latin America, life
evaluations rose by half a point to 2013, and have
fallen slightly more than that since, while in the
North America plus Australia and New Zealand
group, with population dominated by the United
States, life evaluations have fallen by roughly
0.3 points from the beginning to the end of
the period.
What about well-being inequality? Since 2012,
the mid-point of our data period, well-being
inequality has fallen insignificantly in Western
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Europe and Central and eastern Europe, while
increasing significantly in most other regions,
including especially South Asia, Southeast Asia,
Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North
Africa, and the CIS (with Russia dominating the
population total).
The rankings of country happiness are based this
year on the pooled results from Gallup World
Poll surveys from 2016-2018, and continue to
show both change and stability. As shown by
our league tables for happiness and its supports,
the top countries tend to have high values for
most of the key variables that have been found
to support well-being: income, healthy life
expectancy, social support, freedom, trust and
generosity, to such a degree that year to year
changes in the top rankings are to be expected.
With its continuing upward trend in average
scores, Finland consolidated its hold on first
place, ahead of an also-rising Denmark in
second place.
Then for each country, we showed that average
changes in life evaluations from the earliest years
of the Gallup World Poll (2005-2008) to the
three most recent years (2016-2018). Most
countries show significant changes, with slightly
more gainers than losers. The biggest gainer
was Benin, up 1.4 points and 50 places in the
rankings. The biggest life evaluation drops were
in Venezuela and Syria, both down by about
1.9 points.
We turned finally to consider the ways in which
the quality of government, and the structure of
government policies, influence happiness. The
effects were seen to be easier to trace in specific
policy areas, but also showed up in aggregate
measures of governmental quality, whether
based on citizen perceptions or the quality
indicators prepared by the World Bank. Among
these latter measures, the greatest impact still
appears to flow from the quality of policy delivery,
including the control of corruption. Finally,
making use of international data measuring
peace and conflict, countries able to reduce
conflict and achieve peace were estimated to
become happier places to live.

Endnotes
1	Though the Gallup World Poll started in 2005 with an initial
27 countries, the first full wave was not completed until
2006. We thus merge the survey data for 2005 and 2006
for presentation in all our figures based on annual data.
For simplicity, the 2005-2006 wave is labeled as 2006
in figures.

13	This influence may be direct, as many have found, e.g.
De Neve, Diener, Tay, and Xuereb (2013). It may also
embody the idea, as made explicit in Fredrickson’s
broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2001), that good
moods help to induce the sorts of positive connections that
eventually provide the basis for better life circumstances.

2	These results may all be found in Figure 2.1 of World
Happiness Report 2018.

14	See, for example, Danner, Snowdon, and Friesen (2001),
Cohen, Doyle, Turner, Alper, and Skoner (2003), and Doyle,
Gentile, and Cohen (2006).

3	Gallup weights sum up to the number of respondents from
each country. To produce weights adjusted for population
size in each country, we first adjust the Gallup weights so
that each country has the same weight (one-country-onevote) in each period. Next we multiply total population
aged 15+ in each country by the one-country-one-vote
weight. Total population aged 15+ is equal to the total
population minus the amount of population aged 0-14.
Data are mainly taken from WDI released by the World
Bank in January 2019. Specifically, the total population and
the proportion of population aged 0-14 are taken from the
series “Population ages 0-14 (percent of total)” and
“Population, total” respectively from WDI. Population data
in 2018 is not available yet, so we use the population
growth rate in 2017 and population in 2017 to predict the
population in 2018. There are a few regions lacking data in
WDI, such as Somaliland, Kosovo, and Taiwan Province of
China. In the case of Taiwan, we use the data provided by
its statistical agency. Other countries/regions without
population are not included in the calculation of world or
regional trends. There were some countries which didn’t
have surveys in certain years. In this case, we use the survey
in the closest year to interpolate them.
4	Together, these five countries comprised almost half of the
2017 global population of 7550 million. The individual
country percentages of global population in 2017 were
China 18.4%, India 17.7%, United States 4.3%, Indonesia 3.5%
and Brazil 2.8%.
5	The countries in each region are listed in Table 33 of
Statistical Appendix 1.
6	See, for example, Atkinson (2015), Atkinson and Bourguignon
(2014), Kennedy, Lochner, and Prothrow-Stith (1997),
Keeley (2015), OECD (2015), Neckerman and Torche
(2007), and Piketty (2014).
7	See Helliwell, Huang, and Wang (2016). See also Goff,
Helliwell, and Mayraz (2018), Gandelman and Porzekanski
(2013), and Kalmijn and Veenhoven (2005).
8	See, for example, Evans, Barer, and Marmor (1997), Marmot,
Ryff, Bumpass, Shipley, and Marks (1994), and Marmot
(2005).
9	See Goff et al. (2018) for estimates using individual
responses from several surveys, including the Gallup World
Poll, the European Social Survey, and the World Values Survey.
10	The statistical appendix contains alternative forms without
year effects (Table 14 of Appendix 1), and a repeat version
of the Table 2.1 equation showing the estimated year effects
(Table 9 of Appendix 1). These results confirm, as we would
hope, that inclusion of the year effects makes no significant
difference to any of the coefficients.
11	As shown by the comparative analysis in Table 8 of
Appendix 1.
12	The definitions of the variables are shown in Technical Box
1, with additional detail in the online data appendix.

15	These are Syria, Qatar and Bhutan. There are two reasons
for thinking the 2015 Bhutan score may be an under-estimate
for 2016-2018 happiness. One is that large-scale Bhutanese
surveys asking happiness questions have revealed a rising
trend. The other is that the SWL average from the 2015
Bhutanese survey is significantly higher than would be
expected by comparison with other countries with answers
available for both SWL and the Cantril ladder. The eighth
round (2016-2017) of the European Social Survey (ESS)
asked the life satisfaction question in 23 European
countries that are also included in the Gallup World Poll,
permitting an approximate relation to be estimated
between national average scores for life satisfaction and
the Cantril ladder. For the 23 countries, the cross-sectional
correlation between SWL and ladder averages for
2016-2017 is 0.88. Using these data to interpolate a ladder
equivalent for the Bhutan 2015 survey SWL average of
6.86 gives 6.40 as an equivalent ladder score. This ladder
estimate is substantially higher than the Gallup estimate
for Bhutan in 2015 of 5.08.
16	We put the contributions of the six factors as the first
elements in the overall country bars because this makes it
easier to see that the length of the overall bar depends only
on the average answers given to the life evaluation
question. In World Happiness Report 2013 we adopted a
different ordering, putting the combined Dystopia+residual
elements on the left of each bar to make it easier to
compare the sizes of residuals across countries. To make
that comparison equally possible in subsequent World
Happiness Reports, we include the alternative form of the
figure in the online Statistical Appendix 1 (Appendix
Figures 7-9).
17	These calculations are shown in detail in Table 16 of online
Statistical Appendix 1.
18	The prevalence of these feedbacks was documented in
Chapter 4 of World Happiness Report 2013, De Neve,
Diener, Tay, and Xuereb (2013).
19	The coefficients on GDP per capita and healthy life
expectancy were affected even less, and in the opposite
direction in the case of the income measure, being
increased rather than reduced, once again just as expected.
The changes were very small because the data come from
other sources, and are unaffected by our experiment.
However, the income coefficient does increase slightly,
since income is positively correlated with the other four
variables being tested, so that income is now able to pick
up a fraction of the drop in influence from the other four
variables. We also performed an alternative robustness test,
using the previous year’s values for the four survey-based
variables. This also avoided using the same respondent’s
answers on both sides of the equation, and produced
similar results, as shown in Table 13 of Statistical Appendix 1
in World Happiness Report 2018. The Table 13 results are
very similar to the split-sample results shown in Tables 11
and 12, and all three tables give effect sizes very similar to
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those in Table 2.1 in reported in the main text. Because the
samples change only slightly from year to year, there was
no need to repeat these tests with this year’s sample.
20	This footprint affects average scores by more for those
countries with the largest immigrant shares. The extreme
outlier is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with a foreignborn share exceeding 85%. The UAE also makes a distinction
between nationality and place of birth, and oversamples
the national population to obtain larger sample sizes. Thus,
it is possible in their case to calculate separate average
scores 2016-2018 for nationals (7.10), the locally born (6.95),
and the foreign-born (6.78). The difference between the
foreign-born and locally-born scores is very similar to that
found on average for the top 20 countries in the 2018
rankings. Compared to other countries’ resident populations,
UAE nationals rank 14th at 7.10.
21	These calculations come from Table 17 in Statistical
Appendix 1.
22	The data are shown in Table 17 of Statistical Appendix 1.
Annual per capita incomes average $47,000 in the top 10
countries, compared to $2,100 in the bottom 10, measured
in international dollars at purchasing power parity. For
comparison, 94% of respondents have someone to count
on in the top 10 countries, compared to 58% in the bottom
10. Healthy life expectancy is 73 years in the top 10,
compared to 55 years in the bottom 10. 93% of the top 10
respondents think they have sufficient freedom to make
key life choices, compared to 63% in the bottom 10.
Average perceptions of corruption are 35% in the top 10,
compared to 72% in the bottom 10.
23	Actual and predicted national and regional average
2016-2018 life evaluations are plotted in Figure 40 of
Statistical Appendix 1. The 45-degree line in each part of
the Figure shows a situation where the actual and predicted
values are equal. A predominance of country dots below
the 45-degree line shows a region where actual values are
below those predicted by the model, and vice versa. East
Asia provides an example of the former case, and Latin
America of the latter.
24 For example, see Chen, Lee, and Stevenson (1995).
25	One slight exception is that the negative effect of corruption
is estimated to be slightly larger, although not significantly
so, if we include a separate regional effect variable for Latin
America. This is because corruption is worse than average
in Latin America, and the inclusion of a special Latin
American variable thereby permits the corruption coefficient
to take a higher value.
26	The variables used for ranking in this table are the same as
those used for regressions in Table 2.1.
27	The Global Happiness and Well-being Policy Report 2019,
which was released in February, 2019, is published by the
Sustainable Development Solutions Network, and may be
found on line at http://www.happinesscouncil.org.
28 See Diener & Biswas-Diener (2019).
29 See Durand & Exton (2019).
30 See Peasgood et al. (2019).
31 See Seligman & Adler (2019).
32 See Krekel et al. (2019).
33 See Bin Bishr et al. (2019).
34	See O’Donnell (2013), and the Technical Appendix to
O’Donnell et al. (2014).

35 See Frijters & Layard (2018).
36 See Peasgood et al. (2019).
37	See Kraay et al. (1999) and Kaufman et al. (2009). The
latest data are included in the on-line data files.
38 See Helliwell & Huang (2008) and Ott (2010).
39 See Helliwell, Huang, Grover & Wang (2018).
40 See Helliwell, Huang, Grover & Wang (2018, p.1345).
41	The result is presented in Helliwell, Hung, Grover and Wang
(2108), and confirmed in columns 7 and 8 of Table 11 in
Statistical Appendix 2, using the Gallup World Poll data
from 2005 through 2012.
42	These results are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 in
Statistical Appendix 2.
43	Because of the limited year-to-year variation of these
features within countries, the estimates are done using the
same estimation framework as in Table 2.1, with year fixed
effects generally included and also regional fixed effects in
Table 17.
44	As shown in column 12 of Table 17 in Statistical Appendix 2.
The completeness of social safety net coverage has a
positive effect that drops out in more fully specified models
including GDP per capita and the shares spent for health
and military spending, as shown in columns 10-12 of Table 17.
45	For evidence in the case of Ukraine, see Coupe & Obrizan
(2016). The authors also show that the happiness effects of
conflict are found especially within the parts of the country
directly affected by conflict.
46	The results are shown in Table 19 of Statistical Appendix 2,
and the list of 14 countries is in Table 20. Syria must be
treated as a special case, as it is not represented in the
Uppsala data. The dramatic effects of the conflict in Syria
are revealed by the annual data in Figure 5 of Statistical
Appendix 1.
47	The correlations are -0.51 for the levels and -0.20 for the
changes, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively, in
Statistical Appendix 2. See also Welsch (2008).
48	The calculation is based on the results shown in column 9
of Table 21 in Statistical Appendix 2.
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Introduction
The idea that policymakers should aim for
something beyond GDP is far from new, but
it has regained prominence in recent years.
A growing contingent of governments and
international organisations are beginning to
focus their attention on the “happiness” or
subjective well-being (SWB) of citizens.1 Some
governments now produce national well-being
statistics, while many others also go further and
use SWB data and research to inform their
policymaking decisions. Despite this nascent
change in the way many governments are going
about the way they formulate and evaluate
public policy, relatively little is currently known
about the ways in which the SWB of citizens
influences their behaviour in the political sphere.
This chapter reviews some of the research on
SWB and political behaviour, and assesses the
evidence for some of the key questions that arise
within the literature. For example, are happier
people any more or less likely to engage with
politics and, when it comes to it, turn out to
vote? And if so, does their level of happiness
influence whom they ultimately vote for? In
particular, are happier people any likelier to vote
to re-elect governing parties? And to what
extent might levels of (un)happiness play a role
in driving support for populist and authoritarian
politicians?
One of the overarching themes that arises
from the chapter is that although the existing
literature on happiness and political behaviour is
somewhat small, the issues nevertheless are of
pressing significance for policy. In many ways,
research in the social and behavioural sciences
currently lags behind developments in the
real world of government and public policy.
Directions for future research abound and, in
reviewing the small number of existing studies
on SWB and voting, the discussion points
towards various potentially fruitful directions
for further investigation in the area.
Most of the existing literature on politics and
happiness relates to the ways in which political
institutions and processes affect people’s
well-being, thus treating happiness as an outcome
(or dependent) variable. But much less is generally
known about the effects of individual and societal
happiness on political behaviour and outcomes.
Many of the open questions involve happiness as

a causal force — an input (or independent)
variable predicting and possibly producing
political behaviours. It is on this issue that the
chapter is focused.
A number of topics fall outside of the scope
of the chapter. Principal among these is the
aforementioned research into the effects on
happiness of political processes and outcomes
like democracy, participation, governance quality,
and particular government programmes and
policies.2 Likewise, the discussion leaves
aside the issue of whether being a liberal or a
conservative makes people any more or less
happy,3 as well as the extent to which the winning
and losing of elections affects the happiness of
partisans.4 Equally, the discussion does not
generally review the literatures on the correlates
of satisfaction with democracy, emotional
responses to specific candidates or the role of
discrete emotions like fear, anger and hope in the
political process,5 and focuses rather on the
effects of core dimensions of subjective wellbeing like life satisfaction on political behaviour.

Are happier people more likely to be
engaged with politics?
A large and long-running literature in political
science has studied the determinants of political
participation.6 Relatively little attention has been
paid, however, to the extent to which subjective
well-being is one of the factors influencing
whether people vote in elections, or engage with
politics in other ways such as donating time and
money to political campaigns.
From a theoretical standpoint, one might
imagine the effects of happiness on participation
to be ambiguous. On the one hand, people who
are more satisfied with their lives may feasibly
disengage from politics, having already reached
a level of comfortable apathy. In this sense, it has
been speculated that raising happiness could
lead to “an emptying of democracy”.7 But on the
other hand, a growing literature on the ‘objective
benefits of subjective well-being’ has shown
that happiness has important effects on a variety
of pro-social behaviours.8 Happier people are,
for example, more likely to volunteer in the
community and donate money to charity. But
does this translate also to engagement in the
political sphere?
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One answer to this question uses data from the
American National Election Survey (ANES),9 which
in 2000 for one year only included question
asking respondents: “In general, how satisfying
do you find the way you’re spending your life
these days? Would you call it completely satisfying,
pretty satisfying, or not very satisfying?” The
survey also included its regular questions on
participation, including whether or not the
respondent voted, contributed or worked for a
political campaign, attended a rally, or engaged
in other political behaviours.
The data on a sample of around 1,300 US citizens
show a strong positive relationship between life
satisfaction and turnout. This is true in the raw
data, and remains the case when controlling for a
wide range of confounding demographic factors
typically known to drive turnout such as age,
race, and education. Importantly, the association
remains statistically and substantively significant
over-and-above factors relating to political
partisanship, ideology, and various measures of
social capital such as inter-personal trust (which
are themselves known to be well-correlated with
SWB, as well as voting). In the authors’ most
restrictive specification, the estimated coefficient
on life satisfaction suggests that being very
satisfied, as opposed to not very satisfied, is
associated with a 6.7 percentage point change in
the probability of voting – a magnitude that
rivals that of education.
Along the same lines, other research has shown
that in the United States people who are
depressed are less likely to vote.10 Further, it has
also been found using survey research that in
rural China there is a positive correlation between
happiness and voting in local village elections.11
Using panel data from the United Kingdom,
as people become happier over time, their
propensity to vote also increases.12 A one-point
increase in life satisfaction is associated with a
2% increase in the propensity to vote in an
upcoming election. However, the magnitude
of this association is reduced greatly by the
inclusion of other background variables associated
with the probability of voting.
What about other forms of participation, beyond
voting? The ANES data suggest that happier
people are also more likely to participate in
politics in the United States in other ways like
working on political campaigns and contributing

to political candidates. However, interestingly,
there is no such significant relationship with
more ‘conflictual’ forms of political activity like
protesting.13 In German panel data that follows
individuals from year-to-year, there is seemingly
little systematic relationship between life
satisfaction and non-voting forms of political
participation.14
Although participation is perhaps the hitherto
most studied outcome in the literature on the
effects of happiness in the political sphere, there
remains a great deal of room for further research
in the area. In the first instance, there is a clear
need for more empirical work using causal
research designs. This may include laboratory
and field experiments in which researchers
directly seek to influence the SWB of randomly
chosen groups or individuals, or take advantage
of natural experiments occurring in the real world.
In addition, a great deal more theoretical
development is needed in order to more clearly
understand any observed empirical link between
happiness and participation. For example, what
are the main mechanisms we would expect to
be driving this relationship? Given these
mechanisms, would we expect the relationship
to vary in different institutional contexts? Or in
different political contexts? Or according to
different elements of subjective well-being, such
as positive and negative affect? Might we also
expect different types of people (rich or poor,
old or young, high or low education, and so on)
to be differentially influenced by their well-being
when it comes to making participation decisions?
Are there reasons to expect the relationship to
be linear, or might we expect non-linearities like a
tail-off at high levels of satisfaction or happiness?
This important theoretical work will surely also
lead to further empirical work.
In beginning to investigate the generalisability
of the relationships observed in the current
literature, it is instructive to turn here briefly to
the World Values Survey, a large cross-national
survey including respondents from over 100
countries worldwide, in order to shed some initial
empirical light on the issue. Here it is possible
to investigate the basic relationship between
happiness and individuals’ self-reported “interest
in politics”. The question has been asked in
310 national surveys in 103 countries since
the early 1980s, alongside a 4-point overall

Figure 3.1: Happiness and Political Interest
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happiness question. Figure 3.1 shows that
very unhappy people are more likely to be
disengaged from politics.15 Happier people are
more likely to be enageged, but this relationship
flattens off at higher levels of happiness. Once
a range of demographics such as education,
marital status, age, and income quintiles are
controlled for in a fuller regression specification,
very happy people are around 9.3 percentage
points more likely to be interested in politics
than not at all happy people.16

Are happier people more likely to
vote for incumbents?
While it is interesting to study the extent to
which happiness affects whether or not people
vote, it is perhaps even more important to
understand whether it influences whom they
vote for. As has been documented in previous
editions of the World Happiness Report, a
number of countries around the globe have
begun to see subjective well-being as a major
policy goal.17 Do governments have any electoral
motivation to do so?

For a long time, the main measure of government
success has been GDP. Despite movements in the
direction of going beyond such macroeconomic
indicators, this is undoubtedly still the case for
most if not all countries. One perfectly good
reason for this focus is the extensive evidence
that governments are much more likely to be
re-elected when the economy is doing well. A
truly vast empirical research literature going
back several decades in economics and political
science on “economic voting” has shown this to
be the case.18 Economic voting is evident both at
the individual level, where individuals with healthy
household financial situations are more likely to
profess a preference for governing parties. And
also at the national level, where incumbent parties
generally receive higher vote shares the more
buoyant is the election-year economy.
The theoretical literature in political economy
sharpens the (perhaps intuitive) point that by
linking re-election chances to an outcome like
the state of the economy, incumbent politicians
are given powerful incentives to act on that set
of issues.19 Elections can be seen as a device for
voters to “control” politicians. Knowing they will
only be re-elected if the economy is doing well,
they will make sure to work hard to ensure that
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this is the case, rather than spending their time,
among other things, enriching themselves
through corruption or pursuing pet projects
that may be of little use to voters and what they
care about.20
But what sort of incentives do politicians face
exactly? If their re-election is dependent upon
the economy above all else, it is not unreasonable
for governments to concentrate their efforts
there. But if their chances of re-election are
tied to a broader set of outcomes, which
might reasonably be measured using a more
comprehensive measure of success like
subjective well-being, then it follows that they
will have strong incentives to focus their policymaking on individuals’ broader well-being.
Since the early 1970s, the Eurobarometer series
of opinion surveys has included a four-category
question on respondents’ overall life satisfaction,
with answers ranging from “not at all” to “very”
satisfied. Since the survey has taken place
roughly twice a year, it is possible to link general
election results to the national average life
satisfaction of a country in the run-up to that
election, and study the extent to which SWB is

a predictor of election results (alongside other
more standard measures).21
In a paper examining a set of elections in
15 EU countries since 1973 it was found that, in
the first place, the electoral fate of governing
parties is significantly tied to the performance
of the national economy. Using a standard
model of economic voting, the data show that
government vote share in these elections is
associated positively with the election-year
economic growth rate, and negatively with the
unemployment rate.22
Over and above this, however, the study showed
that national average life satisfaction is significantly
related to the vote share subsequently received
by parties that go into the election as part of
the governing coalition. Figure 3.2 shows this
relationship graphically. Having adjusted for
country and year fixed effects (as well as set of
variables standard to the economic voting
literature such as party fractionalisation and the
number of parties in government), there is a
clear and significant positive relationship between
national life satisfaction in the run-up to general
elections and the subsequent electoral success

Figure 3.2: Happiness and Government Vote Share in Europe
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Source: Based on data from Ward (2015) on general elections in Europe, 1973-2014. Binned scatterplot is shown,
having first adjusted both life satisfaction and government vote share for country and year fixed effects, as well
as party fractionalisation, cabinet ideological disparity, prior government seat share, and the number of parties in
government. National Happiness is the country-mean of the 1-4 life satisfaction question at the closest Eurobarometer
survey prior to the election. Government vote share is the vote share collectively received by all of the parties in
government going into the election

of governing parties. A one standard deviation
increase in national life satisfaction is associated
with nearly an 8 percentage-point increase in
cabinet vote share. In a model including SWB
together with the main macroeconomic indicators,
one standard deviation increases in national life
satisfaction and the economic growth rate are
associated with roughly 6 and 3 percentage
point gains for incumbent parties, respectively.
Figure 3.3 shows the fraction of the variance in
cabinet party vote share that can be explained by
a) national levels of life satisfaction in the months
leading up to a general election and b) each of the
standard macroeconomic indicators. In a bivariate
regression, national SWB is able to account for
around 9% of the variance in the incumbent vote
within countries. Whereas economic growth—the
more orthodox measure used in the literature on
retrospective voting—explains around 6.5%.
While it is an interesting (partial) correlation,
there is naturally a limit to what can be inferred
from a cross-national regression of only 140 or so
elections. One concern is that the finding may be
an example of an ‘ecological fallacy,’ meaning,
that despite this aggregate relationship, individual
voters may not actually vote on the basis of their
happiness. A further concern is that the three
main macroeconomic indicators included in the
regression (GDP growth, unemployment, and
inflation) are measured with error and may not
fully capture the state of the economy. Any
remaining association of government vote share
and SWB could simply reflect this unmeasured
bit of economic performance, and thus not really
tell us a great deal beyond what is already known
from the extensive literature on economic voting.
Moreover, a major worry when seeking to attach
a causal interpretation to the association between
SWB and incumbent voting is that that any
observed empirical relationship may simply
reflect ‘reverse causality,’ since people are known
to be happier on average when their chosen
political party is in power.23
However, an ingenious paper by Federica Liberini
and her colleagues provides support for a causal
interpretation of the happiness-to-voting link.24
They use longitudinal data from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which follows
individuals repeatedly on an annual basis. Between
1996 and 2008 the authors are able to track
respondents’ life satisfaction on a scale of 1-7

and also their support for governing parties.
Each year people were asked whether they
support or feel closer to a particular party (and,
if not, which party they would vote for were
there a general election tomorrow). Using a
sample of 4,882 individuals, the authors estimate
regression analyses predicting whether or not
the respondent reports supporting a political
party that was in power at the time of the
survey.25 The data show a significant relationship
between life satisfaction and incumbent support.
This remains the case when looking withinindividuals over time, and thus controlling for a
wide range of potentially confounding permanent
factors between people (such as some elements
of attitudes, personality, social class, and so on).
Controlling for individual and year fixed effects
as well as time-varying individual demographics
like age and marital status, becoming satisfied
with life (i.e. answering at least 5 out of 7) makes
people around 1.9 percentage points more likely
to support the incumbent party.
It is well established in the academic literature
that happiness is influenced by economic
circumstances. In the BHPS data household
income and subjective financial situation (whether
household finances have stayed the same, gotten
better, or worse over the past year) are positively
related to incumbent voting over time, as we
would expect from the extensive prior literature
on economic voting. However, even controlling
for these financial factors, being satisfied with
life makes people 1.6 percentage points more
likely to support the incumbent.
Importantly, the authors also leverage an
exogenous “shock” to people’s happiness, which
allows them to consider the relationship between
SWB and voting in a quasi-experimental setting
and ultimately attach a causal interpretation to
the relationship. They observe the happiness
and voting patterns of individuals who become
widowed, an event which on the whole should
not be directly attributable to the actions of
incumbent government politicians.26 As can
be seen in Figure 3.3, widowhood reduces
both happiness and government support.27, 28
Taken together, the emerging evidence suggests
that there is a causal relationship between
happiness and incumbent voting. However, there
remains a large amount of room and need for
further research in the area.
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Figure 3.3: Predictors of Government Vote Share in Europe
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One obvious omission from the existing literature
is the use of alternative measures of SWB.
Currently the evidence shows a strong relationship
between life satisfaction and voting (both the
decision whether to vote and whom to vote for).
But there may well be differences between
evaluative SWB and more emotional measures
such as positive and negative affect. A further
dimension here is temporal – it may well be that
people’s subjective feelings about the future
have a stronger role to play in determining
voting behaviour than current SWB. Use, for
example, of the “Cantril Ladder in 5 years”
measure may be of interest to researchers in
the coming years.

to which the use of SWB as a proxy for
(experienced) utility in the model tells us any
more than using financial indicators as a proxy
for the more standard notion of (decision) utility.
However, in the future much more could be said
about the ways in which the two may be expected
to behave differently, as well as potentially
interact with each other. The existing research
suggests that both people’s financial situation
and their happiness have independent effects
on their voting intentions. Thus one potential
avenue for further theory could be to use a
multitask framework where politicians face
incentives to improve both the material and
non-material well-being of voters.

In general, a great deal more theoretical work
is needed in order to better understand and
rationalise existing findings (as well as to
point towards directions for further empirical
research). While studies have sketched formal
models of retrospective voting in which voters
observe their own well-being in order to update
their beliefs about the quality of incumbent
politicians,30 these are otherwise typically
relatively standard political agency models.
The principal difference is that the model and
empirical work focuses on assessing the extent

Currently the literatures on i) SWB and participation
and ii) SWB and incumbent voting are largely
separate. Further research will likely synthesise
these two processes, since ultimately the act of
voting for a particular candidate is likely to be a
two-step process. In the first step, people decide
whether or not to vote. And in the second, they
decide whom to vote for. Both may be equally
important in determining electoral outcomes.
Another important area of empirical and theoretical
development will likely seek to understand what
might be thought of as a third (initial) step, “step

zero,” in this progression, namely the process
of attribution for outcomes. On the one hand,
one might see a voter’s decision to base their
electoral choice on their level of happiness as
a rational response to a substantive policy
outcome (namely, their welfare under the current
government). But on the other hand, evidence of
well-being affecting voting could equally be seen
as evidence of behavioural or emotional bias in
the electoral process. One key question here is
whether or not voters distinguish between
policy-relevant and policy-irrelevant determinants
of their SWB when it comes to making vote
choices.31 One might imagine, for example, that
people attribute losses in subjective well-being
to government action but gains to their own
efforts and actions.32
The evidence on widowhood suggests that
people are to some extent not able or willing
to filter relevant and irrelevant sources of
happiness. Additional research suggests that
incidental (i.e. non-relevant) mood can play a
role in swinging political outcomes. For example,
it has been shown in the United States that
incumbents benefit in terms of vote share
following local college football wins.33 In
addition, rain has been shown to affect voting
patterns in ballot propositions in Switzerland,
with rainfall decreasing the vote shares for
change.34 Further theoretical work is needed
in order to determine the extent to which,
and the conditions under which, this kind of
behaviour weakens or strengthens the incentives
faced by incumbent politicians.35 In other words,
if people are using their well-being as a heuristic
that helps them to update their beliefs about
incumbents, when does and doesn’t this lead
them astray? Ultimately, the over-arching
theoretical question to be addressed in this
area is the extent to which happiness-based
voting is likely to be welfare-enhancing overall.

Are unhappier people more likely to
vote for populists?
Populism is far from new.36 But the past decade
has seen a significant rise in the prominence of
populist political movements, particularly in
Western Europe where parties like The League
and Five Star Movement in Italy, Front National
in France, and the AfD in Germany have gained

significant electoral ground, with some now
having entered into governing coalitions at
both the regional and national levels. Elsewhere,
populist parties in countries like Austria,
Greece, Hungary, Poland, the UK and further
afield have also been rising to prominence
and power.
There is no single definition of populism, making
its measurement and empirical study problematic.
Perhaps the key aspect of populist ideology,
which spans various different definitions, is
an anti-establishment worldview.37 Populist
politicians typically distinguish between the
virtue of “ordinary” people on the one hand, and
the corrupt “elite” on the other. Related themes
in the study of the recent rise in populism have
also included a growth in the success of parties
promoting nativist or nationalist sentiment,
as well as an opposition to or rejection of
cosmopolitanism and globalisation.38
An obvious question arises from this recent
political trend: is this all a manifestation of rising
levels of unhappiness? If pressed to describe
one thing that brings these different political
movements and parties together, one feature
that stands out is that they all share a certain
discontent, or unhappiness, with the status quo
in their respective countries.
Yann Algan and his colleagues leverage a unique
survey dataset of 17,000 French voters in the
2017 presidential election, which saw a radical
redrawing of the French political landscape.39
Figure 3.4 shows the relationship in the data
between life satisfaction and voting for Marine Le
Pen’s right-wing populist candidacy, which made
it through to the second-round of voting. Happier individuals were much less likely to have voted
for her, across all income levels. Indeed, of all of
the main candidates, Le Pen voters were on
average the least satisfied with life. Mélenchon
voters were more satisfied, though not a great
deal more so. However, voters of the two more
establishment candidates, Macron and Fillon, had
on average much higher life satisfaction.40
Ultimately, the research suggests that standard
social and economic variables are not sufficient
to explain or understand the rise in support for
the far-right in France. The common factor among
the disparate groups of Le Pen voters was their
low levels of current subjective well-being, and a
general sense of pessimism about the future.
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Figure 3.4: Effects of Life Satisfaction on Incumbent Support in the UK

Satisfaction with Overall Life
Years of Widowhood
7

6

6

Average Life Satisfaction

Average Life Satisfaction

Treated Group
7

5

4

3

2

5

4

3

2

All Other Years

Years of Widowhood

Control Group

Treated Group

Support of Incumbent Party
Treated Group

Years of Widowhood
.5

Prob. (Support Incumbent)

Prob. (Support Incumbent)

.5

.45

.4

.35

.3

.25

.45

.4

.35

.3

.25

All Other Years

Years of Widowhood

Control Group

Treated Group
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A growing number of studies have begun to
examine the determinants of two other noteworthy
electoral events in which populism is often said
to have prevailed: the 2016 Brexit vote in the
United Kingdom and the election of Donald
Trump in the United States. Were these, again,
instances of an unhappy populace venting its
frustration with the establishment?
Eleonora Alabrese and colleagues use large-scale
survey data in the UK Understanding Survey to
assess the extent to which subjective well-being
predicted the Brexit vote.41 Using a sample of
around 13,000 respondents, they assess the
extent to which a number of different variables at
the individual and aggregate level are predictive

of leave voting. They find a strongly significant
association between life satisfaction and leave
support, those who were dissatisfied with life
overall were around 2.5 percentage points more
likely to answer yes to the question of whether
the United Kingdom should leave the European
Union. This is true both at the individual-level
and at the aggregate local-authority level, where
the percentage of people dissatisfied predicts
the leave vote.
Federica Liberini and colleagues also use data
from the UK Understanding Society survey to
show the same thing: that, all else equal, people
with lower levels of life satisfaction were more
likely to be leave voters.42 However, they also

show that this unhappiness was not the main driver
of leave support in the data, rather measures of
subjective financial insecurity were able to
explain more of the variance in support for the
United Kingdom leaving the European Union.43

-10 percentage points, only 3.4% of people were
of low life satisfaction (0-4 on the 0-10 scale).
But in strong Trump voting areas (where the
swing was greater than 10 percentage points)
this more than doubles to 7.1%.

In the United States, Gallup has for the past
decade surveyed a large random sample of US
residents every day on a number of topics,
including various aspects of their subjective
well-being. Aggregating well-being measures like
life satisfaction and the experience of different
emotions day-to-day to the county-level, Jeph
Herrin and colleagues find a strong correlation in
the raw data between area-level SWB and shifts
in the Republican vote share.44 Table 3.1 shows
their main finding of a correlation between SWB
and Trump voting. The authors split counties
into 6 categories, according to the percentage
point electoral shift from 2012 to 2016, and relate
these to county-level SWB measures.45 As can be
seen, a higher percentage of people placing
themselves near the bottom of the Cantril
ladder - both currently and in 5 years’ time –
is significantly associated with larger swings
towards the Republican Party. In counties where
the Romney to Trump swing was smaller than

Similarly, feelings of happiness, enjoyment,
smiling and laughter were associated with
smaller Republican swings. Perhaps surprisingly,
negative emotions like stress, anger, and worry
were not significantly associated with voting
patterns. The results are highly suggestive, but
more work is needed in order to assess the
extent to which these patterns are more or less
predictive of the election outcome than more
standard economic and demographic factors,46
and, importantly, whether they contribute any
explanatory power over-and-above such factors
in a multivariate regression framework.
As yet, the evidence on SWB and populism is
confined to a small number of (important)
political events. To what extent do these findings
translate to other countries and time periods? In
order to attempt to shed some suggestive
empirical light on the question of (un)happiness
and populism (and/or authoritarianism), it is
useful to turn to the World Values survey

Table 3.1: Subjective Well-Being and the Election of Donald Trump

Swing to
Republicans
(2016-2012)

Current Life
Satisfaction

Life
Satisfaction
in 5 Years

% (0-4) % (7- 10) % (0-4) % (8-10)

Experienced
a lot yesterday
Happy

Stress

Enjoyment

Worry

Smile

Sadness

Anger

lowest to - 10%

3.4

72.5

4.5

71.7

90.8

43.0

86.7

31.6

82.0

16.1

13.9

-10% to -5%

4.4

69.2

4.3

69.1

88.9

39.6

85.0

29.7

82.3

17.5

14.5

-5% to 0%

4.9

66.9

5.1

67.2

88.7

40.0

85.0

29.3

81.3

17.2

14.5

0% to 5%

6.0

63.5

6.2

63.6

87.8

39.1

84.0

29.6

79.9

18.3

14.5

5% to 10%

6.4

61.8

7.4

59.9

87.9

40.5

84.1

29.0

78.4

18.2

14.5

10% to highest

7.1

60.9

7.7

57.9

86.5

40.4

83.1

29.5

77. 1

18.6

13.2

p-value

<0.001

<0.001

< 0.001

<0.001

<0.001

Q.410

<0.001

0.114

<0.001

<0.001

0.932

Source: Herrin et al (2018). SWB figures are based on surveys of 177,192 respondents in 2016 in the Gallup-Healthways
Well-being survey. P-value based on a non-parametric test for trend over voting shift categories. Change in vote share
is from 2012 to 2016. All figures are at the county level.
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Table 3.2: Life Evaluation and Political Values/Attitudes
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Confidence in
Political Parties

Opinion of
Political System

Having a Strong
Leader Bad/Good

Opinion of
Democracy

See Myself as
Citizen of World

(1-4)

(1-10)

(1-4)

(1-4)

(1-4)

Life Satisfaction
(vs. 1)
2

0.067*

0.276***

-0.123*

-0.002

-0.049*

(0.038)

(0.053)

(0.072)

(0.017)

(0.028)

0.041**

0.530***

-0.077***

0.048***

-0.052*

(0.016)

(0.075)

(0.020)

(0.017)

(0.027)

0.084***

0.801***

-0.079***

0.053**

-0.026

(0.019)

(0.093)

(0.027)

(0.020)

(0.022)

0.094***

0.823***

-0.065**

0.055***

0.027

(0.017)

(0.099)

(0.026)

(0.020)

(0.029)

0.126***

1.050***

-0.091***

0.068***

-0.002

(0.022)

(0.114)

(0.031)

(0.023)

(0.028)

0.152***

1.189***

-0.109***

0.088***

0.020

(0.021)

(0.116)

(0.031)

(0.022)

(0.029)

0.172***

1.279***

-0.119***

0.113***

0.064**

(0.022)

(0.125)

(0.031)

(0.023)

(0.028)

9

0.200***

1.379***

-0.131***

0.119***

0.122***

(0.025)

(0.132)

(0.042)

(0.025)

(0.027)

10

0.194***

1.259***

-0.041

0.097***

0.188***

(0.023)

(0.128)

(0.034)

(0.025)

(0.032)

2.05

4.65

2.21

3.34

3.01

333329

180261

349371

352725

146402

3
4
5
6
7
8

Mean Dep Var
Individuals
Countries
Within-Country R2

99

68

100

100

74

0.01

0.04

0.02

0.02

0.01

Source: World Values Survey. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country-level. Further
controls in all models: household income (quintiles), education level, marital status, gender, age and its square.
Notes: * 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

(WVS), which has since the early 1980s included
questions on both SWB and people’s political
attitudes and beliefs. The empirical analysis here
looks in turn at five different attitudes and seeks
to investigate their relationship with both life
satisfaction and general happiness.47
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.2 assess the drivers of
i) respondents’ confidence in established political
parties as well as ii) their overall assessment of
the current political system in their country.
Both measures are likely to tap into the antiestablishment ideas lying behind populist rhetoric
and the general mistrust of the elite.48 As can be
seen in Table 3.2, life satisfaction is associated
with each of the two anti-elite/ anti-establishment
variables.49 Unhappy respondents have the least
faith in political parties and the political system
as a whole in their country.50 For example, those
least satisfied with their lives have an opinion of
the political system that is nearly 1.3 points (on a
1 to 10 scale) lower than the most satisfied,
holding constant other important factors like
income, age and education.51
Columns 3 and 4 move on to the issue of
authoritarian attitudes and beliefs. Here there is

a clear relationship between satisfaction with life
and respondents’ opinion of the benefit of
having a strong leader. The unhappiest among
the survey respondents are the most likely to say
that having a strong leader in charge would be
good for the country.52 A similar relationship
between happiness and authoritarian beliefs is
evident when respondents are asked of their
opinion of democracy in general. Coefficients for
the full set of control variables are reported in an
appendix, and show a particularly strong effect
of education. In predicting both support for
strong leaders and opinions of democracy, being
of high education (as compared to low) is
associated with over a 2-point difference on each
of the 1-4 scales.
Finally, column 5 attempts to tap into concepts
of nativism versus cosmopolitanism. Again, a
clear relationship is found with subjective
well-being. Holding constant a variety of factors
like age, income, and education, the unhappiest
people across the countries included in the WVS
are most likely to more strongly reject the idea of
being a citizen of the world.

Figure 3.5: Life Satisfaction and Voting in the French 2017 Presidential Election
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Source: Algan et al (2018). Lines show the smoothed weighted average of the proportion of people voting for Marine
Le Pen at each level of life satisfaction and at different quintiles of income.
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Figure 3.6: Life Satisfaction over Time in Western Europe
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countries are shown in an appendix.

So, does this mean that rising unhappiness is
driving the rise in populism? The issue is far from
clear-cut, mainly because in the longest-running
source of data for countries where populist
parties have made the most gains over the past
decade, there appears to be very little evidence
of a general increase in misery. Figure 3.5
looks at the 9 countries that have been in the
Eurobarometer from its inception in 1973, and
plots the percentage of the population answering
in each of the four life satisfaction categories.
As can be seen, there is no evident dramatic
uptick in the number of people declaring
themselves to be either “not at all” or “not very”
satisfied with their lives.53 Similarly, Chapter 2
of this report finds that levels of life evaluation
have remained relatively steady over the past
decade and, if anything, have risen over the
past few years.
A puzzle thus arises as to why it is that
a) unhappier people seem to hold more populist
and/or authoritarian attitudes, but b) the rise of
populism seems difficult to explain by any rise in
unhappiness overall. Future research is needed in
order to understand these issues more clearly,
both in Europe (the region on which much of the

discussion here is focused) as well as, importantly,
elsewhere around the world.
One strong hypothesis is that although there has
been little rise in unhappiness in terms of life
satisfaction, it may be that a significant rise in
levels of negative affect (or a drop in positive
affect) is driving the rise in populism support.54
Chapter 2 of this report documents a concerted
rise over the past decade in levels of negative
affect, a measure that is made up of the average
frequency of worry, sadness and anger, all over
the world. In Western Europe, where populist
parties have made significant gains, there has
been a significant rise in these negative emotional
states since 2010. 55 Future work should look
more closely by country (and by region within
countries) at the relationship, if there is one,
between such measures of negative emotional
states and populist party vote shares at general
elections. Additionally, research should investigate
the potential effects of future expectations of
well-being on populist voting.
An alternative, or more likely complementary,
explanation may be that the current rise in
populism is not best explained by demand-side
factors (i.e. unhappiness), but rather on the

supply-side of populist politics. If this is the case,
one important and interesting line of research
may attempt to study the extent to which
populist politicians have successfully developed
ways of appealing to and “tapping into” the
existing well of unhappy people. The use of
(increasingly sophisticated) methods like sentiment analysis on the text of speeches and other
campaign materials by populist and non-populist
politicians, for example, may provide a highly
fruitful avenue of further research in this regard.56
A related hypothesis is that while unhappy
people may have long been favourable to populist
ideas, other cultural and societal factors have
changed over the past few decades that have
allowed for this unhappiness (pent-up demand)
to be now “activated” in the political sphere. For
example, some candidate variables in this regard
might include: the secular decline across the
Western world in general deference, the rise of
social media as a source of information, or the
loss of credibility that elites suffered following
the financial crisis in 2008 (or other public policy
mismanagements).
A final possibility could be that it is not the
average level of well-being that is driving changes
in support for populist political movements,
but it rather has to do with the variance of SWB
(i.e. well-being inequality). Work in the future in
this regard might explore the explanatory power
of measures like the standard deviation of
happiness rather than the mean in predicting
populist electoral success.57 It is worth noting,
however, that the evidence presented in Chapter
2 of this report suggests that there has been no
significant increase in well-being inequality in
Western Europe over the past decade.

Conclusion
Happier people are not only more likely to
engage in politics and vote, but are also more
likely to vote for incumbent parties. This has
significant implications for the electoral incentives
that politicians face while in office. There appears
to be a significant electoral dividend to improving
happiness, beyond ensuring a buoyant economic
situation. Governments around the globe that are
moving in the direction of focusing their policymaking efforts on the population’s broad
well-being are not only doing so to improve

people’s happiness for its own sake, but they also
appear to have electoral reasons to do so out of
(enlightened) self-interest.
The empirical evidence that exists is currently
largely focused on correlations between happiness
and voting behaviour — with influences likely to be
running in both directions, or due to movements in
some third factor. This has obvious drawbacks, and
a significant area of further research will likely be
focused on establishing the likely causal influences
for the various relationships studied in this chapter.
Not only this, a number of further open questions
(both theoretical and empirical) are of great
interest both academically as well as in the
policy sphere. For example, which domains or
sources of people’s subjective well-being are
most prominently driving the empirical association
between happiness, the decision of whether to
vote, and whom to vote for? If there are political
incentives to focus policy on happiness, to what
extent do politicians respond to them? Do
people vote more on the basis of their own
happiness or society’s happiness as a whole? Are
people more likely to make vote choices based
on SWB in countries where official happiness
statistics are more prominently published? Does
the relationship between well-being and voting
differ when considering local and national
elections? Do people reward (punish) left- and
right-wing governments differently for the
(un)happiness of the country? Are right- and
left-wing voters equally likely to base their
political decision-making on their level of
happiness? To what extent, and how, have
successful populist political movements
managed to tap into people’s unhappiness? If it
is true that unhappier people vote for populists,
will populist incumbents be able to retain their
support? And what makes some unhappy
people turn to right-wing populism and some
to left-wing populism?
Research into the links between happiness
and political behaviour is still very modest in
scale, but it is growing significantly. Given the
increasing use of subjective well-being data in
public policy, there is increasing interest in
knowing if and why happiness affects voting
behaviour. Open theoretical and empirical
questions abound in the field, and it is likely
that the literature will continue to grow over
the coming years.
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Endnotes
1	The OECD (Durand 2018) reports that over 20 countries
worldwide have begun to use well-being data in some
way during the policymaking process. See also O’Donnell
et al (2014).
2

See, e.g., chapter 2 of this report.

3	For more on this, see Napier and Jost (2008); Wojcik
(2015); Curini et al (2014).
4	See, e.g., Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005); Blais and
Gélineau (2007); Powdthavee et al (2017); Dolan et al
(2008).
5	See, e.g., Blais et al (2017) and Stadelmann-Steffen and
Vatter (2012) on satisfaction with democracy. See Glaser
and Salovey (2010) for a review of early work in psychology
on affective responses to candidates. For an introduction
to, and review of, some of the early work in political
science on the role of emotions in the political process,
see Marcus (2000).
6

See Blais (2006) for a review.

7

Veenhoven (1988).

8

See De Neve et al (2013).

9

Flavin and Keane (2012).

10 Ojeda (2015).
11

See Zhong and Chen (2002).

12 Dolan et al (2008).
13 Flavin and Keane (2012).
14 Pirralha (2018).
15	Binned scatterplots of continuous SWB and binary political
interest are shown, using OLS FE regressions. No covariates
are included; however, the measures are adjusted for
country fixed effects. That is, the plots are shown having
first residualised from country dummies. The “binning”
takes places after the residualisation from country FEs,
which accounts for the fact that the number of bins is not
necessarily equal to the number of response categories to
the happiness question in the survey.
16	Country and year fixed effects are also included in
the model. The coefficient on “very happy” of .09277
(SE = .04078) reported in the text is derived from a linear
probability model; non-linear specifications produce
similar estimates. N= 439,732.
17 See endnote 1 above.
18	See, e.g., Fair (1978), Kramer (1971), Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier (2000), Healy and Malhotra (2013).
19	Such theories are usually referred to as “political agency”
models, since they model the political process as a
principal-agent relationship (much like in models of
contracts in other areas of economics). Voters are the
principals while governing politicians are the agents, to
whom voters have delegated the responsibility and
authority to make policy. The actions and effort of
politicians are not generally directly observable by the
voters, who instead are left to make their judgements
based on the outcomes that are observable in the world
such as like the state of the economy.

20	For a classic moral hazard model of this type, see,
e.g., Barro 1973. It is also worth noting that more recent
theoretical models have focused on adverse selection in
addition to moral hazard. On these accounts, elections
provide a chance for voters to re-elect incumbents whose
observable outcomes suggest they are more competent
or honest (see, e.g., Fearon 1999, Besley 2006).
21	Ward (2015). On average, the time between a survey and
election is around 4 months.
22	Ibid. The regressions predict cabinet vote share, and
include country and year fixed effects as well as various
contextual and institutional variables standard to the
literature on macroeconomic voting patterns.
23 Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005).
24 Liberini et al (2017a).
25 This was the Labour Party in all-but-one year of the study.
26	In some instances, this may not be the case – for example,
where people die in public hospitals the widowed spouse
could well reasonably blame the government if politicians
have underfunded health care. The authors show, however,
that even after transitions of governments, widowed
individuals continue to “blame” the new governing party.
27	Using a matched control group, the authors confirm this
more formally in a difference-in-difference regression
framework. Additionally, they also show that happiness has
a significant effect on incumbent voting intentions when
using widowhood as an instrumental variable for happiness
in a two-stage least squares regression framework.
28	Away from the United Kingdom, but also at the individual
level, life satisfaction is significantly and positively related
to the intention to vote for a governing party in a survey of
voters in the run-up to the 2013 general election in Malaysia
(Ng et al (2016)). At the national level, the average
happiness of countries using the Latinobarómetro survey is
positively related to national governments’ re-election
chances in subsequent Presidential elections (Martínez
Bravo (2016).
30 See Ward (2015).
31	Determining what is and is not policy-relevant is not
necessarily straightforward. The burgeoning academic
literature across the social sciences on subjective wellbeing has shown that individual and societal happiness is
influenced by a wide array of policy-relevant factors. These
include personal and national income, (un)employment and
inflation, noise and air quality, educational provision, mental
and physical health, the provision and quality of public
services, the control of corruption, social capital and
societal cohesion, and many more (for overviews, see Clark
(2018), Dolan et al (2008), Clark et al (2018)). Even some of
the more inherently personal (and thus seemingly more
policy-irrelevant) factors of people’s lives studied in the
literature - such as gender, age and racial differences in
happiness - are often inextricably linked to the social and
political context of where people live, and frequently call
for a policy-related explanation and/or a policy response.
32	In which case the relationship between changes in SWB
and government vote share may well be asymmetric.
33 Healy et al (2010).
34 Meier et al (2016).

35	For a fuller discussion of the issue of attribution and
incentives, see Healy and Malhotra (2013).
36	For a review of the history of populism in Europe, see
Mudde (2016). See also Mudde (2007).
37	I make no attempt here to provide an overall or
comprehensive definition. There are a number of different
approaches to defining populism – for example, one can
distinguish ideational approaches, political-strategic
approaches, as well as social-cultural ones. For a recent
review of these different approaches to the study of
populism, see Kaltwasser et al (2017).
38 See, e.g., Inglehart and Norris (2017), Dustmann et al (2017).
39 Algan et al (2018).
40	The difference between Le Pen and Macron voters is
substantial. Macron voters are on average nearly 0.3 SDs
above the mean and Le Pen voters just over 0.25 SDs
below it.
41 Alabrese et al (2018).
42 Liberini et al (2017b).
43	Examining a separate political phenomenon – the rise of
protest voting in Rotterdam in the Netherlands - Ouweneel
and Veenhoven (2016) find in a similar vein that protest
voters did not come most frequently from the least happy
districts of Rotterdam. But rather they came from from
what they term the “medium-happy segment”. The authors
instead interpret their results as generally fitting an
explanation in terms of middle-class status anxiety.
44 Herrin et al (2018).
45	These are: less than -10 (in other words a larger than 10
percentage point shift towards Hillary Clinton), -10 to -5, -5
to 0 (inclusive), 0 to 5, 5 to 10, and greater than a 10
percentage point shift towards Donald Trump.
46	For example, other more commonly used variables in the
explanation of the 2016 election in academic as well as
policy discourse - such as economic hardship (the stagnant
wages of the American middle class as well as job losses
arising from the decline in domestic manufacturing) and
other more demographic factors like a perceived ‘status
threat’ by minorities felt on the part of high-status
individuals such as white Americans and men.
47	These five survey items are arguably indicative of populist
and authoritarian attitudes; however, clearly there
is no pretence to these being exhaustive of the concepts
of either.
48	In each case, the model holds constant a number of
variables important to the literature such as age, gender,
education status, and income. A version of the table
reporting coefficients for this full set of controls is shown in
an online appendix. A set of country and year fixed effects
are also included, such that the estimates are derived by
making comparisons between people within any given
country. Here the focus is on life satisfaction, but analogous
tables using general happiness are also shown in an online
appendix.
49	The associations are slightly smaller for women than men,
though not greatly so. See Tables S3.3 and S3.4 in the
online appendix for interaction models of all the regressions
in Table 3.2. Interactions are shown with gender, education
level, and income quintiles.

50	Although these outcomes are measured on ordered likert
scales, linear regressions are presented here for ease of
interpretation; arguably more suitable regressions estimated
using ordered logit models produce similar results.
51	Similar findings are found for general happiness in an online
appendix.
52	This relationship goes in the same (expected) direction
when considering general happiness, but the point
estimates are less clearly defined statistically.
53	In an online appendix, analogous plots for each of the
countries are shown in turn, including those who joined the
European Union (and thus the Eurobarometer) later on in
time.
54	Future work in this direction should look both at overall
levels of positive and, in particular negative affect; but it
should also investigate the role of distinct emotions like
worry, stress, and anger in driving populist support. Work in
this direction will thus build upon the established political
psychology literature, cited above, that investigates the role
of distinct emotions in the political process.
55	It is worth noting, however, that negative affect has fallen in
Central and Eastern Europe, where populist have also seen
electoral success.
56	For more on the use of text-based analysis in the study of
SWB, see Chapter 6 of this report.
57	The same point applies to the question of SWB and turnout
as well as SWB and incumbent voting. Additional models
(available on request) on the sample of elections studied in
Ward (2015) show that the SD of life satisfaction is a
significant predictor of government vote share. However,
the mean (level) effect dominates, and the SD is statistically
non-significant once both level and variance are included in
the equation.
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Introduction
Humans are an extremely prosocial species.
Compared to most primates, humans provide
more assistance to family, friends, and strangers,
even when costly.1 Why do people devote their
resources to helping others? In this chapter, we
examine whether engaging in two specific types
of prosocial behavior, mainly donating one’s time
and money to others, promotes subjective
well-being, which encompasses greater positive
affect, lower negative affect, and greater life
satisfaction.2 Next, we identify the conditions
under which the well-being benefits of prosociality
are most likely to emerge. Finally, we briefly
highlight several levers that can be used to
increase prosocial behavior, thereby potentially
increasing well-being.

How to Interpret the Evidence
In interpreting the evidence presented in this
chapter, it is crucial to recognize that most
research on generosity and happiness has
substantial methodological limitations. Many of
the studies we describe are correlational, and
therefore causal conclusions cannot be drawn.
For example, if people who give to charity report
higher happiness than people who do not, it is
tempting to conclude that giving to charity
increases happiness. But it is also possible that
happier people are more likely to give to charity
(i.e. reverse causality). Or, people who give to
charity may be wealthier, and their wealth – not
their charitable giving – may make them happy.
Researchers typically try to deal with this problem
by statistically controlling for “confounding
variables,” such as wealth. This approach works
reasonably well when the variable of interest
(e.g., charitable giving) and any confounding
variables (e.g., wealth) are measured with a high
degree of precision.
In reality, however, it is often difficult to reliably
measure complex constructs (like wealth) using
brief, self-report surveys. Rather than reporting all
of their assets and liabilities, survey respondents
might be asked to report their household income,
which provides a sensible—but incomplete—
indicator of the broader construct of wealth. For
example, if Sian and Kelly each earn $60,000/
year, but Sian has six kids and no savings, and
Kelly has no kids and a six-figure savings account,

then Kelly is wealthier than Sian and may be able
to give more money to charity. Now, let’s imagine
the relationship between charitable giving and
happiness was really explained entirely by
wealth. Because income does not fully capture
the complex concept of wealth, charitable giving
might still predict happiness over and above
income because the ability to give captures an
aspect of financial security not captured by
income. Although researchers have recognized
these challenges for decades, recent work using
computer simulations has demonstrated that
effectively ruling out confounds is harder than
many scholars have assumed.3
To overcome this issue, it is essential to conduct
experiments in which the variable of interest can
be manipulated without altering other variables.
For example, using experimental methodology,
researchers can give participants money and
assign them at random to spend it on themselves
or on others; because participants are assigned
to engage in generous spending based on the
flip of a coin (metaphorically speaking), they
should not be any wealthier than those assigned
to spend money on themselves, on average.
While experiments may sometimes seem
slight or artificial because they typically involve
adjustments of small behaviours, this approach
eliminates many pesky confounds, like wealth,
that plague correlational research, thereby
enabling statements about how generous
behavior affects happiness.
As the example above illustrates, conducting
experiments tends to be much costlier than
simply asking survey questions. Therefore,
researchers have traditionally relied on relatively
small sample sizes when conducting experiments,
particularly when the experiments attempt to
alter people’s behavior in the real world. This
reliance on small sample sizes not only creates a
risk of failing to detect effects that are real—it
also creates a high risk of finding “false positives,”
effects that turn out not to be real.4
In order to establish replicable effects, researchers
now recognize that it is important to conduct
experiments with sufficiently large sample sizes. A
recent meta-analysis concluded that experiments
on helping and happiness should include at least
200 participants per condition.5 This means that
an experiment in which participants are randomly
assigned to one of two conditions needs at least
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400 participants in order to produce reliable
results. Unfortunately, almost none of the
experiments conducted in this area meet this
criterion, although we specifically flag those that
do. In fact, many studies in this area include
fewer than 50 participants per condition (including
some of our own). This is worrisome because
samples sizes much under 50 are barely sufficient
to detect that men weigh more than women
(at least 46 men and 46 women are needed to
reliably detect this difference, which is about half
a standard deviation).6 Thus, unless researchers
are examining an effect that is genuinely large
(i.e., bigger than the gender difference in
weight), studies with group sizes under 50 run a
high risk of being false positives. For this reason,
we describe studies with group sizes below 50
as “small” throughout this chapter, and we urge
readers to treat evidence from these studies as
suggestive rather than conclusive.

Well-being Benefits of Giving Time
Volunteering is defined as helping another person
with no expectation of monetary compensation.7
A great deal of correlational research shows
that spending time helping others is associated
with emotional benefits for the giver. Indeed,
research has documented a robust link between
volunteering and greater life satisfaction, positive
affect, and reduced depression. In a review of
37 correlational studies with samples ranging
from 15 to over 2,100,8 adult volunteers scored
significantly higher on quality of life measures
compared to non-volunteers.9
The conclusions of this review paper have
been confirmed in two more recent large-scale
examinations. First, a recent synthesis of the
literature including 17 longitudinal cohort studies
(N=72,241) found that volunteering was linked
to greater life satisfaction, greater quality of life,
and lower rates of depression.10 The majority
of the studies included in this synthesis used
inconsistent quality of life measures and
participants were mostly women living in
North America aged fifty or older. Fortunately,
converging data from a large nationally
representative sample of respondents living
in the UK helps to overcome these limitations.
In a sample of 66,343 respondents, volunteering
was associated with greater well-being, as
measured by the General Health Survey, a

validated scale which includes several items related
to general happiness.11 In this study, the well-being
benefits of volunteering emerged most strongly for
individuals forty years of age or older. Collectively,
these data provide compelling evidence that there
is a reliable link between volunteering and various
measures of subjective well-being, while also
indicating the possibility of critical moderators,
which is a point we return to below.
Additional research suggests that the relationship
between volunteering and well-being appears
to be a cross-cultural universal. Researchers
analyzed data from the Gallup World Poll, a
survey that comprises representative samples
from over 130 countries. Across both poor and
wealthy countries (N=1,073,711), there is a positive
relationship between volunteer participation and
well-being (see Table 4.1 for average monthly
estimates of the percentage of people who
volunteered time or made charitable donations
in years 2009-2017 of the Gallup World Poll, and
Figure 4.1 for a graphical representation of the
individual-level data depicting the strength of
the relationship between volunteering and
well-being for the same years).12 These results
further point to the reliability of the association
between volunteering and subjective well-being
across diverse economic, political, and cultural
settings.13
Of course, it is possible that demographic
differences between volunteers and non-volunteers
explain observed differences in well-being.14 For
example, women are more likely than men to
volunteer15 and derive greater satisfaction from
communal activities.16 Moreover, a large survey of
over 2,000 people in the UK indicates volunteers
are older and from higher socioeconomic
backgrounds.17 In addition, a large sample of over
5,000 responses to the English Longitudinal
Study of Aging indicates that volunteers are
healthier than non-volunteers.18 It is also possible
that the benefits of volunteering are driven
entirely by the fact that people who volunteer
are generally more socially connected than
non-volunteers.19 Stated differently, it is possible
that there is no unique relationship between
volunteering and well-being. Casting doubt on
these possibilities, in a sample of 10,317 women
and men recruited from the Wisconsin Longitudinal
Study, volunteering predicted well-being above
and beyond numerous demographic characteristics
and participation in self-focused social activities,

Figure 4.1: A graphical representation of the association between volunteer
participation and well-being around the world.
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Note: Volunteer work predicts greater life satisfaction in most countries surveyed by the Gallup World Poll
(2009-2017; N=1,073,711) while controlling for several important covariates, such as age, household income, gender,
food security, education, and marital status. Shading depicts the degree of association in standardized beta weights.

such as formal sports, cultural groups, or country
clubs.20 The results of these large-scale surveys
suggest a robust link between volunteering and
well-being that exists beyond demographics and
social connectedness.
Despite the seemingly ubiquitous association
between volunteering and well-being, there is
very little experimental evidence showing that
volunteering causally improves happiness.
For instance, in a systematic review of
nine experiments with a total sample of
715 participants (median number of participants
per study = 54), researchers found no evidence
that volunteering casually improved well-being
or reduced depressive symptoms.21 Consistent
with this observation, in a more recent
experimental study, 106 Canadian 10th graders
were assigned to volunteer 1-2 hours per week
for 10 consecutive weeks or to a wait-list control.22
Students assigned to volunteer showed no

change in positive affect, negative affect, or
self-esteem as compared to the wait-list.
Similarly, the largest known experimental
study in the literature to date showed no causal
impact of volunteering on subjective well-being.
A sample of 293 college students in Boston were
randomly assigned to complete 10-12 hours of
formal volunteering each week or were randomly
assigned to a wait-list control group. When
subjective well-being was assessed for both
groups, there was no positive benefit of formal
volunteering.23 Unlike the majority of published
experimental research in this area, this
experiment was pre-registered and sufficiently
powered to detect a small effect of volunteering
on subjective well-being. Thus, this experimental
study suggests that existing correlational data
may have overestimated the well-being benefits
of volunteering.24
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Another possibility is that there are critical
conditions predicting when and for whom
volunteering promotes well-being. In a study
of more than 1,000 community dwelling older
adults living in the US, volunteering was linked
to greater well-being for individuals who believe
that other people are fundamentally good versus
those higher in hostile cynicism and believe other
people are selfish and greedy.25 As described
above, older individuals benefit more from
formal volunteering.26 Relatedly, individuals who
score higher in depressive symptoms also report
experiencing greater boosts in well-being from
volunteering. In one daily diary study—which
asked 100 participants to report on their mood
and helping activities each day for ten days—
respondents experiencing the greatest depressive
symptoms reported the greatest mood benefits
from helping others.27 Individuals who score
lower in agreeableness also experience greater
well-being in response to volunteering. In one
experimental study (N=348), participants who
scored lower in agreeableness, and who were
randomly assigned to spend time helping other
people in their daily life (vs. a control condition),
reported the greatest increases in life satisfaction
over a three-week intervention study period.28
In summary, the research presented in this
section provides evidence for a reliable association
between formal volunteering and subjective
well-being in large correlational surveys but
reveals little evidence for a causal relationship.
Given the dearth of large-scale experimental
studies sufficiently powered to explore this
question, more research is needed. Recent findings
indicate that individuals from at-risk groups gain
the greatest benefits from volunteering, suggesting
that these may be the most fruitful samples for
further exploration.

Well-being Benefits of Giving Money
Spending money on others – often called prosocial
spending – is associated with higher levels of
well-being. Evidence for this relationship comes
from various sources. For instance, individual who
pay more money in taxes – thereby directing a
portion of their income to fellow citizens through
public goods – report greater well-being in over
two decades of German panel data, even while
controlling for income and a number of other
predictors of happiness.29 In addition, charitable

donations appear to activate reward centers
within the human brain, such as the orbital
frontal cortex and ventral striatum.30 Moreover, in
a representative sample of over 600 American
adults, individuals who spent more money in a
typical month on others by providing gifts and
donating to charity reported greater happiness.31
Meanwhile, how much money people reported
spending on themselves in a typical month was
unrelated to their happiness.32 More broadly,
responses from more than one million people in
130 countries surveyed by the Gallup World Poll
indicates that financial generosity – measured as
whether one has donated to charity in the past
month – is one of the top six predictors of life
satisfaction around the world (see Table 2.1 in
Chapter 2 for the latest aggregate results, while
Figure 4.2 shows results based on individual data).
In contrast to the volunteering literature
discussed above, the causal impact of financial
generosity on happiness is supported by several
small experimental studies.33 For example, in one
of the first experiments on this topic, 46 Canadian
students were randomly assigned to spend a five
or twenty dollar windfall on themselves or others
by the end of the day. In the evening, all students
were called on the phone to report their happiness
levels.34 Individuals randomly assigned to spend
money on others (vs. themselves) reported
significantly higher levels of happiness. Although
the sample size of this initial study was very
small and consisted only of university students,
more recent research has provided further
support for this idea. A large scale experiment
using a similar design yields consistent findings
with over 200 participants per condition.35
Several experiments support the possibility that
the relationship between prosocial spending and
happiness may be detectable in most humans
around the globe.36 For instance, participants in
Canada (N=140), India (N=101), and Uganda
(N=700) reported higher levels of happiness
after reflecting on a time they spent money
on others versus themselves.37 The emotional
benefits of generous spending are also
detectable among individuals from rich and poor
nations immediately after purchases are made. In
one study, a total of 207 students from Canada
and South Africa earned a small amount of
money that they could use to purchase an edible
treat, such as cookies or juice, available to them
at a discounted price. Half the participants were

Figure 4.2: A graphical representation of the association between prosocial
spending and well-being around the world.
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Note: Donating money to charity predicts greater life satisfaction in most countries surveyed by the Gallup World Poll
(2009-2017; N=1,073,711) while controlling for several important covariates, such as age, household income, gender,
food security, education, and marital status. Shading depicts the degree of association in standardized beta weights.

told that the items they purchased were for
themselves, and the other half of participants
were told that the items they purchased would
be donated to a sick child at a local hospital.
Importantly, participants in both conditions were
able to choose between whether they wanted to
make a purchase (and, if so, what to buy) or take
the cash for themselves. This choice provided
participants with a sense of autonomy over their
spending , which is important for experiencing
the emotional rewards of giving (discussed in
greater detail below). Immediately afterward, all
participants reported their current positive
affect. Converging with earlier findings, individuals
who purchased items for others were happier.38
Importantly, this finding emerged not only in
Canada (where few students reported financial
hardship), but also in South Africa, where more
than 20% of respondents reported trouble
securing food for their family in the past year.

Additional research suggests that the emotional
benefits of prosocial spending are detectable
even in places where people have had little to
no contact with Western culture. Consider one
study conducted with a small number of villagers
(N=26) from a traditional society in Vanuatu,
where villagers live in huts made from local
materials, survive on subsistence farming, and
have no running water or electricity. Villagers
participated in a version of the goody-bag study,
in which they earned a small sum of money that
they could use to buy packaged candy, a rare
treat on the island nation. Once again, half the
participants were able to purchase the candy for
themselves while the other half were able to
purchase the candy for another villager. Consistent
with previous research, villagers reported greater
happiness after purchasing treats for others
rather than themselves.39
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As well as emerging around the world, the
emotional rewards of giving may be detectable
early in life. In one small study conducted with
20 Canadian toddlers, children were given eight
edible treats and asked to share some of these
treats with a puppet. Throughout the study,
children’s’ facial responses were captured on film
and later coded for happiness. Coders observed
that toddlers showed larger smiles when giving
treats away than when receiving treats themselves,40 and this result has been replicated in a
handful of subsequent studies with larger samples.41
Finally, the emotional rewards of prosocial
spending are even detectable among recent
criminal offenders. In one large, pre-registered
experiment, 1295 ex-offenders were randomly
assigned to purchase items for themselves or
children in need before reporting their current
happiness.42 As observed in other samples,
ex-offenders reported greater happiness when
purchasing for others than when purchasing for
themselves. Taken together, these findings point
to the possibility that the well-being benefits of
generous spending may be a human universal.
Financial generosity seems to lead to happiness
in a variety of contexts, suggesting that it is a
relatively robust effect. Studies using the goody
bag paradigm demonstrate that the emotional
benefits of prosocial spending emerge even
when givers do not interact directly with the
recipient (N=207).43 In addition, the positive
emotions that givers experience after generous
spending have been detected with various
assessment tools, such as self-report happiness
scales and observer reports, suggesting that
findings are not accidental outcomes captured on
one specific measure. Indeed, in one experiment
conducted with 119 Canadian university students,
a research assistant unaware of a participant’s
recent spending rated individuals who bought
items for charity as happier than individuals who
bought items for themselves.44

Different Currencies,
Different Contexts
In addition to giving time and money, people
can provide assistance in various other ways. For
instance, holding the door open for a stranger,
paying someone a compliment, caring for a sick
relative, comforting a spouse, or returning a lost

wallet are all small but meaningful forms of
generous action. Consistent with much of the
work reported above, these demonstrations of
social support and kindness may promote
well-being for the helper as well.45 In one study,
104 participants randomly assigned to commit
five random acts of kindness a week over a
six-week period were happier than those assigned
to a no-action control group, but only when all
five acts were completed on one day per week
(as opposed to spread out over a week).46 More
recently, researchers conducted a six-week
experiment in which a sample of students, online
workers, and community dwelling adults (N=473)
were randomly assigned to commit acts of
kindness for either other people, humanity/the
world, or themselves; meanwhile, a neutral
control group did not alter their behavior.47 Both
forms of prosocial – kindness directed to others
and humanity/the world – led to the greatest
happiness improvements overtime.
Even in the workplace, where most adults spend
a substantial portion of their time, research
suggests that prosocial behavior and a prosocial
orientation are linked to emotional benefits for
employees and overall job satisfaction.48 For
instance, in one well-powered longitudinal survey
(from 1957-2004, N > 10,000), the importance
participants reported placing on the opportunity
to help others when selecting a job predicted
their well-being almost 30 years later.49 In a
3-week study, employees (N = 68) completed
mood measures each morning and then several
times during the course of each workday.
Employees who engaged in prosocial behaviors
(e.g., “Helped someone outside my workgroup”
and “Covered for coworkers who were absent or
on break”) experienced greater positive mood
over time.50 Yet, while every corporation offers
personal incentives (in the form of wages and
bonuses), far fewer companies offer prosocial
incentives or bonuses – such as the opportunity
to donate to charity, or to spend on co-workers.
Although companies clearly believe that such
“personal” incentives are effective, they are
linked with some unfortunate consequences,
including increased competition and decreased
helping among employees.51 While personal
incentives clearly are effective in some situations
and with some employees, it is possible that
prosocial incentives may also be effective in not
only improving the well-being of employees, but

also their performance. Demonstrating this, in
one small-scale field experiment (N = 139), bank
employees randomly assigned to donate either
$50 to charity reported not only greater job
satisfaction but also greater happiness, compared
to employees not given this opportunity or those
assigned to donate only $25.52

When Giving to Others is Most Likely
to Increase Well-Being
Behaving generously can increase happiness—
but this effect is not inevitable. Instead, research
has identified several key ingredients that seem
to be important for turning good deeds into
good feelings. Specifically, people are more likely
to derive joy from helping others when:
(1) they feel free to choose whether or
how to help.
(2) they feel connected to the people
they are helping.
(3) they can see how their help is making
a difference.
Freedom of choice. Considering the potential
benefits of giving for both individuals and
society, it is tempting to require at least some
groups of people (such as students or the
unemployed) to engage in volunteer work or
other forms of helping. But making people feel
that they have been forced to help others can
undercut the pleasure of giving. For example, in
one study, 138 American university students were
asked to keep a daily diary, reporting whether
and how they helped each day, as well as rating
their day-to-day happiness.53 The students felt
happier on days when they provided help to
someone or did something for a good cause—but
only if they did so because it seemed important
to them, enjoyable, and consistent with their
values. When they helped because they felt it
was mandatory or necessary in order to avoid
disapproval, the emotional benefits of generosity
evaporated.
Similarly, data from 167 American adults reveals
spending money on others is associated with
greater happiness among individuals who believe
strongly in social justice, equality, helping and
similar self-transcendent values.54 But there is
no detectable relationship between prosocial
spending and happiness for individuals who do
not endorse such self-transcendent values,

suggesting that requiring these people to help
would not improve their happiness.
The importance of free choice may help to
explain a long-standing puzzle within research
on volunteering: Older people tend to derive
greater emotional benefits from volunteering
than younger people.55 Although a variety of
factors may contribute to this age difference,
scholars have argued that younger people may
derive less pleasure from volunteering in part
because they are more likely to see this activity
as an obligation—something they have to do to
gain work experience.56
Several small experimental studies provide
supporting evidence for the idea that choice
matters. In one experiment, 80 American university
students made a series of decisions about how
to divide a windfall of $5 between themselves
and another participant. The more they gave
away, the better they felt afterward.57 However,
when the opportunity to choose was removed,
such that participants were forced to give a
certain amount of money away, the benefits of
giving disappeared entirely. And in an fMRI study
with 19 participants, people exhibited greater
activation in regions of the brain linked to
processing rewards when they were allowed to
make voluntary donations to a local food bank
than when these donations were mandatory.58
Participants in this study also reported feeling
10% more satisfied with their donation when it
was voluntary rather than mandatory, even though
the money was always going to a good cause.
How, then, can people be encouraged to engage
in generous behavior, without undermining the
emotional benefits of their generosity? Simply
altering the way help is requested or framed may
make a difference. In a small lab study, 104
American university students were presented
with an opportunity to help out with a task and
were told that they “should help out” or that “it’s
entirely your choice whether to help or not”.59
When their freedom to choose was highlighted,
participants felt happier after helping compared
to those who were told they should help. In a
more extensive six-week study, 218 university
students across both the US and South Korea
were required to complete acts of kindness each
week.60 Half of them were randomly assigned to
receive messages designed to support their
feelings of autonomy by, for example, emphasizing
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that how and where they chose to help was
entirely up to them. Across both cultural groups,
students who received these messages showed
greater improvement in happiness compared to
students who engaged in acts of kindness without
receiving these messages. These results were
somewhat inconsistent across outcome measures,
however, and like all of the findings presented in
this section, this promising approach would be
worthwhile to test on a larger scale.
Social connection. When engaging in generous
behavior provides opportunities for positive
social interactions and relationships, helping is
likely to be especially beneficial for the helper.
Correlational research on volunteering suggests
that part of the reason volunteers are less
depressed than non-volunteers is simply that
volunteers attend more meetings, providing
more opportunities for social integration.61 A
correlational study of spending habits points to
a similar conclusion. A sample of over 1,500
Japanese students were asked whether they
had spent any money on others over the summer
and whether doing so had exerted any positive
influence on their social relationships.62 Most
students who spent money on others reported
that this expenditure had positively influenced
their relationships. And these students reported
greater overall happiness compared to students
who had not spent money on others or had
spent money on others without perceiving any
positive impact on their relationships. Of course,
these correlational findings are open to a variety
of explanations—for example, happier people
may simply be more likely to spend money on
others and to perceive positive effects on their
relationships.
Several small experimental studies provide at
least some supporting evidence for the idea that
feelings of social connection are important in
turning generosity into happiness. When 80
adults were approached on a Canadian university
campus and asked to reflect on a past prosocial
spending experience, they felt happier if they
were asked to think about spending money on
a close friend or family member rather than an
acquaintance.63 Even when people give money
to stranger or acquaintances, providing an
opportunity for social interaction might increase
the emotional benefits of giving. A small sample
of twenty-four students in a lecture hall were
given $10 and allowed to decide how much, if

any, to share with a classmate who had not
received any money.64 The more money these
students gave away, the better they felt afterward—but only if they were allowed to deliver
the money in person to their classmate. When
students made the same decision without having
the opportunity to personally deliver the donation,
those who gave away more money actually felt
slightly worse.
For charities, then, an important challenge lies
in making donors feel connected to causes that
otherwise would feel distant or unfamiliar. To
explore this idea, researchers approached
68 adults on a Canadian university campus
and presented them with an opportunity to
donate to a charity that provides fresh water to
rural African communities.65 Half the time, the
researcher disclosed that she was personally
involved with the charity and that she was
helping raise money for a friend who had recently
returned from working with the charity in Africa.
The rest of the time, the researcher did not reveal
this information. Although participants made their
donations in private, without the researcher’s
knowledge, they got more of an emotional boost
from giving if they knew that the researcher was
personally connected to the cause.66 Because
this experiment (like all the others in this section)
relied on a small convenience sample, these
results should be interpreted with special caution.
Still, we would tentatively suggest that enhancing
feelings of social connection for volunteers and
donors may represent a promising avenue for
increasing the emotional benefits of helping.
Seeing how you made a difference. Generous
behavior may be more likely to promote happiness
when helpers can easily see how their actions
make a difference for others. When people look
back on their past acts of kindness, they feel
happier if they are asked to think about actions
that were motivated by a genuine concern for
others, rather than by benefits for themselves
(N=299).67 This finding aligns with research
examining the health correlates of volunteering.
For instance, a study examining data from over
10,000 individuals in the Wisconsin Longitudinal
Study found that volunteering is associated with
lower mortality risk in older adults,68 but only
when volunteering is motivated by other-oriented
(as opposed to self-oriented) reasons.69 These
findings tentatively suggest that helping people
see how their actions make a difference for

others might enhance their long-term positive
feelings about engaging in acts of kindness.
To test this idea more directly, researchers
presented 120 people on a Canadian university
campus with an opportunity to donate to charity.70
Half of them were asked to donate to UNICEF.
The others were asked to donate to Spread the
Net. Although both UNICEF and Spread the Net
are devoted to promoting children’s health,
UNICEF tackles a very broad range of initiatives,
potentially making it difficult for donors to
envision how their dollars will make a difference.
In contrast, Spread the Net offers a clear, concrete
promise: For every $10 donated, they supply one
bed net to protect a child from malaria. The more
participants donated to Spread the Net, the
better they felt afterward, whereas this emotional
“return on investment” was eliminated when
people gave money to UNICEF. This finding
suggests that charities may be able to increase
donors’ happiness by making it easier for them
to envision how their help is making a concrete
difference.
In fact, simply re-framing helpers’ goals to be
more concrete and achievable can make giving
feel more satisfying.71 While taking a break
between completing surveys, 92 American
university students were asked to help recruit
bone marrow donors by preparing flyers. Before
completing this task, they were asked to pursue
either a relatively abstract goal (providing “hope”
to those in need of bone marrow donations) or a
more concrete one (providing “a better chance
of finding a donor”). After helping out with the
fliers, individuals who had been told to pursue
the more concrete goal felt happier than those
presented with the more abstract goal. Thus, by
prompting donors and volunteers to give with a
concrete, achievable goal in mind, charities may
be able to increase the emotional rewards of
their contributions.
Finally, some research suggests that the
benefits of having a specific prosocial impact
also strengthen the link between helping and
emotional benefits both at and after work.72
Indeed, some initial evidence from a small
sample (N = 33) of employees suggests that
feelings of prosocial impact may in some cases
lead to improved employee performance. In a
two week longitudinal study, call center employees
who read information about how their work

made a difference in the lives of others were
more successful in garnering donations than
workers who read about how their work could
benefit them personally, or those in a control
condition.73
Summary and implications for policy. Research
on the factors that amplify the happiness
benefits of helping is limited, due to reliance
on correlational designs and experiments with
small convenience samples. Still, this literature
provides some valuable clues: people seem most
likely to derive happiness from giving experiences
that provide a sense of free choice, opportunities
for social connection, and a chance to see how
the help has made a difference.
Policies and programs that offer all three of
these ingredients may have a particularly high
likelihood of providing happiness benefits for
givers. For example, consider Canada’s innovative
Group of 5 program, whereby any five Canadians
can privately sponsor a family of refugees.
Although tax dollars provide support for refugees
in many countries, Canada is the only country in
the world that allows ordinary citizens to take
such an autonomous role in this process. After
raising enough money to support a family for
their first year in Canada, the sponsorship group
has the opportunity to meet the family at the
airport, as they first set foot in Canada. Because
the sponsorship group provides help with
everything from finding housing and a family
doctor to getting the kids enrolled in school,
there is ample opportunity to see how the
family’s life is being transformed and to develop
strong social relationships with them. It is also
notable that no Canadian is allowed to undertake
this alone; requiring people to work together in
a group of five or more is likely to increase social
bonds among those who want to help (as well as
improving feasibility). Thus, this policy provides
a model of one way in which governments can
facilitate positive helping experiences for their
own citizens, while addressing broader problems
in the world.
Finally, while the evidence above examines the
link between prosociality and happiness for the
giver, it is worth asking if receiving assistance is
beneficial for the recipient. To this end, a large
body of research demonstrates that receiving
social support, such as encouragement from
close others, is typically associated with greater
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psychological and physical well-being.74 However,
receiving other forms of aid, such as financial
support, may have detrimental consequences
for the recipient because it may lead to social
stigma75 or threaten one’s self-esteem.76 As a
result, it is critical to examine when generosity
is beneficial for both parties. To the best of
our knowledge, research in this area is limited
but early evidence suggests that two of the
aforementioned ingredients – autonomy and
social connection – may prove important.
Highlighting the value of autonomy, one small
experiment (N=124) found that both helpers and
recipients experienced greater positive emotion
after helpers provided autonomous help (as
opposed to controlled help or no help at all).77
Another small study demonstrates the potential
value of social connection. Above we described
a study in which twenty-four students could
decide how much of a $10 sum to give another
student in their classroom.78 Givers were happier
when they gave more money, but only when the
funds were delivered in person. Interestingly,
recipients also reported greater happiness from
receiving more money when the funds were
given in person (vs. through an intermediary).
Taken together these findings provide tentative
evidence that giving which facilitates autonomy
and social connection may offer the greatest
benefits for both parties.

How to Encourage Prosociality
Given its benefits, how can prosociality be
encouraged? A large body of research suggests
that prosocial behavior can be increased through
various individual, organizational, and cultural
factors, some of which we briefly describe below.
At the individual level, some research suggests
that helpers are more likely to provide assistance
when experiencing positive emotional states.79
For instance, awe – a positive emotion felt when
encountering vast and expansive stimuli, such
a panoramic view of the Pacific Ocean – is
associated with and leads to greater generosity.
Evidence supporting this claim comes from
several sources. Among a large, nationally
representative sample of over 1,500 Americans,
people reporting that they experience more
awe in their daily lives were also more likely to
generously share raffle tickets for a large cash
draw with a stranger.80 Supplementing this

correlational research, an experiment conducted
with 254 students suggests that awe causally
increases generosity. Students randomly
assigned to view an awe-inducing video of
stunning nature scenes were more generous in
a subsequent task than students shown an
amusing or emotionally neutral film.81 How can
communities and policy makers harness this
research to increase generosity? One way may
be to invest in public green spaces, such as
parks, trails, or beaches. Exposure to nature,
especially scenes that are large and expansive,
may boost kindness in light of the research
discussed above.
A number of other factors have been shown to
promote prosocial behavior. As just one example,
some evidence suggests that people donate
more money to charitable causes and campaigns
when they appreciate how their assistance will
help those in need. For instance, one experiment
found that providing potential donors with
information about how their funds would be
used led to donations that were nearly double
the size.82 Therefore, information about the
impact of one’s help may not only unleash the
emotional benefits of giving as discussed above,
it may also increase generosity. Organizations
and charities can capitalize on these findings by
providing clear information about their programs.
Doing so allows people to see how they can
effectively improve the lives of vulnerable
targets, which should bolster support from
potential donors.
In addition, certain large-scale or cultural
factors can impact generosity as well. For
instance, culture may shape the rates and forms
of help provided around the world. Indeed,
while generosity appears to be valued in many
cultures,83 cultural norms shape rates and forms
of helping behavior.84 In our analyses of the
Gallup World Poll, it is evident that rates of
volunteering and charitable giving differ
dramatically depending on the cultural context.
For example, rates of charitable donation within
the past month range from the lowest of 7% of
respondents in Myanmar to the highest of 89%
in Burundi (See Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: The percentage of respondents within each country who reported
donating to charity or volunteering within the last month.

Country

Percentage of respondents
within the country who reported
Donating Money to a Charity
in the Past Month

Percentage of respondents within the
country who reported Volunteering
Time to an Organization in the
Past Month

All Countries

29.2%

19.7%

(1)

Afghanistan

28.1%

17.9%

(2)

Albania

18.8%

8.4%

(3)

Algeria

11.2%

8.7%

(4)

Angola

13.6%

16.8%

(5)

Argentina

19.0%

16.4%

(6)

Armenia

9.3%

7.9%

(7)

Australia

70.3%

38.1%

(8)

Austria

53.0%

26.9%

(9)

Azerbaijan

15.0%

22.3%

(10)

Bangladesh

15.9%

11.4%

(11)

Belarus

18.6%

27.0%

(12)

Belgium

40.7%

25.9%

(13)

Belize

28.6%

25.3%

(14)

Benin

11.4%

13.2%

(15)

Bolivia

22.3%

22.1%

(16)

Bosnia Herzegovina

33.4%

5.2%

(17)

Botswana

13.9%

19.0%

(18)

Bulgaria

16.9%

5.4%

(19)

Burkina Faso

13.2%

14.5%

(20)

Burundi

6.5%

8.6%

(21)

Cambodia

41.5%

8.3%

(22)

Cameroon

19.1%

15.7%

(23)

Canada

63.4%

37.4%

(24)

Central African Republic

14.0%

21.3%

(25)

Chad

15.6%

14.9%

(26)

Chile

45.1%

15.0%

(27)

China

10.5%

4.8%

(28)

Colombia

22.7%

20.5%

(29)

Congo Brazzaville

11.9%

14.8%

(30)

Congo Kinshasa

11.2%

14.7%

(31)

Costa Rica

32.5%

23.2%

(32)

Croatia

20.7%

8.6%

(33)

Cyprus

46.0%

25.8%

(34)

Denmark

60.3%

22.4%

(35)

Dominican Republic

26.5%

33.2%

(36)

Ecuador

17.0%

14.3%

(37)

Egypt

15.8%

6.2%

(38)

El Salvador

12.6%

18.3%

(39)

Estonia

19.9%

17.9%

(40)

Ethiopia

18.4%

16.8%

(41)

Finland

43.3%

28.7%

(42)

France

27.7%

27.6%

(43)

Georgia

5.2%

17.5%

(44)

Germany

49.4%

25.0%

(45)

Ghana

24.5%

31.6%
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Table 4.1: The percentage of respondents within each country who reported
donating to charity or volunteering within the last month. (continued)

Country

Percentage of respondents
within the country who reported
Donating Money to a Charity
in the Past Month

(46)

Guatemala

33.3%

35.0%

(47)

Haiti

47.6%

31.2%

(48)

Honduras

27.8%

30.8%

(49)

Hong Kong

60.4%

16.9%

(50)

Hungary

20.7%

9.5%

(51)

Iceland

67.3%

26.8%

(52)

India

25.9%

18.5%

(53)

Indonesia

68.7%

38.8%

(54)

Iran

51.9%

23.3%

(55)

Ireland

69.9%

38.3%

(56)

Israel

51.9%

23.1%

(57)

Italy

38.4%

16.4%

(58)

Japan

24.4%

24.0%

(59)

Jordan

18.9%

6.9%

(60)

Kazakhstan

21.3%

21.2%

(61)

Kenya

36.2%

35.7%

(62)

Kosovo

38.6%

11.4%

(63)

Kyrgyzstan

25.3%

25.8%

(64)

Laos

42.9%

13.2%

(65)

Latvia

26.9%

10.2%

(66)

Lebanon

35.1%

10.4%

(67)

Liberia

16.8%

48.5%

(68)

Lithuania

12.2%

11.2%

(69)

Luxembourg

52.1%

30.0%

(70)

Macedonia

28.1%

8.6%

(71)

Madagascar

11.0%

25.1%

(72)

Malawi

21.5%

29.7%

(73)

Malaysia

44.9%

29.5%

(74)

Mali

12.1%

10.2%

(75)

Malta

71.0%

25.3%

(76)

Mauritania

22.6%

16.3%

(77)

Mexico

20.9%

18.9%

(78)

Moldova

20.6%

17.3%

(79)

Mongolia

42.3%

35.5%

(80)

Montenegro

20.2%

7.6%

(81)

Mozambique

16.7%

30.2%

(82)

Namibia

11.1%

22.0%

(83)

Nepal

30.6%

27.0%

(84)

Netherlands

70.0%

35.6%

(85)

New Zealand

67.5%

41.5%

(86)

Nicaragua

28.3%

20.5%

(87)

Niger

8.8%

10.4%

(88)

Nigeria

29.6%

33.7%

(89)

Norway

60.3%

32.1%

(90)

Pakistan

32.8%

14.2%

(91)

Panama

33.4%

26.7%

(92)

Paraguay

34.4%

21.6%

Percentage of respondents within the
country who reported Volunteering
Time to an Organization in the
Past Month

Table 4.1: The percentage of respondents within each country who reported
donating to charity or volunteering within the last month. (continued)

Country

Percentage of respondents
within the country who reported
Donating Money to a Charity
in the Past Month

(93)

Peru

19.3%

19.4%

(94)

Philippines

25.3%

39.3%

(95)

Poland

28.9%

11.5%

(96)

Portugal

22.5%

14.2%

(97)

Puerto Rico

39.3%

26.2%

(98)

Qatar

59.6%

16.6%

(99)

Romania

21.6%

6.7%

(100)

Russia

10.1%

17.5%

(101)

Rwanda

16.3%

13.5%

(102)

Saudi Arabia

29.5%

14.0%

(103)

Senegal

12.5%

13.4%

(104)

Serbia

21.7%

5.1%

(105)

Sierra Leone

26.1%

41.0%

(106)

Singapore

49.8%

19.9%

(107)

Slovakia

29.5%

14.3%

(108)

Slovenia

37.1%

33.5%

(109)

South Africa

16.7%

24.9%

(110)

South Korea

35.4%

21.6%

(111)

Spain

29.9%

15.9%

(112)

Sri Lanka

52.8%

48.3%

(113)

Sudan

19.9%

23.1%

(114)

Sweden

57.0%

13.5%

(115)

Switzerland

54.0%

31.8%

(116)

Syria

43.0%

13.0%

(117)

Taiwan

40.7%

18.8%

(118)

Tajikistan

19.9%

39.9%

(119)

Tanzania

31.5%

14.3%

(120)

Thailand

72.8%

15.4%

(121)

Togo

9.4%

14.5%

(122)

Trinidad and Tobago

37.1%

31.9%

(123)

Tunisia

10.6%

8.6%

(124)

Turkey

18.4%

8.5%

(125)

Uganda

22.0%

26.0%

(126)

Ukraine

18.2%

20.3%

(127)

United Kingdom

72.3%

29.5%

(128)

United States

62.3%

42.4%

(129)

Uruguay

26.4%

15.4%

(130)

Uzbekistan

32.4%

35.5%

(131)

Venezuela

13.4%

12.5%

(132)

Vietnam

22.9%

12.0%

(133)

Zambia

20.8%

28.5%

(134)

Zimbabwe

9.9%

20.5%

Percentage of respondents within the
country who reported Volunteering
Time to an Organization in the
Past Month

Note: This table presents the percentage of respondents reporting that they donated money to charity or
volunteered time to an organization within the past month within each country surveyed by the Gallup World Poll,
averaged across 2009-2017.
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Conclusion
This chapter summarizes research on the link
between prosocial behavior and happiness.
While numerous large-scale surveys document a
robust association between donating time and
well-being (even while statistically controlling for
a number of confounds), experimental evidence
offers little support for a causal relationship.
Meanwhile, a growing body of experimental
evidence suggests that using money to benefit
others leads to happiness. Future research should
aim to utilize large, pre-registered experiments
that identify key predictions in advance.
As research examining these questions continues,
there may be opportunities for testing and

harnessing the benefits of prosociality in daily
life. For instance, education and health care
services may adopt prosocial strategies that can
be compared to current “business as usual”
practices used elsewhere. This also has the
advantage of building collaborations spanning
academic, private, and governmental partners.
The involvement of front-line service providers in
both the design and execution of alternatives
would do much to increase the success, policy
relevance and wider application of the innovations
being tested. Harnessing pro-sociality offers the
prospect of managing institutions and delivering
services in ways that can save resources while
potentially boosting happiness for all parties.85
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The years since 2010 have not been good ones
for happiness and well-being among Americans.
Even as the United States economy improved
after the end of the Great Recession in 2009,
happiness among adults did not rebound to the
higher levels of the 1990s, continuing a slow
decline ongoing since at least 2000 in the
General Social Survey (Twenge et al., 2016; also
see Figure 5.1). Happiness was measured with the
question, “Taken all together, how would you say
things are these days—would you say that you
are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”
with the response choices coded 1, 2, or 3.
Happiness and life satisfaction among United
States adolescents, which increased between
1991 and 2011, suddenly declined after 2012
(Twenge et al., 2018a; see Figure 5.2). Thus,
by 2016-17, both adults and adolescents were
reporting significantly less happiness than
they had in the 2000s.
In addition, numerous indicators of low
psychological well-being such as depression,
suicidal ideation, and self-harm increased sharply
among adolescents since 2010, particularly
among girls and young women (Mercado et al.,
2017; Mojtabai et al., 2016; Plemmons et al., 2018;
Twenge et al., 2018b, 2019a). Depression and
self-harm also increased over this time period

among children and adolescents in the UK
(Morgan et al., 2017; NHS, 2018; Patalay & Gage,
2019). Thus, those in iGen (born after 1995) are
markedly lower in psychological well-being than
Millennials (born 1980-1994) were at the same
age (Twenge, 2017).
This decline in happiness and mental health
seems paradoxical. By most accounts, Americans
should be happier now than ever. The violent
crime rate is low, as is the unemployment rate.
Income per capita has steadily grown over the
last few decades. This is the Easterlin paradox:
As the standard of living improves, so should
happiness – but it has not.
Several credible explanations have been posited
to explain the decline in happiness among adult
Americans, including declines in social capital
and social support (Sachs, 2017) and increases in
obesity and substance abuse (Sachs, 2018). In
this article, I suggest another, complementary
explanation: that Americans are less happy due
to fundamental shifts in how they spend their
leisure time. I focus primarily on adolescents,
since more thorough analyses on trends in time
use have been performed for this age group.
However, future analyses may find that similar
trends also appear among adults.

Figure 5.1: General happiness, U.S. adults, General Social Survey, 1973-2016
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Figure 5.2: General happiness, U.S. 8th, 10th, and 12th graders (ages 13 to 18),
Monitoring the Future, 1991-2017
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The data on time use among United States
adolescents comes primarily from the
Monitoring the Future survey of 13- to
18-year-olds (conducted since 1976 for 12th
graders and since 1991 for 8th and 10th graders),
and the American Freshman Survey of entering
university students (conducted since 1966, with
time use data since 1987). Both collect large,
nationally representative samples every year
(for more details, see iGen, Twenge, 2017).

During the same time period that digital media
use increased, adolescents began to spend less
time interacting with each other in person, including
getting together with friends, socializing, and
going to parties. In 2016, iGen college-bound high
school seniors spent an hour less a day on faceto-face interaction than GenX adolescents did in
the late 1980s (Twenge et al., 2019). Thus, the way
adolescents socialize has fundamentally shifted,
moving toward online activities and away from
face-to-face social interaction.

The rise of digital media and
the fall of everything else

Other activities that typically do not involve
screens have also declined: Adolescents spent
less time attending religious services (Twenge et
al., 2015), less time reading books and magazines
(Twenge et al., 2019b), and (perhaps most
crucially) less time sleeping (Twenge et al., 2017).
These declines are not due to time spent on
homework, which has declined or stayed the
same, or time spent on extracurricular activities,
which has stayed about the same (Twenge &
Park, 2019). The only activity adolescents have
spent significantly more time on during the
last decade is digital media. As Figure 5.4
demonstrates, the amount of time adolescents
spend online increased at the same time that
sleep and in-person social interaction declined,
in tandem with a decline in general happiness.

Over the last decade, the amount of time
adolescents spend on screen activities (especially
digital media such as gaming, social media,
texting, and time online) has steadily increased,
accelerating after 2012 after the majority of
Americans owned smartphones (Twenge et al.,
2019b). By 2017, the average 12th grader
(17-18 years old) spent more than 6 hours a day
of leisure time on just three digital media activities
(internet, social media, and texting; see Figure
5.3). By 2018, 95% of United States adolescents
had access to a smartphone, and 45% said they
were online “almost constantly” (Anderson &
Jiang, 2018).

Figure 5.3: Hours per day U.S. 12th graders spent online, playing electronic games,
texting, and on social media, Monitoring the Future, 2017.
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Figure 5.4: Time spent on the internet, sleeping more than 7 hours a night most
nights, frequency of in-person social interaction across 7 activities, and general
happiness, standardized (Z) scores, 8th and 10th graders, Monitoring the Future,
2006-2017
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Several studies have found that adolescents and
young adults who spend more time on digital
media are lower in well-being (e.g., Booker et al.,
2015; Lin et al., 2016; Twenge & Campbell, 2018).
For example, girls spending 5 or more hours a
day on social media are three times more likely
to be depressed than non-users (Kelly et al.,
2019), and heavy internet users (vs. light users)
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are twice as likely to be unhappy (Twenge et al.,
2018). Sleeping, face-to-face social interaction,
and attending religious services – less frequent
activities among iGen teens compared to previous
generations – are instead linked to more happiness.
Overall, activities related to smartphones and
digital media are linked to less happiness, and
those not involving technology are linked to
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Figure 5.5: Correlation between activities and general happiness,
8th and 10th graders, Monitoring the Future, 2013-2016
(controlled for race, gender, SES, and grade level)
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more happiness. (See Figure 5.5; note that when
iGen adolescents listen to music, they usually do
so using their phones with earbuds).
In short, adolescents who spend more time on
electronic devices are less happy, and adolescents
who spend more time on most other activities
are happier. This creates the possibility that iGen
adolescents are less happy because their increased
time on digital media has displaced time that
previous generations spent on non-screen
activities linked to happiness. In other words,
digital media may have an indirect effect on
happiness as it displaces time that could be
otherwise spent on more beneficial activities.
Digital media activities may also have a direct
impact on well-being. This may occur via upward
social comparison, in which people feel that their
lives are inferior compared to the glamorous
“highlight reels” of others’ social media pages;
these feelings are linked to depression (Steers et
al., 2014). Cyberbullying, another direct effect of
digital media, is also a significant risk factor for
depression (Daine et al., 2013; John et al., 2018).
When used during face-to-face social interaction,
smartphone use appears to interfere with the
enjoyment usually derived from such activities;
for example, friends randomly assigned to have
their phones available while having dinner at a
restaurant enjoyed the activity less than those
who did not have their phones available (Dwyer
et al., 2018), and strangers in a waiting room who
had their phones available were significantly less
likely to talk to or smile at other people (Kushlev
et al., 2019). Thus, higher use of digital media
may be linked to lower well-being via direct
means or by displacing time that might have
been spent on activities more beneficial for
well-being.

Correlation and causation
Most of the analyses presented thus far are
correlational, so they cannot prove that digital
media time causes unhappiness. Third variables
may be operating, though most studies control
for factors such as gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status. Reverse causation is also
possible: Perhaps unhappy people spend more
time on digital media rather than digital media
causing unhappiness. However, several longitudinal
studies following the same individuals over time

have found that digital media use predicts
lower well-being later (e.g., Allen & Vella, 2018;
Booker et al., 2018; Kim, 2017; Kross et al., 2013;
Schmiedeberg & Schroder, 2017; Shakya &
Christakis, 2017). In addition, two randomassignment experiments found that people who
limit or cease social media use improve their
well-being. Tromholt (2017) randomly assigned
more than 1,000 adults to either continue their
normal use of Facebook or give it up for a week;
those who gave it up reported more happiness
and less depression at the end of the week.
Similarly, Hunt et al. (2018) asked college
students to limit their social media use to
10 minutes a day per platform and no more than
30 minutes a day total, compared to a control
group that continued their normal use. Those
who limited their use were less lonely and less
depressed over the course of several weeks.
Both the longitudinal and experimental studies
suggest that at least some of the causation runs
from digital media use to well-being. In addition,
the increases in teen depression after smartphones became common after 2011 cannot be
explained by low well-being causing digital
media use (if so, one would be forced to argue
that a rise in teen depression caused greater
ownership of smartphones, an argument that
defies logic). Thus, although reverse causation
may explain some of the association between
digital media use and low well-being, it seems
clear it does not explain all of it.
In addition, the indirect effects of digital media
in displacing time spent on face-to-face social
interaction and sleep are not as subject to
reverse causation arguments. Deprivation of
social interaction (Baumeister & Leary, 1995;
Hartgerink et al., 2015; Lieberman, 2014) and lack
of sleep (Zhai et al., 2015) are clear risk factors
for unhappiness and low well-being. Even if
digital media had little direct effect on wellbeing, it may indirectly lead to low well-being
if it displaces time once spent on face-to-face
social interaction or sleep.
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Conclusion
Thus, the large amount of time adolescents
spend interacting with electronic devices may
have direct links to unhappiness and/or may have
displaced time once spent on more beneficial
activities, leading to declines in happiness. It is
not as certain if adults have also begun to spend
less time interacting face-to-face and less time
sleeping. However, given that adults in recent
years spent just as much time with digital media
as adolescents do (Common Sense Media, 2016),
it seems likely that their time use has shifted as
well. Future research should explore this possibility.
Thus, the fundamental shift in how adolescents
spend their leisure time may explain the marked
decline in adolescent well-being after 2011. It may
also explain some of the decline in happiness
among adults since 2000, though this conclusion
is less certain. Going forward, individuals and
organizations focused on improving happiness
may turn their attention to how people spend
their leisure time.
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This chapter provides a general review and
discussion of the debate surrounding Big Data
and well-being. We ask four main questions:
Is Big Data very new or very old? How well
can we now predict individual and aggregate
well-being with Big Data, and to what extent do
novel measurement tools complement surveybased measures? Is Big Data responsible for the
rising interest in well-being or a threat to it?
What are the economic and societal consequences
of Big Data, and is there a point to government
regulation of ownership, access, and consent?

Quo Vadis?
The availability of information has increased
dramatically over the last decades, with roughly
a doubling in the market for data storage every
two years.1 The main driver of this has been the
spectacular reduction in the costs of gathering
and transferring information: cheaper computer
chips and faster computers have followed Moore’s
law since the 1970s. As a result, there are now
billions of databases on the planet with all kinds
of information, including lists of genetic markers,
inventory, pictures, topography, surveillance
videos, administrative datasets and others.2
The amount of data on individuals collected is
baffling. For instance, whilst it was reported in 2014
that there were thousands of “data brokering”
firms buying and selling information on consumers,
with the biggest company Axciom alone already
having an average of 1500 pieces of information
on 200 million Americans, today the amount is
4 times higher at least. As for Google queries,
they went from 14 billions per year in 2000 to
1.2 trillions a decade later.
The main business model that pays for the
collection and analysis of all this data is
advertising: Internet companies and website
hosts now sell personalised advertising space
in a spot market, an industry worth around
250 billion a year. There is also a smaller market
for information about individuals: professional
“data broker” firms specialise in collecting data
on individuals around the world, selling it to all
and sundry. This includes their creditworthiness
and measures of their Internet-related activities.
Firms are getting increasingly good at matching
records from different sources, circumventing
privacy laws and guessing the identification

behind de-personalised information by crossreferencing financial transactions and recurrent
behaviour.
Academic articles and books on these
developments are now plentiful. The term
used to describe this data explosion and its
Big Brother type uses, “Big Data”, was cited
40,000 times in 2017 in Google Scholar, about
as often as “happiness”! This data explosion was
accompanied by the rise of statistical techniques
coming from the field of computer science, in
particular machine learning. The later provided
methods to analyse and exploit these large
datasets for prediction purposes, justifying
the accumulation of increasingly large and
detailed data.3
The term Big Data in this chapter will refer to
large datasets that contain multiple observations
of individuals.4 Of particular interest is the data
gathered on individuals without their “considered
consent”. This will include all forms of data that
one could gather, if determined, about others
without their knowledge, such as visual information
and basic demographic and behavioural
characteristics. Other examples are Twitter,
public Facebook posts, the luminescence of
homes, property, etc.
Is this information used to say something about
well-being, ie Life Satisfaction? How could it be
used to affect well-being? And how should it be
used? These question concerning Big Data and
Well-being - where are we, where could we go,
and where should we go - will be explored in
this chapter.
In the first Section we give a brief history of
Big Data and make a broad categorization of all
available forms of Big Data and what we know
about their usages. In the second Section we
ask how well different types of data predict
well-being, what the potential use is of novel
measurement instruments, and what the most
promising forms of data are to predict our
individual well-being. We will also look at the
question of what the likely effects are of the
increased use of Big Data to influence our
behaviour. This includes how useful information
on well-being itself is to governments and
businesses. In the third Section we then review
the agency issues surrounding Big Data and
well-being: who is in control of this data and
what future usage is desirable? How important is
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considered consent when data usage agreements
for commercial purposes become either the
default option or a requirement to access
services provided by Internet companies?
To illustrate the review, we augment the chapter
with twitter data from Mexico and draw on the
2018 WHR calculations from the Gallup World
and Daily Polls, and other major data sources.
We do this in particular to discuss how much of
well-being one can explain the types of information
that currently available in the public domain.

1. Big Data: A Brief History
Before the advent of writing and during the long
hunter-gatherer period, humans lived in fairly
small groups (20-100) of people who knew each
other well. Gathering data on those around them,
particularly their emotional state, was necessary
and normal, as one can gleam from humanity’s
empathic abilities and the varied ways in which
faces and bodies communicate internal lives to
others. It might not have been recorded on
usb-drives, but the most intimate details would
have been the subject of gossip and observation
within the whole group with which humans lived.
It would have been vital to know about others’
abilities, health, likes and dislikes, and kinship
relations. All that shared data would now have to
be called something like “distributed Big Data”.
Then came large agricultural hierarchies and
their need to control populations, leading to
systems of recording. The Sumerian script is the
oldest known system of writing, going back at
least 6,000 years, and one of its key uses was to
keep track of the trades and taxes of those early
kingdoms: the business of gathering taxes
needed records on who had paid how much and
who was yet to pay how much. One might see
the hundreds of thousands of early clay tablets
of the Sumerian accountants as the first instance
of “Big Data”: systematic information gathered
to control and manipulate a population.
Some 4,000 years ago, in both Egypt and China,
the first population censuses were held, recording
who lived where and how much their wealth was,
with the express purpose of supporting the tax
ambitions of the courts of those days. A census
was the way to know how much individuals,
households, villages, and whole regions could be
taxed, both in terms of produce and labour time.

The key initial use of Big Data was simply to
force individuals into paying taxes. The use of a
census to measure and tax a population has
stayed with humanity ever since, including the
regular censuses of the Romans, the Domesday
book ordered by William the Conqueror in 1086
in Britain, up to the present day where censuses
are still held in many countries. The modern
countries that don’t have a census, usually have
permanent population records, an even more
sophisticated form of Big Data.
The Bible illustrates these early and still dominant
uses of Big Data: the book of Genesis lists the
genealogy of the tribe, important for matters of
intermarriage and kinship claims; and the book
of Exodus mentions the use of a population
census to support the tabernacle. Courts and
governments were not the only gatherers of Big
Data with an interest in recording and controlling
the population. Organised religion and many
secular organisations collected their own data.
Medieval churches in Europe collected information
on births, christenings, marriages, wills, and
deaths. Partly this was in order to keep track of
the daily business of a church, but it also served
the purposes of taxation: the accounts were a
means of counting the faithful and their wealth.
Medieval universities also kept records, for
instance of who had earned what qualification,
because that is what they sold and they needed
to keep track of their sales. As with churches,
universities also had internal administrations
where they kept track of their possessions, loans,
debts, “the academic community”, teaching
material, etc.
With the advent of large corporations came
totally different data, connected to the need to
manage long-run relations with many employees:
records on the entitlements and behaviour of
employees, alongside identifying information
(where they could be found, next of kin, etc.).
These records were held to allow a smooth
operation of organisations and were subsequently
used as the basis of income taxation by governments, a good example of where the Big Data
gathered by one entity (firms) gets to be used
by another (a tax authority) for totally different
purposes.
What has been said above can be repeated for
many other large organisations throughout the
ages: they kept track of the key information they

needed to function. Traders needed to keep
track of their clients and suppliers. Hospitals and
doctors needed to keep track of ailments and
individual prescriptions. Inns needed to keep
track of their guests. Towns needed to keep track
of their rights versus other authorities. Ideologies
needed to keep track of actual and potential
supporters. Etc. There is hence nothing unusual
about keeping records on individuals and their
inner lives, without their consent, for the purposes
of manipulation. One might even say that nothing
on the Internet is as invasive as the monitoring
that is likely to have been around before the
advent of writing, nor is anything on the internet
more manipulative than the monitoring of large
empires that pressed their populations into
taxes, wars, and large projects (like building the
pyramids). Big Data is thus ancient. There is just
a lot more of it nowadays that is not run and owned
by governments, and an incomparably stronger
capacity to collect, classify, analyse, and store it
due to the more recent rise in computer power
and the rapid development of computer science.
In the present day, governments are still large
producers and consumers of Big Data, usually
without the consent of the population. The
individual records are kept in different parts of
the government, but in Western countries they
usually include births, marriages, addresses,
emails, fingerprints, criminal records, military
service records, religion, ethnicity, kinship
relations, incomes, key possessions (land,
housing, companies), and of course tax records.
What is gathered and which institution gathers
the data varies by country: whereas in France
the data is centrally gathered in a permanent
population record and it is illegal to gather data
on religion and ethnicity, in the US the various
bits of data are gathered by different entities and
there is no problem in measuring either religion
or ethnicity.5
Governments are also in the business of analysing,
monitoring, and manipulating our inner lives. This
is a well-understood part of the social contract
and of the socialisation role of education, state
media, military service, national festivities or
national ceremonies: successful countries manage
to pass on their history, values and loyalties to
the next generation.6 Big Data combined with
specific institutions surrounding education,
information, taxation or the legal system is then
used to mould inner lives and individuals’ identities.

Consent in that process is ex post: once individuals
are “responsible citizens” they can have some
say about this in some countries, but even then
only to a limited degree because opting out is
often not an option.
In the Internet age, the types and volume of
data are truly staggering, with data gathered
and analysed for lots of purposes, usually
profit-motivated. The generic object is to get a
consumer to click on a website, buy a service,
sign some document, glance some direction,
vote some way, spend time on something, etc. A
few examples illustrate the benefits and dangers.
Supermarket chains now gather regular scanner
and card-data on the sales to their customers.7
Partly in order to improve the accuracy of their
data, they have loyalty programs where customers
get discounts in exchange for private information
that allows the supermarkets to link names and
addresses to bank cards and other forms of
payment. As a result, these companies have
information on years of purchases by hundreds
of millions of households. One use of that data
has been to support “just on time” delivery to
individual stores, reducing the necessity for each
store to have large and expensive magazines
where stocks are held, making products cheaper.
That system requires supermarkets to fairly
accurately predict what the level of sales will be
for thousands of products in stock, which not
merely needs good accounting of what is still
in stock, but also good forecasting of future
demand which requires sophisticated analysis of
previous sales. Hence supermarkets know with
near-perfect accuracy how much extra ice-cream
they will sell in which neighbourhood if the
weather gets warmer, and just how many Easter
eggs they will sell at what discounted price.
One might see this use of Big Data as positive,
efficiency improving.
Then there is the market for personalised
advertising, also called behavioural targeting.
On the basis of their internet-observable history,
which will often include their social communication
on the internet (including their mobile phone
device), it is predicted what advertising is most
likely to work on them. Personalised advertising
is then sold on a spot market, leading to personalised recommendations (ie one’s previous
purchases), social recommendations (what similar
people bought), and item recommendations
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(what the person just sought). Hildebrandt
typified the key aspect of this market when
she said “profiling shifts the balance of power
between those that can afford profiling (...) and
those (...) profiled”.8 This advertising market is
enormous and has grown fast. Paid media
content in 2017 was reportedly worth over
500 billion dollars, and digital advertising was
worth some 230 billion in 2017 according to
industry estimates. The business model of many
internet firms is to offer services for free to
anyone in the world, funded by the ads attracted
to the traffic on that site. The grand bargain of
the Internet is thus free services in exchange for
advertising. This is both well-understood and
well-known, so one could say that this bargain
is made under conditions of considered consent:
users of free services (like Facebook) should know
that the price of those services is that their personal
information is sold for advertising purposes.
There is also a market for more invasive information,
where access to goods and services is decided
on the basis of that information. An old example
from before the internet was credit-worthiness
information, which could be bought off banks
and other brokers. This was of course important
when it came to large purchases, such as a house
or setting up a new business. A good modern
example is personalised information on the use
of online health apps. Individuals visiting free
online health apps which give feedback on, for
instance, how much someone has run and where,
are usually asked to consent to the sale of their
information. That information is very useful to,
for instance, health insurance companies
interested in knowing how healthy the behaviour
of someone is. Those health insurance companies
will look more favourably on someone known
to have a fit body, not buy large volumes of
cigarettes and alcohol online, and have a
generally considered and healthy lifestyle. It is
thus commercially important for health insurance
companies to buy such data, and not really an
option to ignore it.
This example also shows the ambiguity involved
in both consent and the option of staying “off
the grid”: it is unlikely that everyone using health
apps realises the potential uses of the data they
are then handing over, and it is not realistic to
expect them to wade through hundreds of
pages of detailed consent forms wherein all
the potential uses would be spelled out. Also,

someone who purposefully stays “off the grid”
and either actively hides their online behaviour
via specialised software or is truly not online at
all, will not be unaffected by health profiling
activities for the very reason that there is then no
profile of them. To a health insurance company,
the lack of information is also informative and
likely to mean that person has something to hide.
Hence, even someone actively concerned with
leaving no digital footprints and having very
limited data on them online, will be affected
without their consent by the activities of others.
Privacy is very difficult to maintain on the Internet
because nearly all large internet-site providers
use a variety of ways to identify who accesses
their websites and what their likely interests are.
Websites use cookies, Javascripts, browser
Fingerprinting, Behavioural Tracking, and other
means to know the moment a person clicks on a
website who that person is and what they might
want. What helps these websites is the
near-uniqueness of the information that a
website receives when it is accessed: the
IP-address, the Browser settings, the recent
search history, the versions of the programs
used, and the presence of a variety of added
software (Flash, Javascript, cameras, etc.). From
that information, internet sites can usually know
who has accessed them, which can then be
matched to previous information kept on that
IP address, bought and sold in a market. Only
very Internet-literate individuals can hope to
remain anonymous.
The fact that the main use of Big Data on the
Internet is to aid advertising should also be
somewhat reassuring for those who fear the
worst about Big Data: because the advertising
market is worth so much, large internet companies
are careful not to sell their data for purposes that
the population would be highly disapproving of,
whether those purposes are legal or not. It is for
instance not in the interest of e-bay, Apple,
Google, or Samsung to sell information about the
porn-viewing habits of their customers to potential
employers and romantic partners. These uses are
certainly worth something, and on the “Dark
Web” (the unauthorised parts of the internet)
such information can (reportedly) indeed be
bought and sold, but for the “legitimate” part of
the market, there is just too much to lose.
How does this relate to well-being?

2. The Contribution of Big Data to
Well-being Science

one on average would know from typical medical
records remains an interesting question.

Mood analysis is very old, with consumer and
producer sentiment recorded in many countries
since the 1950s because it predicts economic
cycles well.9 However, the analysis of the well-being
of individuals and aggregate well-being is starting
to take off as more modern forms of mood
analysis develop. These include counting the
positive/negative affect of words used in books
or any written documents (e.g. Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count); analysis of words used in
Twitter feeds, Facebook posts, and other social
media data through more or less sophisticated
models of sentiment analysis; outright opinion
and election polling using a variety of tools
(mobile phone, websites, apps). New technologies
include Artificial Intelligence analysis of visual,
olfactory, sensory, and auditory information.
They also include trackable devices that follow
individuals around for large parts of the day and
sometimes even 24/7, such as fitbits, mobile
phones or credit cards.

In order to have some comparison, we first
document how available datasets that include
direct information on well-being reveal the
potential of different types of information to
predict well-being. We take the square of the
correlation coefficient (R2) as our preferred
indicator of predictability.

One may first wonder whether “Big Data” can
improve well-being predictions, and help solve
what economists have called “prediction policy
problems”?10
2.1 Predictability of Individual and Aggregate
Well-being, a benchmark.
Some forms of Big Data will trivially explain
well-being exceedingly well: social media posts
that inform friends and family of how one feels
are explicitly meant to convey information about
well-being and will thus have a lot of informational
content about well-being to all those with access.
Claims that social media can hence predict our
well-being exceedingly well thus need not be
surprising at all for that is often the point of
social media. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
have some sense of how much well-being can be
deduced from the average individual, which is
equivalent to the question how much well-being
is revealed by the average user of social media. A
similar question arises concerning medical
information about individuals: very detailed
medical information, which includes assessments
of how individuals feel and think about many
aspects of their lives, will also explain a lot of
their well-being and may even constitute the best
measures available. Yet, the question how much

Andrew Clark et al. (2018) run typical life
satisfaction regressions for the United Kingdom,
with comparisons for Germany, Australia, and
the United States. The main finding is that
the R2 does not typically go beyond 15% and
even to reach that level needs more than
socio-democraphic and economic information
(income, gender, age, family circumstances,
wealth, employment, etc.) but also needs
subjective indicators of health, both physical
health and mental health which are both
measured using subjective questions. Using the
US Gallup Daily poll, we show in the Online
Appendix that the same relationship holds there
too. The relatively low predictability of life
satisfaction at the individual level has long been
a known stylised fact in the literature, with early
reviews found for instance in the overview book
by Michael Argyle et al. (1999) where Michael
Argyle also notes the inability of regularly
available survey-information to explain more
than 15% of the variation in life satisfaction
(largely based on World Value Survey data).
Generally, well-being is poorly predicted by
information from regular survey questions, but
health conditions appear to be the most reliable
predictors of well-being. The availability of
administrative datasets capturing the health
conditions of an entire population - for instance
via drug prescriptions - suggests health may be
the best proxy available to predict well-being in
the future (see also Deaton 2008). Clark et al.
(2018) find that mental health explains more
variation in well-being than physical health does,
also a typical finding that we replicate for the
United States (see online Appendix).
What about variation in aggregate well-being?
In Chapter II of the WHR 2018, Helliwell et al.
(2018) looked at how well differences in average
well-being across countries over time can be
explained by observabled average statistics.
Table 2.1 of that chapter showed a typical
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cross-country regression wherein 74% of the
variance could be explained by no more than a
few regressions: GDP per capita, levels of social
support, life expectancy, an index of freedom, an
index of generosity, and an index of perceptions
of corruption.
That chapter also found that the strongest
moves up and down were due to very plausible
and observable elements: the collapsing economy
of Venuzuela showed up in a drop of over
2 points in life expectancy from 2008-2010 to
2015-2017, whilst the recovery from civil war and
Ebola in Sierra Leone lead it to increase life
satisfaction by over a point. Hence countryvariations are strongly predictable. We did our
own calculations with the same Daily Gallup
dataset (in the Online Appendix) and also found
we could explain even higher levels (90%) of
variation between US states if one added selfreported health indicators to this set.
Predictability of aggregate well-being thus
differs strongly from individual well-being and
has different uses. Predicting aggregate
well-being can be useful if individual measures
are unavailable, for instance due to wars or
language barriers.
When individuals originate from various countries,
well-being predictions based on standardized
variables capturing income, jobs, education
levels or even health are about half as powerful
as within country predictions (see online Appendix,
but also, for instance Claudia Senik (2014) on the
cultural dimensions of happines). This is true
both for individual-level and country-level
predictability.11 This suggests socio-economic and
demographic factors affect subjective well-being in
very different ways across cultures and countries
at various levels of economic development.
The use of alternative sources of Big Data, like
content analysis of tweets, does not necessarily
help. In their research, Laura Smith and her
co-authors ask whether well-being ‘translates’
on Twitter.12 They compare English and Spanish
tweets and show translation across languages
leads to meaningful losses of cultural information.
There exists strong heterogeneity across wellbeing measures. For instance, at the individual
level, experienced feelings of happiness are
better predicted than reported satisfaction with
life as measured by the Cantril ladder. This is the
opposite for country-level regressions.

2.2 Can Big Data Improve Well-being Predictions?
Standard socio-demographic variables, especially
the health conditions of a population, can generate
high well-being predictability, at least at a more
aggregate level. However, with the rise of digital
data collection and improvements in machine
learning or textual analysis techniques, alternative
sources of information can now be exploited.
Standard survey-based measures of happiness
could then be used to train prediction models
relying on “Big Data” sources, hence allowing for
a finer analysis across time and space of the
determinants of well-being.13 Table 6.1 reviews the
main studies that have tried to predict life
satisfaction or happiness from alternative Big
Data sources. The information collected is
extracted from digital footprints left by individuals
when they go online or engage with social media
networks. In this section, we focus on studies
proposing the construction of new measures of
well-being based on how well they can predict
reported happiness and life satisfaction. Hence,
Table 6.1 does not reference articles that have used
NLP and other computerized text analysis
methods for the sole purpose of eliciting emotional
content, which we discuss in the next section.
Quite surprisingly, the classical issue of a generally
low predictability of individual-level satisfaction
remains. The clearest example is a study by
Kosinsky and his co-authors that looks at how
predictive Facebook user’s page likes are of
various individual traits and attributes, including
their well-being.14 Life satisfaction ranks at the
bottom of the list in terms of how well it can be
predicted, with an R squared of 2.8% only. This
does not mean predictive power cannot be
improved by adding further controls, but it
provides a reasonable account of what should be
expected. Strikingly, alternative studies using
sentiment analysis of Facebook status updates
find similarly low predictive power, from 2% of
between-subjects variance explained to a
maximum or 9%.15 These differences are explained
by the measure of well-being being predicted,
and the model used. Research also showed
positive emotions are not significantly correlated
to life satisfaction on Facebook, contrary to
negative emotions.16 This suggests social pressure
may incite unhappy individuals to pretend they
are happier than they really are, which is less
likely to be the case for the display of negative
emotions.

Table 6.1: Can Big Data Predict Well-being? Review of R2 Coefficients Across Studies
Reference

SWB measure

Big Data measure

Big Data source Unit of analysis

R2

Collins et al. (2015)

Life satisfaction

Status updates

Facebook

Facebook users

0.02

Kosinski et al. (2013)

Life satisfaction

Type of Facebook
pages liked

Facebook

Facebook users

0.028

Liu et al. (2015)

Life satisfaction

Status updates
(positive emotions)

Facebook

Facebook users

0.003

Liu et al. (2015)

Life satisfaction

Status updates
(negative emotions)

Facebook

Facebook users

0.026

104

Schwartz et al. (2016)

Life satisfaction

Status updates
(topics, lexica)

Facebook

Facebook users

0.09

105

Algan et al. (2016)

Life satisfaction

Word searches

Google Trends

US weekly
time series

0.760

Algan et al. (2016)

Happiness

Word searches

Google Trends

US weekly
time series

0.328

Collins et al. (2015)

Life satisfaction

Average size of
personal network

Facebook

LS bins

0.7

Collins et al. (2015)

Life satisfaction

Average number
of status updates

Facebook

LS bins

0.096

Collins et al. (2015)

Life satisfaction

Average number
of photo tags

Facebook

LS bins

0.348

Hills et al. (2017)

Life satisfaction

Words

Google Books

Yearly panel
of 5 countries

0.25

Schwartz et al. (2013)

Life satisfaction

Topics and lexica
from tweets

Twitter

US counties

0.094

Individual level
pre dictions

Aggregate level
predictions

Notes: This Table lists the main studies that have tried to predict survey responses to life satisfaction or happiness
questions from alternative Big Data sources. The information collected is extracted from digital footprints left by
individuals when they go online or engage with social media networks.

World Happiness Report 2019

Figure 6.1: County-Level Life Satisfaction, Survey-Based Measures vs.
Predicted from Tweets

Notes: Source: Schwartz et al. (2013) The Figure shows county-level life satisfaction (LS) as measured (A) using
survey data and (B) as predicted using our combined model (controls + word topics and lexica). Green regions have
higher satisfaction, while red have lower. White regions are those for which the language sample or survey size is too
small to have valid measurements. (No counties in Alaska met criteria for inclusion; r = 0.535, p < 0.001)

Figure 6.2: Galup Daily Polls Life Satisfaction vs. Estimated Life Satisfaction from
Google Trends
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Notes: Source: Algan et al. (2019). The graph shows the estimates (with confidence intervals) for weekly life
satisfaction at the US level, constructed using US Google search levels, in red, alongside estimates from the
benchmark (seasonality only) model in yellow and the Gallup weekly series in blue. Confidence intervals are
constructed using 1000 draws. Training data is inside the red lines, and Testing data is outside the red lines.

However, once aggregated, measures extracted
from social networks’ textual content have a
much stronger predictability. A measure of status
updates which yields a 2% R squared in individuallevel regressions yields a five times bigger
coefficient, close to 10%, when looking at life
satisfaction bins.17 Alternative measures have a
much higher predictability like the average
number of photo tags (70%) or the average size
of users’ network of friends (35%). Looking at a
cross-section of counties in the United States,
research by Schwartz and co-authors find the
topics and lexica from Tweets explains 9.4% of the
variance in life satisfaction between-counties.18
Predictability improves to 28% after including
standard controls, as shown in Figure 6.1 which
maps county-level life satisfaction from survey
data along with county-level life satisfaction
predicted using Tweets and controls. This
coefficient remains relatively low, which may
again be due to the manipulability of positive
emotions in social networks.
Research using the emotional content of words
in books led to higher predictability for life
satisfaction.19 Using a sample of millions of books
published over a period of 40 years in five
countries, researchers find an R squared of 25%,
which is similar to the predictive power of
income or employment across countries in the
Gallup World Polls. But the strongest predictability
comes from a paper by Yann Algan, Elizabeth
Beasley and their co-authors, who showed that
daily variation in life satisfaction in the US could
be well-predicted (around 76%) by google-trend
data on the frequency with which individuals
looked for positive terms to do with work, health,
and family.20 Figure 6.2 illustrates these results. The
authors find a lower predictability of experienced
happiness (about 33%). A clear disadvantage of
this method though is that these results would
not easily carry over to a different time-frame,
or a different language. The authors also use
standard regression analysis, while the use of
machine learning models (like Lasso regressions)
can greatly improve out-of-sample prediction in
such cases.
Sentiment analysis via twitter and other searchable
Big Data sources may thus lead to a greater
ability to map movements in mood, both in the
recent past and geographically. The ability to
past-cast and now-cast life satisfaction via
Google search terms and various other forms of

available Big Data may similarly improve our
understanding of well-being in the recent past
and across areas. This increased ability to predict
current and previous levels of mood and life
satisfaction might prove very important for
research as it reduces the reliance on expensive
large surveys. One might start to see papers and
government evaluations using derived measures
of mood and life satisfaction, tracking the effects
of local changes in policy or exogenous shocks,
as well as their effects on other regions and
times. This might be particularly useful when it
comes to social multipliers of events that only
directly affect a subset of the population, such as
unemployment or identity-specific shocks.
The increased ability to tell current levels of
mood and life satisfaction, both at the individual
and aggregated level, can also be used for
deliberate manipulation: governments and
companies can target the low mood / life
satisfaction areas with specific policies aimed at
those communities (eg more mental health help
or more early childcare facilities). Opposition
parties might deliberately ‘talk down’ high levels
of life satisfaction and blame the government for
low levels. Advertisers might tailor their messages
to the mood of individuals and constituents. In
effect, targeting and impact analyses of various
kinds should be expected to improve.
2.3 Big Data as a Complement to Survey-Based
Well-being Measures
Even if mood extracted from social networks
may not fully match variation in survey-based
measures of life satisfaction or happiness, they
often allow for much more detailed analysis of
well-being at the daily level, or even within days.
A good example of how massive data sources
allow a fuller tracking of the emotional state of a
population is given by large-scale Twitter-data
on Mexico, courtesy of Gerardo Leyva who kindly
allowed us to use the graphs in Figure 6.3 based
on the work of his team.21 Sub-Figure (A) shows
how the positive/negative ratio of words varied
from day to day in the 2016-2018 period. One
can see the large positive mood swings on
particular days, like Christmas 2017 or the day
that Mexico beat Germany in the Football Word
Cup 2018, and the large negatives, like the
earthquake in 2017, the loss in the World Cup
against Brasil, or the election of Donald Trump
in the 2016 US Election.
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Figure 6.3: Mood from Tweets in Mexico

(A) Daily Mood (November 2016-September 2018)
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(B) Mexico-Germany Game (Minute-by-Minute Mood)
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Notes: We thank Gerardo Leyva from Mexico´s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) for generously
sharing his data, which were based on the subjective well-being surveys known as BIARE and the big data research
project “Estado de Animo de los Tuiteros en Mexico” (The mood of twitterers in Mexico), both carried out by INEGI.
These data are part of a presentation given by Gerardo Leyva during the “2° Congreso Internacional de Psicologia
Positiva “La Psicologia y el Bienestar”, November 9-10, 2018, hosted by the Universidad Iberoamericana, in Mexico
City and in the “Foro Internacional de la Felicidad 360”, November 2-3, 2018, organized by Universidad TecMilenio in
Monerrey, Mexico.

Figure 6.4: Positive and negative emotions of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart
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Notes: Source: Borowiecki (2017). The left (right) panel plots the author’s index of positive (negative) emotions
from Mozart’s letters from age 15 until his death at age 35. The depicted prediction is based on a local polynomial
regression method with an Epanechnikov kernel, and it is presented along with a 95% confidence interval.

Sub-Figure (B) shows how the mood changes
minute-by-minute during the football match
against Germany, with ups when Mexico scores
and the end of the match. The main take-aways
from these Figures are that one gets quite
plausible mood-profiles based on an analysis of
Twitter data and that individual events are quite
short-lived in terms of their effect on Twitter-mood:
the variation is dominated by the short-run,
making it hard to say what drives the longer-run
variation that you also see in this data. This high
daily variability in mood also shows the limits of
its usefulness in driving policy or understanding
the long-run level of well-being in Mexico.
Another example of the usefulness of alternative
metrics of well-being extracted from Big Data
sources can be found in recently published
research by Borowiecki.22 The author extracts
negative and positive mood from a sample of
1,400 letters written by three famous music
composers (Mozart, Beethoven and Liszt). It
provides an interesting application of Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) to the question of
whether well-being determines creative processes.

The research leverages historical panels of the
emotional state of these composers over nearly
their entire lifetime, and shows poor health or
the death of a relative negatively relates to their
measure of well-being, while work-related
accomplishments positively relates to it. Figure
6.4 shows the positive and negative mood panel
of Mozart. Using random life events as instruments
in an individual fixed effects model, the author
shows negative emotions trigger creativity in the
music industry.
Measures extracted from the digital footprints of
individuals can also provide a set of alternative
metrics for major determinants of well-being
available at a much more detailed level (across
time and space). One example can be found in
previously mentioned research by Algan and
their co-authors.23 They investigate the various
domains of well-being explaining variation in
overall predicted life satisfaction using Google
search data for a list of 554 keywords. From
this list of words, they construct 10 composite
categories corresponding to different dimensions
of life. They find that higher searches for domains

World Happiness Report 2019

like Job Market, Civic Engagement, Healthy
Habits, Summer Leisure, and Education and
Ideals are consistently associated with higher
well-being at the aggregate US level, while Job
Search, Financial Security, Health Conditions, and
Family Stress domains are negatively associated
with well-being.
The fact that “Big Data” often includes time and
geographical information (e.g. latitude and
longitude) can trigger both new research designs
and novel applications to well-being research.
For instance, data based on the location of
mobile devices can have many applications in
the domains of urban planning, which we know
matters for things as important to well-being as
trust, security or sense of community.24 Another
example can be found in research by Clement
Bellet who matches millions of geo-localised
suburban houses from Zillow, a large American
online real estate company, to reported house
and neighborhood satisfaction from the American
Housing Surveys.25 The author finds new constructions which increase house size inequality lower
the house satisfaction of existing homeowners
through a relative size effect, but no such effect
is found on neighborhood satisfaction. Making
use of the richness of Big Data, this research also
investigates the contribution of spatial segregation
and reference groups to the trade-off new
movers face between higher status (i.e. a bigger
house) and higher neighborhood satisfaction.
Life Satisfaction is of course not the only thing
of relevance to our inner lives that can be
predicted. Important determinants of well-being
can also be predicted. For instance, online
ratings have been used to measure interpersonal
trust and reciprocity, known to be major drivers
of subjective well-being.26 How much can we
know about important determinants of well-being
simply from how someone writes, walks, looks,
smells, touches, or sounds?
2.4 New Measures and Measurement Tools
To see the future uses of Big Data for well-being,
we can look at developments in measurement.
Pre-internet, what was measured was largely
objective: large possessions, social relations
(marriages), births and deaths, forms of
accreditation (education, training, citizenship),
income flows (employment, welfare, taxes),
other-relating activities (crime, court cases,

social organisations, large purchases).
Measurement in all these cases was usually
overt and took place via forms and systems that
the population could reasonably be aware of.
Relatively new is data on purely solitary behaviour
that identifies individuals, including all things to
do with body and mind. There is an individual’s
presence in space (where someone is), all manner
of health data on processes within, and data on
physical attributes, such as fingerprints, retina
structure, height, weight, heart rates, brain
activity, etc. Some of this information is now
gathered as a matter of course by national
agencies, starting before birth and continuing
way past death, such as height, eye colour, finger
prints, physical appearance, and age.
In some countries, like Singapore and China,
there are now moves under way to also store
facial features of the whole population, which are
useful in automatically recognising people from
video information and photos, allowing agencies
to track the movements of the population by
recognising them wherever they are. In the
European Union, facial features are automatically
used to verify that individuals crossing borders
are the same as the photos on their passports.
Fingerprint and iris recognition is nigh perfect,
and is already used by governments to check
identity. This has uses that are arguably very
positive, such as in India where fingerprint and
iris-based ID is now used to bypass corruption in
the bureaucracy and directly pay welfare recipients
and others. It of course also has potential negative
uses, including identity theft by copying fingerprints and iris-scan information in India.
The main biophysical measurement devices now
in common use in social science research (and
hence available to everyone) are the following:
MRIs, fMRIs, HRV, eye-scanners, skin conductivity,
cortisol, steroid hormones, introspection, and
mobile sensors that additionally pick up movement, speech, and posture. Table 6.2 lists the
measurement devices currently in wide operation
in the social sciences, with their essential
characteristics and uses reviewed in the book
edited by Gigi Foster (2019). Individually, each of
these biophysical markers has been studied for
decades, with fairly well-know properties. Some
have been around for centuries, such as eye-tracking
and heart rate monitoring. Table 6.2 quickly
describes them and their inherent limitations.

Table 6.2: Description of biophysical measurement devices used frequently in
social sciences

Measure

Description

Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI)

Requires individuals to lie in a large machine and is mainly used to map the size and structure of
the brain, useful for finding brain anomalies. It is expensive, rare, and not informative on what
people think.

Functional MRI (fMRI)

Requires large contraptions and is used to track blood flows in the brain, marking the level of
neuronal activity, useful for knowing which areas are active in which tasks. It is expensive, rare,
very imprecise about people’s thoughts and thought processes (lots of brain areas light up even
in simple cases), and thus of very limited use to any would-be manipulator.

Heart Rate Variability

Can be tracked with heart monitors (small or large) and is primarily useful for picking up
short-term stress and relaxation responses. It is cheap and can be part of a portable package
but is unreliable (high individual heterogeneity) and mainly useful in very specific applications,
such as monitoring sleep patterns or stress levels in work situations.

Eye-tracking scanners

Require close-up equipment (preferably keeping the head fixed) and can be used to see what
draws attention. They are awkward, quite imprecise, and are almost impossible to use outside of
very controlled situations because one needs to know the exact spot of all the things that
someone could be looking at in 3-dimensional space. Except for things like virtual reality, that is
still too hard to do on a large-scale basis.

Skin conductivity

Essentially about measuring sweat responses and requires only small on-body devices, mainly
useful as a measure of the level of excitement. It is very imprecise though (people sweat due to
weather, diet, movement, etc.) and even at best only measures the level of excitement, not
whether that is due to something positive or negative.

Cortisol levels

Can be measured in bodily fluids like saliva and is primarily used as a measure of stress. It reacts
sluggishly to events, is susceptible to diet and individual specific variation, varies highly across
individuals and over time due to diurnal, menstrual, and other cycles, and is difficult to measure
continuously.

Steroid hormones

Like testosterone can also be measured via saliva and is a measure of things like aggression, for
instance going up in situations of competition and arousal. It varies over the life-time and the
day cycle, having both very long-term effects (e.g. testosterone in uterus affects the relative
length of digits) and short-run effects (more testosterone increases risk-taking). It is difficult
and expensive to measure continuously though, and its ability to predict behaviour is patchy.

Introspection

Introspection (the awareness of own bodily processes) is mainly measured by asking people to
guess their own heart rate and is linked to cognitive-emotional performance. It is a very
imprecise construct though, and its ability to predict behaviour is highly limited.

Mobile sensors

Can track many aspects of the body and behaviour at the same time, as well as yield dynamic
feedback from the individual via spot-surveys.
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Whilst these measures have many research uses,
they all suffer from high degrees of measurement
error, high costs, and require the active participation
of the individuals concerned. People know if
there is a large device on their heads that tracks
their eye-movements. And they can easily
mislead most of these measurement devices if
they so wished, for instance via their diet and
sleep patterns (which affect pretty much all of
them). With the exception of non-invasive mobile
sensors, which we will discuss later, the possibilities
for abuse are thereby limited and their main uses
require considered consent.
A new development is the increased ability to
recognise identity and emotional state by means
of features that can be deduced from a distance:
facial features (the eyes-nose triangle), gait,
facial expressions, voice, and perhaps even
smell.27 These techniques are sometimes made
readily available, for instance when it comes to
predicting emotional display from pictures. For
instance, FaceReader is a commercial software
using an artificial neural network algorithm
trained on more than 10,000 faces to predict
emotions like anger or happiness with high levels
of accuracy (above 90% for these two).28
The ability to recognise individuals from afar is now
advancing at high speed, with whole countries
like Singapore and China investing billions in this
ability. Recent patents show that inventors
expect to make big money in this field.29 The
ability to recognise identity from a distance is
not merely useful for governments trying to track
down criminals in their own country or ‘terrorists’
in a country they surveillance covertly. It can be
used for positive commercial applications, like
mobile phone companies and others to unlock
devices of customers who have forgotten their
passwords. Yet, it also offers a potential tool for
companies and other organisations to link the
many currently existing datasets that have a
different basis than personal identity, so as to
build a profile of whole lives.
Consider this last point more carefully: currently,
many forms of Big Data are not organised on the
basis of people’s identity in the sense of their real
name and unique national identifier (such as their
passport details) which determine their rights and
duties in their countries. Rather, they are based on
the devices used, such as IP-addresses, credit
cards, Facebook accounts, email accounts, mobile

phone numbers, Instagram IDs, twitter handles, etc.
Only rarely can these records be reliably linked to
individuals’ true identities, something that will be
increasingly difficult for companies when individuals
get afraid of being identified and start to deliberately mix and swap devices with others.
Remote recognition might give large organisations,
including companies that professionally collect
and integrate datasets, the key tool they need to
form complete maps of individuals: by linking the
information from photos, videos, health records,
and voice recordings they might well be able to
map individuals to credit cards, IP addresses, etc.
It is quite conceivable that Google Street view
might at one point be used to confirm where
billions of individuals live and what they look like,
then coupled with what persons using a particular
credit card look like in shop videos. This can then
be coupled with readily available pictures,
videos, and documents in ample supply on the
internet (eg Youtube, facebook, twitter, snapchat,
etc.) to not only link records over time, but also
across people and countries. The time might thus
come that a potential employer is able to buy
your personal life story, detailing the holidays
you had when you were 3 years old, deduced
from pictures your aunt posted on the internet,
not even naming you, simply by piecing together
your changing features over time.
Remote recognition is thus a potentially powerful
new surveillance tool that has a natural increasingreturns-to-scale advantage (accuracy and
usefulness increase with data volume), which
in turn means it favours big organisations
over small ones. It is not truly clear what
counter-moves are available to individuals or
even whole populations against this new
technology. The data can be analysed and stored
in particular small countries with favourable data
laws, bought anonymously online by anyone
willing to pay. And one can see how many
individual holders of data, including the videos
made by the shopkeepers or the street vendors,
have an incentive to sell their data if there is a
demand for it, allowing the ‘map of everyone’s
life’ to be gathered, rivalling even the data that
governments have.
The advances in automatic emotional recognition
are less spectacular, but nevertheless impressive.
At the latest count, it appears possible for
neural-network software that is fed information

from videos to recognise around 80% of the
emotions on the faces of humans. If one adds
to this the potential in analysing human gaits
and body postures30, the time is soon upon us
in which one could remotely build up a picture
of the emotions of random individuals with
90% accuracy.
The imperfection in measurement at the individual
level, which invalidates it clinically, is irrelevant at
the group level where the measurement error
washes out. Many of the potential uses of these
remote emotion-recognition technologies are
thus highly advantageous to the well-being
research agenda. They for instance promise to
revolutionise momentary well-being measurement
of particular groups, such as children in school,
prisoners in prison, and passengers on trains.
Instead of engaging in costly surveys and
non-randomised experiments, the mood of
workers, school children, and whole cities and
countries can be measured remotely and noninvasively, without the need to identify anyone
personally. This might well revolutionise well-being
research and applications, leading to less reliance
on costly well-being surveys and the ability to
‘calibrate’ well-being surveys in different places
and across time with the use of remote emotion
measures on whole groups. Remote emotional
measurement of whole groups is particularly
important once well-being becomes more of a
recognised policy tool, giving individuals and
their groups an incentive to ‘game’ measures of
well-being to influence policy in the desired
direction. There will undoubtedly be technical
problems involved, such as cultural norms in
emotional expression, but the promise is high.
The potential abuses of remote emotional
measurement are harder to imagine, precisely
because the methods are quite fallible at the
individual level, just as with ‘lie detectors’ and
other such devices supposed to accurately
measure something that is sensitive to people.
Individuals can pretend to smile, keep their face
deliberately impassive, and practise gaits that
mimic what is desired should there be an individual
incentive to do so. Hence commercial or
government abuse would lie more in the general
improvement it would herald in the ability to
predict individual and group well-being.
If one then thinks of data involving interactions
and devices, one thinks of the whole world of

online-behaviour, including twitter, mobile
phones, portable devices, and what-have-you.
Here too, the new data possibilities have opened
new research possibilities as well as possible
abuses. Possibly the most promising and dangerous
of the new measurement options on interactive
behaviour ‘in the real world’ is to equip a whole
community, like everyone in a firm, with mobile
sensors so as to analyse how individuals react to
each other. This is the direction taken by the MIT
Media Lab.31
The coding of mood from textual information
(“sentiment analysis”) has led to an important
literature in computer science.32 So far, its
empirical applications mainly resulted in
predictive modeling of industry-relevant
outcomes like stock market prices, rather than
the design of well-being enhancing policies.33
Well-being researchers should thus largely benefit
from collaborating with computer scientists in
the future. Such collaborations should prove
fruitful for the latter as well, who often lack
knowledge on the distinction between cognitive
or affective measures of well-being, which
measures should be used to train a predictive
model of well-being (besides emotions), and
why. Another promising technique is to use
speech analysis to analyse emotional content or
hierarchical relations, building on the finding
that individuals lower in the social pecking order
adapt their speech and language to those higher
in the social pecking order.34
Overall, these methods should lead to major
improvements in our capacity to understand and
affect the subjective well-being of a population.
By equipping and following everyone in a
community, researchers and manipulators might
obtain a full social hierarchy mapping that is
both relative (who is higher) and absolute
(average hierarchical differences), yielding social
power maps of a type not yet seen before.
Analyses of bodily stances and bilateral stressresponses hold similar promise for future
measurement. This can be used both positively
(eg to detect bullying) and negatively (to
enforce bullying).
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2.5 Is Big Data Driving the Renewed Interest
in Well-being?
The explosion of choice that the Internet has
enabled is probably a key driver of the use of
well-being information: to help them choose
something they like from the millions of possibilities
on offer, consumers use information on how
much people like themselves enjoyed a purchase.
Large internet companies actively support this
development and have in many ways led research
on well-being in this world. Ebay and Amazon for
instance regularly experiment with new forms of
subjective feedback that optimise the information
about the trustworthiness of sellers and
consumers. Nearly all newspapers use a system
of likes for their comments to help individuals sift
through them and inform themselves of what
others found most interesting. Brands themselves
are getting increasingly interested in collecting
the emotional attitudes linked to their mentions
on social networks. Social media monitoring
companies like Brandwatch analyse several
billion emoticons shared on Twitter or Instagram
each year to learn which brands generate the
most anger or happiness.
Hence some part of the surge in interest in
well-being is because of Big Data: individuals are
so bewildered by the huge variety of choice that
they turn to the information inherent in the
subjective feedback of others to guide their own
choices. This subjective feedback is of course
subject to distortion and manipulation, and one
might well see far more of that in the future.
Restaurants may already manipulate their
facebook likes and ratings on online restaurant
guides (as well as off-line guides that give stars
to restaurants), leading to an arms race in terms
of sophisticated rating algorithms that screen
out suspect forms of feedback.35
Yet, the key point is that Big Data gives more value
to well-being measurements. New generations of
consumers and producers are entirely used to
subjective feedback, including its limitations
and potential abuse: they have learnt by long
exposure what information there is in the
subjective feedback of others.
An interesting aspect of the Big Data revolution
is that it is largely driven by private organisations,
not government. It is Google that collected
information on all the streets and dwellings in the

world. Facebook owns billions of posts that have
information on trillions of photos, videos, and
personal statements. Apple has information on
the billions of mobile phones and app-movements
of its customers, data it can use for advertising.
Private companies also collect information on
millions of genetic profiles, so as to sell people
gene charts that show them where their ancestors
came from on the basis of a sample of their own
genes. They also have the best data on genealogy,
which involves collecting family trees going back
centuries, allowing them for instance to trace
beneficiaries of wills and unspecified inheritances.
Lastly, they collect embarrassing information
on bankruptcies or credit worthiness, criminal
activities, pornography, defamatory statements,
and infidelity, allowing them to blackmail
individuals and provide buyers with information
about individuals of interest (eg employers or
potential partners).
The fact that this data is in private hands and
often for sale means academics (and sometimes
governments) are very much at a disadvantage
because they often lack the best data and the
resources: no academic institution had the
resources to set up GoogleMaps or Wikipedia,
nor the databases of the NSA that track people
and communication around the world. In many
areas of social science then, the academic
community is likely far behind commercial
research units inside multinational organisations.
Amazon, eBay, and Google probably know more
about consumer sentiments and purchasing
behaviour than any social scientist in academia.
A few leading academic institutions or researchers
do sign data sharing agreements with institutions
like Nielsen or Facebook. Yet, these agreements
are scarce and can lead to problems, like the
2017 scandal of the (ab)use of Facebook profiles
by Cambridge Analytica.
However, the fact that private companies gather
the bulk of Big Data means we should not
confuse the existence of Big Data with an
omniscient Big Brother who is able to analyse
and coherently use all the information. Individual
data packages are held for particular reasons,
and data in one list is often like a foreign language
to other data, stored in different ways on
different machines. This results in marketing
companies often buying inaccurate information
on customer segments (age, gender, etc.) to
data brokers.36 We should thus not presume that

merely because it exists, it is all linked and used
to the benefit or harm of the population. It costs
resources to link data and analyse them, meaning
that only the most lucrative forms of data
get matched and used, with a market process
discovering those uses gradually over time. An
average health centre can for instance easily
have 50 separate databases kept up to date,
ranging from patient invoices to medicine
inventory and pathology scans. The same person
can be in those databases several times, as the
subject of pathology reports, the patient list of
2015, the invoice list of 2010, the supplier of
computer software, the father of another
patient, and the partner of yet another. All on
separate lists and not recorded in the same
format and thus necessarily recognised as one
and the same person.

The degree to which such data is known and can
be used by insurance companies depends on the
social norms in countries and their legislation.
Denmark is very free with such data, offering 5%
of their population records to any researcher in
the world to analyse, giving access to the health,
basic demographics, and family information of
individuals, including the details of their birth and
their grandparents. Norway is similarly privacyinsensitive with everyone’s tax records available
to everyone in the world. Yet, both Denmark and
Norway have a free public health service so it
actually is not that relevant that one could predict
the individual health risk profile of their citizens.

3. Implications: the Economic
Perspective

The use of Big Data to differentiate between
low-risk and high-risk is but one example of the
general use of Big Data to price-discriminate, a
theme more generally discussed by Alessandro
Acquisti in his research.39 When it comes to
products that differ in cost by buyer (ie, insurance),
that works against the bottom of the market, but
when it concerns a homogenous good, it works
in favour of the bottom of the market: lower
prices are charged of individuals with lower
ability to pay, which is inequality reducing.
Privacy regulation can thereby hinder favourable
price-discrimination. Privacy regulations restricting
advertisers’ ability to gather data on Internet
users has for instance been argued to reduce the
effectiveness of online advertising, as users
receive mis-targeted ads.40

3.1 Price Discrimination, Specialisation and AI
We want to discuss three economic aspects of
Big Data: the issue of predictability, insurance
and price-discrimination; the general equilibrium
aspects of the improved predictability of tastes
and abilities; and the macro-consequences of the
availability of so much information about humanity.
There are two classic reasons for insurance: one
is to ensure individuals against sheer bad luck,
and the other is to share risks within a community
of different risk profiles. The first is immune to
Big Data by construction, but the second is
undermined by Big Data. If one were able to
predict different risk profiles, then insurance
companies would either ask higher premiums of
higher risks, or not even insure the high-risk
types. The use of Big Data means a reduction in
risk-sharing which benefits the well-off (who are
generally lower risks).37
This is indeed happening in health38, but also
other insurance markets. Data on age, weight,
and self-rated health is predictive of future
longevity, health outcomes, and consumption
patterns, making it of interest to health insurance
companies, travel insurance companies, financial
institutions, potential partners, potential employers,
and many others.

Where private health insurance is more important,
the issue of Big Data is more acute. Some countries
like Australia forbid health insurance companies
from using personal information (including age)
to help set their insurance rates.

The main macro-economic effect of Big Data is
to reduce market frictions: it is now easier to
know when shops have run out of something,
where the cheapest bargains are, what the latest
technologies are, whom to work with that has
the right skills, what the ideal partner looks like,
where the nearest fuel station is, etc.
In the longer run, the main effect of reduced
frictions is to increase the degree of specialisation
in the economy. The increase in specialisation will
come from reduced search frictions involved in
knowing suppliers and buyers better: companies
and individuals can target their services and
products better and more locally, which in
general is a force for greater specialisation, a
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change that Durkheim argued was the main
economic and social change of the Industrial
revolution.
Greater specialisation can be expected to have
many effects on social life, some of which are
very hard to predict, just as the effects of the
Industrial Revolution were hard to foresee in
the 19th century. Specialisation reduces the
importance of kinship groups in production and
increases the reliance on anonymous platforms
and formal exchange mechanisms, which increases
efficiency but also makes economic relations
less intimate. On the other hand, specialisation
and increased knowledge of others increases
communication over large distances, which is
likely to be pacifying and perhaps culturally
enriching. Specialisation will favour the production
factor that is hardest to increase and most vital
to production, which in the past was human
capital, but in the future might be physical
capital in the form of AI machines. We already
see a reduction in the share of labour in national
income, and Big Data might increase the
importance of sheer computing power and data
storage capacity, both likely to favour capital and
thus increase inequality whilst reducing median
wages. However, this is no more than pure
speculation as it is also possible that Big Data
will allow the majority of human workers to focus
on a skill that is not AI-replicable, perchance
human interaction and creativity (though some
fear that there is no human skills AI cannot over
time acquire).
There will also be macro-effects of Big Data via
a totally different avenue: the effect of lots of
data available for training the intelligence of
non-human entities. It is already the case that
Artificial Intelligence techniques use Wikipedia
and the whole of the Internet to train, for
instance, translation programs from one language
into another. It is the case that the internet was
used by IMB’s Watson machine to outperform
humans at ‘Jeopardy’, a general knowledge quiz.
It is the case right now that the internet’s vast
store of pictures and videos is being used to train
AI machines in the recognition of objects, words,
attitudes, and social situations.41 Essentially, the
available knowledge on the lives of billions of
humans is improving the intelligence of nonhuman entities. This might benefit humanity, for
instance by allowing individuals from totally
different language communities to quickly

understand each other, or might be training rivals
for political dominance.
It is beyond this chapter to speculate what the
end result of these societal forces will be, as one
is then pretty much talking about the future of
the world, so we simply state here that the
explosion in data available to lots of different
actors is part and parcel of major economic
shifts that seem difficult to contain and hard
to predict.
3.2 Privacy and Conclusions
The point of gathering and analysing Big Data is
to uncover information about individuals’ tastes,
abilities, and choices. The main case wherein that
is a clear problem is where individuals want to
keep secrets from others.42 That in turn shows up
the issue of ’face’, ie the need for individuals to
be seen to adhere to social norms whilst in
reality deviating from them.
Big Data potentially uncovers ’faces’: the faces
individuals present to some can be unmasked,
leading to the possibility of blackmail on a huge
scale. One should expect this danger to lead to
countermoves. Whilst some companies may
hence buy information on the behaviour of the
clicks made from an IP address that is then
linked to a credit card and then linked to an
individual name, the individual can react by
setting up random internet behaviour routines
specifically designed to create random clicknoise. Or an individual can totally hide their
internet tracks using specific software to do that.
Similarly, individuals can open multiple bank
accounts, use various names, switch devices with
others, and limit their web presence entirely. The
rich will find this easier than the poor, increasing
the divide.
The crucial question for the state is when and
how to respect the right of individuals to keep
their ’faces’ and thus, in some sense, to lie to
others. The key aspect of that discussion lies in
the reasons for using the faces.
When the reason to keep a face is criminal, the
law already mandates everyone with data on the
criminal activities on others to bring this to the
attention of the authorities. Big Data gatherers
and analysers that uncover criminal activities will
hence be pressed into becoming law-informers,
lest they become complicit in covering up for

crimes. When it comes to crime, Big Data will
simply be part of the cat-and-mouse aspect of
authorities and criminals, which is as old as
society itself. Take taxation, which was the
original reason for the emergence of Big Data.
Sophisticated individuals will now use Big Data
to cover up what they earn via the use of
anonymous companies, online purchases via
foreign countries, and what-have-you. Tax
authorities react by mandating more reporting,
though with uncertain effect. Even China, which
is arguably the country most advanced in
constantly keeping its population under electronic
surveillance, has great difficulties curtailing its
wealthier citizens, whose children often study
abroad and who funnel their wealth as well.43
There are also non-criminal reasons for people to
keep different faces for different audiences
though. People can be embarrassed about their
looks, their sexuality, their family background,
their age, their health, their friends, their previous
opinions, and their likes. They might also want to
keep their abilities, or lack thereof, secret from
employers, friends, and families. Having their
personal information known to all could well be
devastating for their careers, their love life, and
their families.
There is a whole continuum here of cases where
‘face’ might differ from ‘reality’, ranging from
self-serving hypocrisy to good manners to
maintaining diverging narratives with diverging
interest groups. From a societal perspective a
decision has to made as to whether it is deemed
beneficial or not to help individuals keep multiple
faces hidden or not.
The norms on what is considered embarrassing
and private differ from country to country.
Uncovering faces might be considered a crime
in one country and totally normal in another.
Having an angry outburst on social media might
be considered a healthy expression in one
country and an unacceptable transgression in
another. Medical information about sexually
transmitted diseases (even if deduced from
surveillance cameras or Facebook) might scarcely
raise an eyebrow in one country and be
devastating to reputation in another. Indeed,
information that is gathered as a matter of
course by officials in one country (ie the gender
and ethnicity in one country) might be illegal
in another country (eg. France where one is

forbidden from storing data on ethnicity).
World-wide rules on what information should or
should not be subject to privacy legislation (or
what should be considered unethical to gather
by a researcher) would hence seem futile.
Embarrassment and privacy are culture-specific.
Is well-being itself subject to embarrassment? It
would seem not: response rates to well-being
questions are very high in every country sampled,
signifying its universal status as a general signal
of the state of someone’s life that is regularly
communicated in many ways.
It is not immediate that the existence of
embarassment means that privacy is good for
society. For instance, an employer who screens
out an unhappy person as a potential worker
because a happier alternative candidate is likely
to be more productive, is not necessarily having
a net negative effect on society, even though the
person being screened out probably is worse off
in the short run.
From a classic economic point of view, the
employer who discriminates against the unhappy
because they are less productive is perfecting
the allocation of resources and is in fact improving
the overall allocation of people to jobs, leaving it
up to societal redistributive systems to provide a
welfare floor (or not) to those whose expected
productivity is very low.
The same argument could be run for the
formation of romantic partnerships, friends, and
even communities: the lack of privacy might
simply be overall improving for the operation of
society. Yet, it seems likely that the inability of
those without great technical ability to maintain
multiple faces will favour those already at the
top. Whilst the poor might not be able to hide
from their management what they really think
and might not be able to hide embarrassing
histories, those with greater understanding of
the new technologies and deeper pockets will
likely be able to keep multiple faces. One can for
instance already pay internet firms to erase one’s
searchable history on the web.
Whilst the scientific well-being case for the
well-being benefits and costs of maintaining
multiple faces is not well-researched, the UN
has nevertheless declared the “Right to Privacy”
which consists of the right to withhold information
from public view - a basic human right. Article 12
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says “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.”
The UN definition partly seems motivated by the
wish for individuals to be free to spend parts of
their day without being bothered by others, which
is not about multiple faces but more about the
limits to the ability of others to impose themselves
on others. That is not in principle connected to
Big Data and so not of immediate interest here.
The ‘face’ aspect of privacy is contained in the
reference to “honour and reputation” and is seen
as a fundamental Human Right.
If we thus adopt the running hypothesis that
holding multiple faces is important in having a
well-functioning society, the use of Big Data to
violate that privacy and thus attack reputation
is a problem.
Privacy regulation at present is not set up for
the age of Big Data, if there are laws at all. For
instance, the United States doesn’t have a
privacy law, though reference is made in the
constitution against the use of the government
of information that violates privacy. Companies
can do what governments cannot in the United
States. In the United Kingdom, there is no common
law protection of privacy (because various
commissions found they could not adequately
define privacy), but there is jurisprudence
protecting people from having some of their
private life exposed (ie, nude pictures illegally
obtained cannot be published), and there is a
general defence against breaches of confidence
which invokes the notion that things can be
said or communicated ‘in confidence’. Where
confidentiality ends and the right of others to
remark on public information begins is not clear.
Finally, is it reasonable to think that individuals
will be able to control these developments and
to enforce considered consent for any possible
use of the Big Data collected? We think this is
likely to be naive: in an incredibly complex and
highly specialised society, it must be doubted
that individuals have the cognitive capacity to
understand all the possible uses of Big Data, nor
that they would have the time to truly engage
with all the informed consent requests that they
would then get.

Ones sees this dynamic happening right now in
the EU with respect to greater privacy rules that
came in mid 2018, forcing large companies to get
more consent from their clients. As a result,
e-mail inboxes were being flooded with additional
information, requiring consumers to read hundreds
of pages in the case of large companies, followed
by take-it-or-leave-it consent requests which boil
down to “consent to our terms or cease using
our services”. This is exactly the situation that
has existed for over a decade now, and it is
simply not realistic to expect individuals to wade
through all this. The limits of considered consent
in our society are being reached, with companies
and institutions becoming faster at finding new
applications and forms of service than individuals
can keep up with.
Hence, the ‘consumer sovereignty’ approach to
consent and use of Big Data on the internet
seems to us to have a limited lifetime left. The
historical solution to the situation where individuals
are overwhelmed by organised interests that are
far ahead of them technologically and legally is
to organise in groups and have professional
intermediaries bargain on behalf of the whole
group. Unions, professional mediators, and
governments are examples of that groupbargaining role. It must thus be expected that
in countries with benevolent and competent
bureaucracies, it will be up to government
regulators to come up with and enforce defaults
and limits on the use of Big Data. In countries
without competent regulators, individuals will
probably find themselves relying on the market
to provide them with counter-measures, such as
via internet entities that try and take on a
pro-bono role in this (such as the Inrupt initiative).
A key problem that even benevolent regulators
will face is that individuals on the internet can be
directed to conduct their information exchange
and purchases anywhere in the world, making it
hard for regulators to limit the use of ‘foreign
produced’ data. Legal rules might empower
foreign providers by applying only to domestic
producers of research, which would effectively
stimulate out-sourcing of research to other
countries, much like Cambridge Analytica was
offering manipulation services to dictators in
Africa from offices in London.
Concerns for privacy, along with other concerns
that national agencies or international charitable

groups might have about Big Data and the
difficulty of controlling the internet in general,
might well lead to more drastic measures than
mere privacy regulation. It is hard to predict
how urgent the issue will prove to be and
what policy levers regulators actually have.
The ultimate policy tool for national agencies
(or supranational authorities such as the EU)
would be to nationalise parts of the internet
and then enforce privacy-sensitive architecture
upon it. Nationalisation of course would bring
with it many other issues, and might arise from
very different concerns, such as taxation of
internet activities.
It seems likely to us that events will overtake
our ability to predict the future in this area
quite quickly.
Our main conclusion is then that Big Data
is increasing the ability of researchers,
governments, companies, and other entities to
measure and predict the well-being and the inner
life of individuals. This should be expected to
increase the ability to analyse the effects on
well-being of policies and major changes in
general, which should boost the interest and
knowledge of well-being. The increase in choices
that the information boom is generating will
probably increase the use of subjective ratings
to inform other customers about goods and
activities, or about participants to the “sharing
economy” with which they interact.
At the aggregate level, the increased use of
Big Data is likely to increase the degree of
specialisation in services and products in the
whole economy, as well as a general reduction in
the ability of individuals to guard their privacy.
This in turn is likely to lead to profound societal
changes that are hard to foretell, but at current
trajectory seem to favour large-scale information
collectors over the smaller scale providers and
users. This is likely to make individuals less in
control of how information about themselves is
being used, and of what they are told, or even
able to discover, about the communities in which
they live.
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Endnotes
1	See https://www.statista.com/statistics/751749/worldwide-data-storage-capacity-and-demand/
2	Improved internet usage and access have been major
drivers of data collection and accessibility: internet users
worldwide went from less than 10% of the world population
to more than 50% today, with major inequalities across
countries.
3	For a review of such methods and how they can complement standard econometrics methods, see Varian (2014)
4	We define Big data as large-scale repeated and potentially
multi-sourced information on individuals gathered and
stored by an external party with the purpose of predicting
or manipulating choice behaviour, usually without the
individuals reasonably knowing or controlling the purpose
of the data gathering.
5	The question of ethnic-based statistics is an interesting
instance where Big Data is sometimes used to circumvent
legal constraints, for instance by predicting ethnicity or
religion using information on first names in French
administrative or firm databases (Algan et al., 2013).
6

Frijters and Foster (2013)

7	This data is now partly available to researchers and led to
numerous studies, for instance Nielsen consumer panel and
scanner data in the United States.
8

Hildebrandt (2006)

9

Carroll et al. (1994)

10 Kleinberg et al. (2015)
11	The Gallup World Polls survey 1000 individuals each year in
166 countries.
12 Smith et al. (2016)
13 For a discussion, see Schwartz et al. (2013)
14 Kosinski et al. (2013)
15	See Collins et al. (2015), Liu et al. (2015) or Schwartz et al.
(2016)
16 Liu et al. (2015)
17 See Collins et al. (2015)
18 Schwartz et al. (2013)
19 Hills et al. (2017)
20 Algan et al. (2019)
21	We thank Gerardo Leyva from Mexico´s National Institute
of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) for generously sharing
these slides, which were based on the subjective well-being
surveys known as BIARE and the big data research project
“Estado de Animo de los Tuiteros en Mexico” (The mood of
twitterers in Mexico), both carried out by INEGI. These
slides are part of a presentation given by Gerardo Leyva
(head of research at INEGI) during the “2° Congreso
Internacional de Psicología Positiva “La Psicología y el
Bienestar”, November 9-10, 2018, hosted by the Universidad
Iberoamericana, in Mexico City and in the “Foro Internacional
de la Felicidad 360”, November 2-3, 2018, organized by
Universidad TecMilenio in Monerrey, México
22 Borowiecki (2017)
23 Algan et al. (2019)
24 Ratti et al. (2006)

25 Bellet (2017)
26	See for instance Proserpio et al. (2018) or Albrahao et al.
(2017) for recent applications to AirBnb data. See also
Helliwell et al. (2016) for a survey on trust and well-being.
27 See Croy and Hummel (2017)
28 See Bijlstra and Dotsch (2011)
29 See https://patents.google.com/patent/US9652663B2/en
30 See Xu et al. (2015)
31 Hedman et al. (2012)
32 See Liu (2012) for a review.
33 Bollen et al. (2011)
34 Danescu et al. (2012)
35	Online platforms actively try to mitigate manipulation
concerns. Besides, whether subjected to manipulation or
not, these reviews do play a large influential role on
economic outcomes like restaurant decisions or customer
visits. For a review on user-generated content and social
media addressing manipulation concerns, see Luca and
Zervas (2016).
36 See Newmann et al. (2018)
37	Looking at refusals to reveal private information on a
large-scale market research platform, Goldfarb and Tucker
(2012) provides evidence of increasing privacy concerns
between 2001 and 2008, driven by contexts in which
privacy is not directly relevant, i.e. outside of health or
financial products.
38 E.g. Tanner (2017)
39 Acquisti et al. (2016)
40 Goldfarb and Tucker (2011)
41	For instance, recent papers used scenic ratings on internet
sites with pictures or hedonic pricing models to build
predictive models of what humans found to be scenic
(Seresinhe et al. 2017; Glaeser et al. 2018).
42	There are other cultural aspects of the Internet age in
general that lie outside of the scope of this chapter, such
as the general effect of social media, the increased (ab)use
of the public space for attention, and the effects of
increasingly being in a Global Village of uniform language,
tastes, and status.
43	A popular means of estimating the size of tax-evasion is by
looking at the difference in the actual usage of cash versus
the official usage of cash, yielding perhaps 25% tax evasion
in China (Jianglin, 2017). There have also been attempts to
compare reported exports with reported imports (Fisman
and Wei, 2004).
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The United States:
A Mass-Addiction Society
The surge of interest in happiness and public
policy owes much to the case of the United
States. Professor Richard Easterlin (1974) famously
noted 45 years ago that happiness in the U.S. had
remained unchanged from 1946 to 1970 despite
the significant rise of GDP per person. This
finding became known as the Easterlin Paradox.
It has continued to hold true until today. Indeed,
the average life evaluation in the United States,
as measured by the Cantril ladder, has declined
during the past dozen years, from 7.2 in 2006 to
6.9 in 2018, despite ongoing U.S. economic
growth. (See also Twenge, 2019, Figure 1, in this
report,on the decline of subjective well-being
(SWB) among U.S. adults since 2000).
As I noted in last year’s World Happiness Report
(Sachs, 2018), the long-term rise in U.S. income per
person has been accompanied by several trends
adverse to SWB: worsening health conditions for
much of the population; declining social trust; and
declining confidence in government. Whatever
benefits in SWB might have accrued as the result
of rising incomes seem to have been offset by
these adverse trends. This year, I propose a
common driver of many of America’s social
maladies: a mass-addiction society.
Consider the article in this year’s report by
Prof. Jean Twenge (2019) on the rapid rise of
adolescent depression, suicidal ideation, and
self-harm after 2010, and a marked decline in
SWB, apparently due in part to the astoundingly
large amount of time that young people are
spending on digital media: smartphones,
videogames, computers, and the like. It’s plausible
to describe a significant fraction of adolescents
as addicted to screen time, and that is certainly
how many young people themselves describe it.
They regard their own heavy use of smartphones
and other screens as a major problem to overcome, with 54% saying that they spend too much
time on their devices (Jiang, 2018). The numbers
cited by Twenge are indeed startling: “By 2017,
the average 12th grader (17-18 years old) spent
more than 6 hours a day of leisure time on just
three digital media activities (internet, social
media, and texting),” disaggregated by type in
Figure 3 of the paper.

An addiction, generally speaking, is a behavior
like substance abuse, excessive gambling, or
excessive use of digital media, which individuals
pursue compulsively in the face of adverse
consequences known to the individual. My
argument is that the U.S. is suffering an epidemic
of addictions, and that these addictions are
leaving a rising portion of American society
unhappy and a rising number clinically depressed.
The concept of addiction was originally applied
by psychologists and public health specialists
mainly or exclusively to substances such as
tobacco, alcohol, marijuana, opioids (natural and
synthetic), and other drugs. More recently, many
psychologists have come to regard various
behaviors as potential addictions as well. Such
addictive behaviors include gambling; social
media use, video gaming, shopping, consuming
unhealthy foods, exercising, engaging in extreme
sports, engaging in risky sexual behaviors, and
others. Such behaviors may become compulsive,
with individuals pursuing them to excess, despite
the awareness of their harmful nature to the
individuals themselves and to those around them
(including family and friends).
The prevalence of addictions in American society
seems to be on the rise, perhaps dramatically.
These addictions, in turn, seem to be causing
considerable unhappiness and even depression.
The implication, if correct, is that the U.S. society
should be taking actions – as individuals, in
schools, at workplaces, and through public
policies – to reverse these epidemics, as part of
an overall strategy to increase well-being in the
United States to previous levels and beyond.
At the outset of this chapter it’s worth emphasizing
that if the U.S. is indeed suffering from an epidemic
of addictions, the implications are crucial not
only for public policy but also for the rethinking
of economic science. The free-market theory
taught in our universities holds that consumers
know what’s best for them, with businesses
efficiently and appropriately catering to those
desires. The prevalence of addiction suggests a
very different picture: that individuals may be
lured into self-destructive behaviors, notably by
businesses keen on boosting sales of their goods
and services. Economists of course know of such
risks, but drastically underestimate their prevalence
and significance.
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The Basic Psychology and
Neuroscience of Addiction
Warren Bickel (2017) provides a very useful
overview of addiction theories in psychology and
neuroscience. He describes four broad theories,
with considerable overlap among them. These are:
1. Dopamine-related theories
2. Opponent process theories
3. Self-control failure theories
4. Dual decision system theories
These overarching theories have subsidiary
theories as well. Bickel evaluates these four main
theories according to their ability to answer six
benchmarks questions:
1. Why are some commodities or behaviors
addictive while others are not?
2. Why does addiction follow some common
developmental trends?
3. Why do some individuals decrease their
valuation of non-addictive commodities?
4. Why do individuals with addictions engage
in self-defeating patterns of behavior?
5. Why do individuals with addictions engage
in other unhealthy behaviors?
6. What interventions are implied by the
theories?
The dopamine-related theories emphasize the
role of dopamine (DA) pathways as accounting
for the allegedly rewarding effects of addictive
substances or behaviors. In particular, addictive
substances and behaviors are hypothesized to
cause a spike in dopamine release in the mesolimbic
DA pathway linking the ventral tegmental area
(VTA) with the nucleus accumbens, as well as
other DA pathways (to the frontal cortex and the
dorsal striatum). For many years it was thought
that DA was itself a “pleasure” neurotransmitter.
Now, DA is hypothesized to heighten the salience
of stimuli, leading to a “craving” for the addictive
substance or activity.
The opponent process theory hypothesizes a
dysregulation of the neural reward circuitry, such
that a substance or behavior that initially stimulates
pleasure (or positive hedonic valence) later
stimulates an anti-reward system that causes
dysphoria (or negative hedonic valence) in the
case of withdrawal. The basic idea is that
drug-taking or addictive behaviors become
compulsions to avoid the dysphoria associated
with withdrawal.

The self-control failure theories hypothesize that
self-control in general is an exhaustible resource,
and that when that resource is depleted, because
of stress, exhaustion, or other reasons, the result
is short-sighted decisions and impulsivity. In
general terms, stress of various sorts leads to
depletion, which leads to the addictive behavior.
The dual-decision system theory is based on the
core idea that mental processes involve complex
interactions of multiple neurobiological pathways.
At least since the ancient Greeks, philosophers
have, in a similar manner, distinguished between
different parts of the “soul” or mind. Plato
distinguished between reason and emotions;
Aristotle divided the soul into three parts, the
nutritive soul (shared with all plants and animals),
the appetitive soul (shared with animals), and the
rational soul (distinctly human). For both Plato and
Aristotle, the rational soul battled the emotions
and desires emanating from the animal soul.
Modern psychologists have also distinguished
between different pathways of decision making,
for example conscious versus unconscious
decision making, or alternatively, “hot” versus
“cold” decision systems, also called “fast” versus
“slow” systems by Daniel Kahneman.
Neuroscientists try to link these hypothesized
decision pathways to specific brain structures
and neuronal networks. The dominant current
thinking distinguishes between a reward-driven
impulsive pathway centered in the DA-mediated
mesolimbic system and an executive system of
top-down decision making mediated by the
pre-frontal cortex (PFC). The executive system
is responsible for complex problem solving,
planning, and choices involving the future, while
the DA-mediated mesolimbic system gives
salience to immediate rewards associated with
conditional stimuli. One can loosely (though
far from precisely) associate the PFC with
Aristotelian rationality and the mesolimbic
system with “the appetitive soul” or Plato’s
notion of the emotions.
In Bickel’s theory, normal and healthy human
choice is governed by the inputs of both systems,
while addictions result from the dysregulation of
the two systems, specifically from the dominance
of the DA-mediated system relative to the PFC.
He associates the weakening of PFC-linked
decision making with a rise in time discounting.
Specifically, the weakening of the PFC relative to

the mesolimbic system is hypothesized to give a
larger relative weight to immediate gratification
(as guided by the mesolimbic system) relative to
long-term costs and benefits (as guided by the
executive system of the PFC). In some theories, a
third pathway, associated with the insular cortex,
modulates the interactions of the PFC and the
mesolimbic pathways.
In Bickel’s interpretation, addiction is a disorder
marked by an abnormally high rate of time
discount, leading to choices of immediate
gratification even when the choice will bring
known and predictable high costs in the longer
term. Some evidence suggests that dysregulation
of the insular cortex “hijacks” the PFC functions
that would otherwise resist the short-term
temptations. The key to overcoming addiction,
in this view, is to strengthen the PFC once again
to play its crucial role in long-term planning,
complex decision making, and the inhibition of
impulses driven by the mesolimbic system.
According to Bickel, the dual-decision theories
best account for addictive behaviors, which are
characterized by the choice of immediate
gratification despite predictable adverse
consequences in the longer term. With a
weakened executive control, the individual acts
compulsively in the face of a stimulus associated
with a previous surge of dopamine. The stimulus
creates a craving that is not inhibited by the
executive function of the PFC.

An Epidemic of Addictions in the
United States
There is no single comprehensive epidemiology
of addictive behaviors in the United States, in
part because there is no consensus on the
definition and diagnosis of addiction, and in part
because the data are not comprehensively
collected and analyzed to understand the
prevalence and co-morbidities of various kinds
of addictions. It is clear that some individuals
are highly vulnerable to multiple addictions, in
part because of the underlying neurobiological
mechanisms of addiction that are common
across addictive behaviors, e.g. a weakening of
executive control.
The U.S. is in the midst of epidemics of several
addictions, both of substances and behaviors.
Recent data of the Institute of Health Metrics

and Evaluation (IHME) show that the U.S. has
among the world’s highest rates of substance
abuse. The estimates for 2017 are shown in Table
7.1, comparing the U.S., Europe, and Global rates
of disease burden for various categories of
substance abuse. The measures are the DisabilityAdjusted Life Years (DALYs) per 100,000 (100K)
population. For example, the U.S. lost 1,703.3
DALYs per 100K population from all forms of
drug use, the second-highest rate of drug-use
disease burden in the world. The U.S. rate
compares with 340.5 DALYs per 100K in Europe,
roughly one-fifth of the U.S. rate.
Among all 196 countries, the U.S. ranks 2nd overall
in DALYs lost to all drug use disorders; 1st in
DALYs from cocaine use; 3rd in DALYs from opioid
addiction; and 2nd in DALYs from amphetamine
use. The U.S. is moderate only for alcohol use
disorders, ranking 39th. These very heavy burdens
of substance disorders are matched by the high
U.S. rankings on other mental disorders. The U.S.
ranks 5th in the world in DALYs from anxiety
disorders and 11th in the world from depressive
disorders. Across all mental disorders, the U.S.
ranks 4th in the world.
While there is no comprehensive data on the
prevalence of addictions, academic studies and
government reports suggest addiction epidemics
in several areas, including the following (with
prevalence estimates cited by Sussman, 2017,
Table 6.1 and Table 7.1):
•M
 arijuana: 7% of 18-year-olds, 2% of 50-yearolds
• Illicit drugs, non-marijuana: 8% of 18-yearolds, 5% of 50-year-olds
• Tobacco: 15% of U.S. adult population
• Alcohol: 10% for older teenagers and adults
•F
 ood addiction: 10% of U.S. adult population
(= 25% of obese population)
• Gambling: 1-3% of U.S. adult population
• Internet: 2% of U.S. adult population
•E
 xercise: 3-5% of U.S. adult population
(22-26% of college youth)
• Workaholism: 10% of U.S. adult population
•S
 hopping addiction: 6% of U.S. adult
population
•L
 ove and sex addiction: 3-6% of adult
population
According to Sussman’s estimates, around half of
the population suffers from one or more addictions
at any one time.
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Table 7.1: DALYs (Rate per 100,000, 2017) for Various Mental Disorders and
Substance Abuse
U.S. DALYs
(rank per 195 countries
in parenthesis)

Europe DALYs

Global DALYs

Mental disorders

2220.5 (4)

1814.9

1606.8

Drug Use

1703.3 (2)

340.5

355.8

Amphetamines

64.9 (2)

17.7

15.5

Cocaine

131.1 (1)

20.3

13.0

Disorders

Opioids

1220.2 (3)

231.6

281.2

Alcohol

339.8 (39)

515.6

228.6

Anxiety disorders

606.7 (5)

420.6

355.0

Depressive disorders

779.2 (11)

659.5

429.9

Source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, Global Burden of Disease Results Tool,
Online: http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool

There is a tremendous co-occurrence of addictions,
consistent with the dual-decision theory that
attributes addictive behavior to the dominance
of the DA-mesolimbic circuitry relative to the
PFC circuitry. Individuals with addictions may
choose several kinds of short-run boosts to
dopamine over their long-term well-being. Sussman
cites voluminous data on the co-occurrences of
addictions, with 30% to 60% co-occurrence of
cigarettes, alcohol, and other drug use disorders.
He similarly cites many studies linking tobacco
use, drinking and gambling; substance abuse
with sex addiction; substance abuse with
Internet addiction, shopping addiction, and
exercise addiction. A recent study by Lindgren
et al. (2018) demonstrates the common
neurobiological mechanisms of food addiction
and substance abuse. As the article notes,
“Food consumption is rewarding, in part, through
activation of the mesolimbic dopamine (DA)
pathways. Certain foods, especially those high
in sugar and fat, act in a similar way to drugs,
leading to compulsive food consumption and
loss-of-control over food intake.”

Some Implications of Addictions
Addictive behaviors are associated with high
economic costs, personal unhappiness, and
co-morbidities with depressive disorders (MDD)
and other mood and anxiety disorders. Addictions
directly lower well-being through their direct

impacts on poor decision making and outcomes,
social isolation and stigmatization, criminal
activities to obtain illicit substances or to pursue
illicit behaviors, personal shame, and other kinds
of distress. Addictions may also give rise to
clinical depression through mood dysregulation or
secondarily through the acute stresses resulting
from the addiction. At the same time, depression
and other mood disorders may give rise to
addictive behaviors, as individuals try to
“self-medicate” their dysphoria by resorting to
substance abuse or addictive behaviors.
The economic costs run into the hundreds of
billions of dollars per year, certainly several
percent of GDP. One recent online compilation
citing numerous government studies suggests an
annual cost of around $820 billion per year, more
than 4% of GDP (Forogos 2018). Such estimates
should certainly not be regarded as definitive.
The losses directly attributed to addictions are
hard to determine. Moreover, by summing over
the estimated costs of individual addictions, one
is bound to double-count many costs, as many
individuals are addicted to multiple substances
and behaviors, with the resulting absenteeism
and healthcare costs most likely attributed to
each of the individual addictions. On the other
hand, such estimates almost surely fail to
incorporate an accurate monetary measure of
the immense pain and suffering resulting from
the addictions.

Possible Causes of Rising Rates
of Addiction
Many studies indicate a rising prevalence of
several addictions, certainly including opioids,
Internet-related, eating-related, and possibly
others. These epidemics are accompanied by
rising suicide rates and overdoses related to
substance abuse, rising obesity related to eating
addictions, and rising adolescent depression
apparently related to Internet and related
addictions. While there is no overarching
consensus on the reasons for the rising
prevalence of addictions in American society,
several broad hypotheses have been put
forward for consideration. These hypotheses are
inter-related and by no means mutually exclusive.

Mismatches of Human Nature and
Modern Life
The first hypothesis, as expressed cogently for
example by Prof. Lee Goldman in his book Too
Much of a Good Thing (2015), is that several
prevalent addictions result from a discrepancy
between our evolutionary heritage and our
current life conditions. As Goldman explains,
“Early humans avoided starvation by being able
to gorge themselves whenever food was available.
Now that same tendency to eat more than our
bodies really need explains why 35 percent of
Americans are obese and have an increased
risk of developing diabetes, heart disease, and
even cancer.” Similarly, the ancient risk of fatal
dehydration created a craving for salt and water,
which now leads many people to consume an
excess of salt that in turn contributes to high
blood pressure.

Rising Stress Levels Associated with
Increased Socioeconomic Inequality
The second hypothesis, powerfully described by
Profs. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett in their
new book The Inner Level (2019), argues that
high and rising income inequality in high-income
societies leads to stress that leads to addiction:
“As we have seen, trying to maintain self-esteem
and status in a more unequal society can be
highly stressful … [T]his experience of stress can
lead to an increased desire for anything which
makes them feel better – whether alcohol, drugs,

eating for comfort, ‘retail therapy’ or another
crutch. It’s a dysfunctional way of coping, of
giving yourself a break from the relentlessness
of the anxiety so many feel.”

Super-normal Stimuli
The third major hypothesis points to a core
design feature of a market economy: addictive
products boost the bottom line. Americans are
being drugged, stimulated, and aroused by the
work of advertisers, marketers, app designers,
and others who know how to hook people on
brands and product lines. If Sigmund Freud is the
psychologist who made the “unconscious” the
basis of his theories, it was his nephew, Edward
Bernays, the inventor of modern public relations
(PR), who preyed on the unconscious to sell goods.
Bernays trafficked in behavioral conditioning, for
example, famously associating cigarette smoking
with sexual allure of the female models who were
photographed smoking in public, a dubious
“first” for women.
The academic and business literature is rife with
examples of businesses “spiking” their products
by associating them with various kinds of craving:
sex, power, fame, euphoria, or others. As Adam
Alter (2017) powerfully describes in his book
Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology and
the Business of Keeping Us Hooked, the tech
companies are aggressively adjusting their apps
to induce more screen time (e.g. by including
time delays or other screen signals designed to
prompt our heightened attention and rush of
dopamine). Slot machine owners program their
machines so that they give a payout after a long
stretch of losses, in order to hook the individual
on continued gambling. Food companies spike
their products with extra sugar and salt, highly
processed foodstuffs, and fats that trigger a
craving response. The tobacco industry adds
nicotine in order to induce more smoking addiction.

Social Contagion
For countless behaviors, peer imitation and
peer pressure are often decisive for leading
an individual to addiction. Zhang et al. (2018)
review studies showing that “friendship
networks and weight outcomes/behaviours
were interdependent, and that friends were
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similar in weight status and related behaviours.”
Social effects have been identified for marijuana
(Ali et al., 2011), alcohol (Rosenquist, 2010),
cocaine (Barman-Adhikari, 2015), gambling
(Lutter, 2018), and other addictions.

Metabolic Disorders
Illicit drugs, we know, have powerful and direct
pharmacological impacts on the brain that
contribute to their addictive nature and their
long-term harmful effects. Direct physiological
impacts may be contributing to the addictive
qualities and adverse consequences of addictions
other than illicit drugs. For example, recent
research (Small & DiFeliceantonio, 2019) suggests
that processed foods may short-circuit the
gut-brain signaling network that controls satiety.
As the authors conclude, “This raises the possibility
that how foods are prepared and processed,
beyond their energy density or palatability,
affects physiology in unanticipated ways
that could promote overeating and metabolic
dysfunction.” (p. 347)
Similarily, smartphone use may have physiological
effects beyond the psychological effects of peer
pressure, social anxieties, exposure to onscreen
violence, and so forth. Lissak (2018) reports that
“excessive screen time is associated with poor
sleep and risk factors for cardiovascular diseases
such as high blood pressure, obesity, low HDL
cholesterol, poor stress regulation (high
sympathetic arousal and cortisol dysregulation),
and insulin resistance.” (p. 149)

Failures of Government Regulation
In view of the multiple addictive epidemics
underway in the United States that are contributing
to shockingly adverse public health outcomes
– obesity rates among the highest in the world;
rising rates of adolescent depression; rising
age-adjusted suicide rates since the year 2000;
a searing opioid epidemic; and falling overall life
expectancy – one would expect a major public
policy response. Yet the shocking truth is that
U.S. public health responses have been small,
even insignificant, to date. If anything, the
epidemics expose the remarkable power of
corporate vested interests in American political
life, power that is so great that it has forestalled

any effective responses that would jeopardize
corporate profits and control.
Let me briefly describe three examples.
First, much of America’s opioid epidemic is itself
the result of deliberate corporate activity by one
now-notorious company, Purdue Pharma, owned
by the Sackler family. As described in many
recent exposes, Purdue Pharma developed and
aggressively marketed two highly addictive
drugs, MS Contin and Oxycontin, despite inside
knowledge of the dangers of addiction. The
company used hard-sell approaches such as
kickbacks to doctors who prescribed the drugs.
When the addiction risks began to be noted,
the company denied or downplayed them. Even
after paying a large fine and incurring criminal
convictions in 2007, the company continued its
relentless and reckless policies of pushing the
addictive medicines onto unsuspecting patients.
In early 2019, it has begun talk of entering
bankruptcy to protect the assets against future
lawsuits.
Second, the beverage industry has strenuously
resisted responsibility or regulation for the
obesogenic risks of sugar-based sodas. It has
fought relentlessly against sugar taxes aimed to
induce consumers to buy less expensive, safer
beverages. And when one city, San Francisco,
imposed a mandatory warning on sugar-based
beverages (“Drinking beverages with added
sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and
tooth decay. This is a message from the City and
County of San Francisco.”), the American Beverage
Association and other plaintiffs successfully sued
San Francisco. In a ruling that epitomizes the
alarming state of U.S. public policy, the U.S.
Court of Appeals found that the mandatory
warning was an infringement of commercial free
speech under the First Amendment. (U.S. Court
of Appeals, 2019)
Third, processed food industry leaders, such
as Heinz Kraft, have strenuously resisted claims
that highly processed foods are obesogenic,
contributory to metabolic disease, and in need
of regulation. Instead, the industry has mocked
these warnings. In a highly noted and publicized
advertisement during the 2019 Super Bowl, for
example, the Heinz Kraft subsidiary Devour
Foods indeed mocks food addiction by glorifying
it instead. In the Devour Foods Super Bowl ad, an
alluring young woman declares, “My boyfriend

has an addiction,” showing the boyfriend gobbling
up his food. (In the uncensored version of the ad,
she declares that the addiction is “to frozen-food
porn.”) She implies that she tried to lure him
away from the food through spiced-up sex, but
notes of the food, “It’s hard to resist.” The ad
ends with the message: “Never just eat. Devour.”
The list of corporate recklessness in the U.S. goes
on and on, and now especially implicates the
tech industry as well, which has played no
constructive role to date in addressing the
alarming trends of adolescent screen time and
the ensuing depressive disorders described by
Twenge (2019) in this volume. As every major
study of Facebook has shown, the company is
duplicitous in use of personal data, relentlessly
focused on its bottom line, and steadfastly
dismissive of the dire consequences emanating
from the use of its product and services.

Policy Implications
The U.S. has had, by now, two startling wake-up
calls: back to back years of falling life expectancy
and declining measured subjective well-being.
Major studies have documented the rising suicide
rates and substance misuse. Psychologists have
been decrying the apparently soaring rates of
addictive disorders and seemingly associated
mental disorders, including major depressive
disorders and a range of anxiety disorders.
Measured subjective well-being has declined
during the past 10 years, and there are reasons
to believe that the sheer scale of addictive
disorders is probably implicated by this decline
in SWB, though studies have not yet made that
definitive link.
A public policy response built around well-being
rather than corporate profits would place the
rising addiction rates under intensive and urgent
scrutiny, and would design policies to respond to
these rising challenges.
Such responses would perhaps begin with the
following types of measures:
(1)	Stringent regulations of the prescription drug
industry, and a much tougher crackdown on
companies like Purdue Pharma that knowingly
contribute to massive substance abuse;

(2)	Urgent and honest public reflection and
debate on the sociology of addiction
epidemics, noting the role of high and rising
income inequality in unleashing addictions;
(3)	A rapid scale up of publicly financed mental
health services for addiction, anxiety and
mood disorders;
(4)	Strong and effective regulations to limit
advertising and to enforce warning messages
regarding addictive products and activities,
including digital technologies, obesogenic
foods, lotteries and gambling activities;
(5)	Stringent restrictions of advertising to young
children and adolescents of potentially
harmful products and activities;
(6)	Mindfulness programs in schools to help
children to avoid the lures of substance and
behavioral addictions.
Longer-term measures would include public
policies to reduce stress levels in society, including
greater job and healthcare security, reduced
inequalities of income and wealth, healthier
work-life balance, and greater integration of
health and well-being programs in work, schools
and communities. Many of these programs,
and the demonstrably beneficial effects, are
described in the Global Happiness and Well-being
Policy Report 2019 (SDSN, 2019).
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